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Preface 
For the past eight years, senior students from Glendon College, 
York University have been committed to a very unique and innovative 
annual conference project. This student-led initiative has become a well-
respected tradition at Glendon College, entailing, each year, the study of 
a particular country or region of the world chosen by the students. For 
the academic year 2002-2003, our Student Committee chose Russia as 
the theme for this project. 
Indisputably, Russia has baffled its citizens and foreigners alike 
throughout the twists and turns of its tumultuous history. In the past one 
hundred years, the Russian people have experienced a revolution, two 
world wars, seven decades of communist rule, and an ideological 
confrontation with the West. In 1991, the Russian Federation emerged as 
one of the fifteen 'new' nations, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
During the past twelve years, this country has faced immense challenges 
in transforming itself from an 'authoritarian' regime, with a centrally 
planned economy, into a ' free-market ' democracy. Today, Russia is the 
larges·• country in the world, a major political player in the global arena, 
and a state with immense economic potential. Russia possesses 
prodigious natural resources, a key geopolitical position as a bridge 
between Europe and Asia, and international influence as one of the major 
powers. Given Russia's importance on the world stage, it is critical to 
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understand where Russia stands today and where it is headed in the 
future. 
Having this in mind, we decided to commemorate Russia by 
hosting an International Symposium entitled "Russia: The Challenge of 
Change", which took place on March 1, 2003 at Glendon College. Our 
Committee now proudly presents in this work the proceedings of this 
conference along with some of our essays. 
In this text, a number of challenges that Russia is subject to are 
examined. Contributors to the first section examine the interactions 
between tradition and reform in the Russian historical experience. In the 
second section, political and economic issues are examined, specifically 
problems associated with building a democratic state and a market 
economy. Contributors to the third section comment on Russia's external 
affairs, namely Russia-Canada relations, her role on the international 
scene, and current trends in her foreign policy. 
We hope this will contribute to a better understanding of 
Russia' s internal and foreign affairs, while stimulating further discussion 
on the possible directions Russia may take in the future. Moreover, we 
would like this discussion to contribute to the strengthening of Canada-
Russia relations. But most importantly, we would like Russia to take the 
path that best provides peace, stability, and prosperity for the future of 
her people. 
Carlos Canales and Lilly A. Lo Manto 
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Foreword 
Glendon College's founding Principal was Escott Reid. Rhodes 
Scholar, former high commissioner to India and ambassador to Western 
Germany, Reid was one of the artisans of Canada's post World War 11 
foreign policy. Within his vision, Glendon College was to be devoted to 
preparing Canadians for public service. It was for this reason that the 
college was made a fully bilingual campus: all graduates were to be 
competent in Canada's second official language. For, reflecting Reid's 
own experience and preoccupations, the notion of public affairs involved 
international as well as domestic matters. 
Au fil des ans, l'enseignement bilingue en sciences sociales et 
lettres de Glendon a mene bon nombre d'etudiants a jouer un role de 
premier plan au niveau des relations internationales. On compte panni 
nos anciens et anciennes trois ambassadeurs du Canada, un Secretaire-
General-adjoint (Amnistie internationale), des economistes de reputation 
internationale, ainsi que beaucoup d'autres personnes de haut calibre 
occupant ou ayant occupe des postes d'importance a l'echelle mondiale. 
Notre programme d'etudes internationales exerce une influence 
preponderante dans la preparation des etudiants de Glendon a la vie 
publique internationale. Pluridisciplinaire, ce programme s'appui sur 
!'ensemble des ressources du College pour offrir une formation unique 
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dans les deux langues officielles du Canada et ce, dans le domaine des 
etudes internationales. 
One of the programs most remarkable achievements is the 
organization by its students of annual conferences. This is the eighth 
such conference. The topics of previous conferences were, in 
chronological order: Cuba, China, South Africa, the European Union, the 
Middle East, South East Asia, Brazil, and Russia. In most instances, the 
conferences have been followed by visits to the region in question. The 
students have already chosen the theme for next year's conference: India. 
So, as Principal of Glendon, I am delighted to declare open the 
conference on "Russia: The Challenge of Change- Russie: Le deft d'une 
metamorphose" 
Professor Kenneth McRoberts 
Principal of Glendon College, York University 
Section 1 
Can Russia Change? 

Can Russia Be Reformed? 
Professor Robert Johnson, University of Toronto 
I've entitled my remarks today "Can Russia Be Reformed?" The 
fast and dirty answer to this question - what might be called the Bill 
Clinton answer- is: 'Define reform'. I'm going to argue that the entire 
history of Russia from the earliest times can be viewed as the history of 
reform - of almost incessant, deliberate efforts to alter institutions, 
habits, cultures, modes of governance. Indisputably, Ivan IV's 
Oprichnina was a reform, as were the Westernization program of Peter I, 
the agricultural collectivization and industrialization drive of the 1930s, 
the .Khrushchev post-Stalin 'Thaw' , the Brezhnev counter-Thaw, and the 
Y eltsin constitution of 1993. 
This doesn't mean, however, that all those efforts were 
successful or instrumental or that they achieved the results for which 
they were designed. A quick overview of some of the more spectacular 
reform efforts of past ages will, I think, suggest some lessons or cautions 
for present and future reformers. 
The Westernization of Peter I is a good place to begin, not least 
because its most tangible manifestation, the city that bears Peter's name, 
is celebrating its three hundredth anniversary, this year. Peter's 
accomplishments are reflected today in the canals of St. Petersburg, the 
Italianate palaces, the broad boulevards, the manufacturing and 
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commerce of one of the world's great cities. Foreigners make a beeline 
for the Hermitage, with its spectacular collection of mostly western 
European art. Most westerners have heard the legends of how Peter 
shaved off the beards of traditionalists, how he travelled to Amsterdam to 
learn carpentry and navigation, how he introduced Western modes of 
dress and behaviour to his country. And, of course, how he defeated most 
of his enemies and enlarged his country's borders. 
What we hear less about is how these results were achieved, at 
what price. If we look for Peter's legacy in the mines of the Ural 
mountains or in the serf-powered agricultural estates of central Russia, if 
we could excavate beneath the palaces to find the skeletons of all the 
involuntary laborers who died while building Peter's city in the muddy 
swamp of the Neva's estuary, we get a different picture. Peter reformed 
Russia by using the tools and materials that were closest at hand, and 
these were mainly tools of coercion. I don't mean to suggest that Russia 
was unique in taxing and coercing its subjects, or that there are no 
skeletons beneath Paris or London. But it seems to me that there is a 
paradox to Peter's reforms that often goes unnoticed: In making Russia 
more 'modern' and western, Peter also reinforced its most traditional 
and, if you will, backward features. The serfs who made up the vast 
majority of his country's population ended up more exploited, more 
tightly bound to their masters and their duties and their social station, 
than they had been before Peter's reign. In an age when serfdom was 
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fading away in much of western Europe, Peter consolidated and 
solidified it, and it endured for almost 150 years after his death. 
Can we draw a conclusion? A Reform, it seems, comes at a price 
that isn't always recognized or remembered. In Peter's case, it left a 
legacy of problems (of serfdom and related oppression) that in the long 
run held Russia back, and ultimately worked against the very 
westernization that Peter was trying to implement. 
The next reform, I would like to address is the one Russians 
traditionally referred to as the 'Great Reform' -the package of changes 
introduced early in the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), foremost 
am'ong them the emancipation of the serfs. This is another story that will 
be familiar to most readers, and in some ways it is a story of success. 
More than one writer has noted the contrast between Russia, where 
emancipation was achieved with a minimum of social disruption and 
bloodshed, and the United States, where slavery was ended only after a 
fratricidal Civil War that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Russia's 
emancipation, moreover, was part of a package of reforms that also 
created new, representative institutions of local government (the 
'zemstvo') and liberalized the judiciary, military service, censorship, 
urban administration, higher education, and many other areas of political 
and economic life. 
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What isn't always appreciated, however, is that virtually all of 
these reforms produced results that the tsar and his ministers had not 
anticipated. Perhaps, the most dramatic example came at the trial of the 
radical populist V era Zasulich for attempting to assassinate a prominent 
police official in 1878. Under the newly-reformed court procedures, her 
lawyers used the public trial as a forum for denouncing repressive police 
practices, and the jury - another innovation - acquitted Zasulich. From 
that point onward, Russian police agencies tried to bypass the courts and 
rely more upon extra-judicial methods of investigation and punishment. 
If they couldn't undo the reform, they did their best to circumvent it. 
In later years other reforms of the early 1860s, such as the 
'zemstvo' and university statutes, were formally reversed by counter-
reforms. Peasant emancipation was fully implemented, but did not 
produce the economic or social stability that its architects had intended. 
Peasants resented the fact that they were obliged to repay the state, over a 
period of 49 years, for the land they received under emancipation. 
Another source of discontent was that their former lords retained control 
of large tracts of land. The peasant commune, which the reformers had 
considered a source of social stability, eventually became a nucleus for 
resistance and social unrest. 
Does this mean that the 'Great Reform' was ill-conceived or 
unrealizable? I don't think so. What it does suggest, however, is that any 
reform is likely to take on a life of its own, producing unexpected results. 
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The object of reform is almost always a product of previous history, 
which will help to condition the reform's outcomes. Let me say this more 
concretely: The Russian countryside in 1861 was not a blank slate on 
which Alexander 11 and his ministers could write whatever they chose. 
Emancipation was an interactive process, in which the life that peasants 
had led under serfdom helped define the range of possible 
transformations. 
The final decades of Romanov rule saw a still different array of 
reform initiatives, aimed at strengthening capitalist tendencies. These 
were associated with the names of two of the most prominent officials of 
the time, Sergius Witte and Petr Sto1ypin. Today, a hundred years later, 
both of these have become the object of much attention in Russia as 
representatives of 'alternatives' that could have taken Russia down a 
different path. 
Witte served as Minister of Finance through most of the 1890s. 
He is credited with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway and 
with a spurt of economic growth that had few equals anywhere in the 
world at that time. Because of time constraints, I can only mention a few 
key points in his career and reform strategy: 1) He recognized that Russia 
could not move forward by mechanically copying the policies of other 
industrial powers; instead he relied on a combination of high tariffs, 
active state intervention, and foreign investment; 2) the Trans-Siberian 
railroad was designed to enable Russia to expand its economic influence 
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in China and the North Pacific region, where it could compete more 
effectively with the other European Great Powers of the day; 3) although 
he strongly opposed going to war against Japan, that disastrous war 
(1904-1905) was almost a direct outcome of his policies, in an indirect 
way, those same policies brought Russia into alliance with France and 
Britain, helping to pave the way to her disastrous involvement in the 
First World War; 4) his career was cut short when he lost the tsar's 
confidence - one feature of the Old Regime that was outside his power to 
change. Conclusions? Reforms are more likely to succeed when they are 
addressed to the specific circumstances and opportunities of a historical 
moment, without mechanically following a recipe from some other time 
and place. Reform is, however, a complex process whose outcomes 
cannot always be anticipated, or whose unwelcome outcomes cannot be 
prevented. 
What about Stolypin? You may remember that he supported a 
program of land reform, based on the introduction of private ownership 
to the communally-organized peasantry. By the best estimates, roughly 
25% of the peasants in the Empire underwent some kind of 
reorganization of their holdings, BUT 1) Stolypin lost the tsar' s favor, 
and was assassinated by a terrorist before his program really took hold. 
2) Historians today give the Stolypin program credit mainly for the ways 
in which it departed from its original agenda and adapted to peasant 
wishes and needs - an adaptation that was not Stolypin's work. 3) In 
1917, as the Bolsheviks were coming to power, peasants throughout the 
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empire strongly reasserted their communal instincts, and reversed the 
process of privatization. From then until 2002, full private ownership of 
land has not existed in Russia. The new Land Code passed last year is 
still being contested. In sum, the Stolypin experience suggests that 
reforms are more effective when they are flexible and responsive to 
circumstances. But unless an environment is favourable a program of 
reform can be reversed overnight. 
Arguably the most ambitious and least successful reform of the 
Soviet era was agricultural collectivization. The campaign that Stalin 
inaugurated at the end of the 1920s shows a particular kind of hubris - of 
a set of leaders who thought that Marxism gave them a recipe for 
defeating class enemies and building a socialist future. The system that 
they built has been criticized not just for the enormous loss of life and 
resources that went into its construction, but also for the economic 
inefficiencies that plagued it from Day 1. Some of collectivization's 
proponents presented the reform as a means of introducing efficiency and 
economies of scale to peasant agriculture, but the inefficiencies of the 
kolkhoz system persisted to the very end of the Soviet Union. Others saw 
collectivization as a means of extracting an investable surplus from an 
unwilling countryside, but even in this regard it should probably be 
counted a failure: Faced with the disastrous harvests of the early years, 
the Soviet leadership had to divert resources into agriculture that they 
had hoped to use for industrial construction. In later years - the 1960s 
and beyond - agriculture remained a drain on the country's resources, 
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and today the agricultural sector is still waiting for change. 
Collectivization illustrates what Anatolii Vishnevskii has called 
Aconservative modernization - perhaps a modern equivalent of what 
Peter I was seeking 300 years ago. This was an attempt to build a modern 
western and industrial society and economy without replicating the 
human and social infrastructure on which the Amodel societies rested. It 
didn't work. 
The final reform on my list is the Yeltsin constitution of 1993. I 
can remember the debates that went on in that year, and the enthusiasm 
with which many western observers applauded President Yeltsin' s attack 
on the Duma. What exactly was in the minds of the President's advisors I 
can not say, but I have a pretty clear recollection of the terms in which 
the discussion was framed in North America. Yeltsin, in the eyes of 
many westemers, was representing 'democracy' while the Duma 
members, although they had been popularly elected, were perceived as 
enemies of reform. In retrospect, the 1993 reform looks more like a 
response to the exigencies of one moment, based on little analysis of how 
that moment had come about. The result was not so much 'democracy' 
as an 'executive presidency'- a political system in which the President's 
powers are significantly greater than in most parliamentary regimes. 
Yeltsin himself was never wholly successful in using those powers, but 
his successor shows every sign of being able to put this machinery to 
more ambitious uses. Whether the ultimate result will be more 
democratic ones remains, I believe, an open question. 
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Are there overall lessons to this recital? It is tempting to say 
'plus ya change', but I think we can do better than that. Certainly one 
moral is: 'Be careful what you wish for'. Most of the reforms on my list 
have produced at least some unexpected results, and most have carried 
price tags that were not clearly recognized at the time they were 
introduced. 
Another moral, powerfully reinforced by the expenences of 
many other states and nations, is that bigger isn't usually better: the 
grander the scheme, the greater the potential for disaster. The reforms 
that have turned out to be most productive in the long run have usually 
begun with more modest goals and targets, and have been flexible 
enough to change course over time. The more rigidly a program was 
followed, the greater the chance of negative results and unexpected costs. 
In this very brief and truncated presentation, I've been trying to 
toss out some ideas and problems that will help you to think about the 
topics that follow on today's agenda- reforms that have been attempted 
in the past few years, or are still being contemplated. I am tempted to 
conclude with a well-known quotation from Marx: "Men make their own 
history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing". I think, though, 
that Mick Jagger said it more succinctly: "You can't always get what you 
want, but if you try try try, you may sometimes get what you need". 

Who Drives The Troika? 
Professor Sergei Plekhanov, York University 
As the conference brochure reminds us, Nikolai Gogol, writing a 
century and a half ago, compared Russia with a troika: a three-horse 
carriage rolling fast across the roadless, boundless, windswept Russian 
prairie - the steppe. "Oh, troika, birdlike troika, who has invented you? -
he wrote. Only a very bold people could have created you in a land 
which does things in a big way and which has spread forth half around 
the world ... The driver is not wearing some German boots- no, he's all 
beard and mittens, and he sits hell knows on what - but watch him get 
up, crack his whip, start his long song - and the horses shoot forward, the 
spokes in the wheels become smooth discs, and the pedestrian shrieks in 
fright- and there it flies! 
Isn't it also you, Russia that is speeding forward like a 
boisterous, winning troika? Smoke clouds at your feet, bridges roll, and 
everything lags behind and stays in the past ... What is the meaning of 
this horrifying movement? What mysterious force is hidden in these 
incredible horses? ... Where are you flying, Russia, answer me? .. No, she 
won't answer". 1 
This is an interesting comparison - especially if we recall that it 
described Russia in the middle of the 191h century, when the Europeans 
saw her, under the iron rule of Nicholas I, as a static, conservative, 
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backward empire. Challenging this perception, and as if foreseeing the 
great upheavals ahead, Gogol pictured Russia as a country moving 
forward at great speed -but without a clear sense of where it is headed. 
Sixteen years ago, when a young, confident, powerful General 
Secretary of the CPSU urged a stony-faced congress of his party to get 
Russia moving to catch up with the West, the main doubt was whether 
any serious, fundamental changes were at all possible in the enormous, 
inert bureaucratic empire built under the red flag. No one could imagine 
how much was to change. And the dominant discourse about Russia in 
these sixteen years has been dominated by the theme of incredible, earth-
shaking, historic transformations - from communism to capitalism, from 
authoritarianism to democracy, from empire to nation-state, from atheism 
to revival of religion. 
But after all these great transformations, one is left wondering 
whether Russia has become more like the West or more like its own 
traditional self. Look at the symbolic side. The Westernized Russia flies 
the tricolour flag of Peter the Great and wears the Byzantian state 
emblem with its double eagle, holy cross and scepter, 1,500 years old, 
with the superimposed old coat of arms of Muscovy, the Third Rome, 
500 years old. While old churches are being restored and many new ones 
are being built, the Russian Army gets back its red flag and red star, and 
the new national anthem is the old Soviet one, with modified words, of 
course. 
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But is it a problem if Russia has revived its traditions while it 
was remaking itself in the Western image? Isn't it a measure of a 
country's inner strength and self-confidence if it adopts new and foreign 
ideas and practices creatively, grafting them on without damaging the 
native stem? Unfortunately, this is not exactly how we Russians do 
things - and the question is why. 
Every country periodically has to deal with the challenge of 
change in one from or another. Some countries cope with the challenge 
by gradually modifying, reforming existing institutions in line with the 
changed circumstances. Others fail at reform and carry out the changes 
through the destruction of the existing order, chaos, and subsequent 
rebuilding. Looking back on the century which has seen more 
revolutions than any other, the story of Russian communism being at the 
center of it all - both in 1917 and in 1991 - a century which has 
celebrated revolution as the locomotive of history, it is easy to become a 
skeptic about revolutionary means. Indeed, evolution, carefully designed 
reform is obviously the preferred method, as human society is essentially 
organic, not mechanical. It is a persuasive argument that a revolution is a 
tragedy, a catastrophe, a form of cruel and unusual punishment- or an 
unaffordable luxury, if you will. As the ancient Chinese curse put it, 
'May you live in interesting times'. 
As a Russian, I have lived through incredibly interesting times, 
taking part in the Soviet reform process, and then in the revolutionary 
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events which culminated m the collapse of the Soviet system. I've 
experienced an intoxicating sense of liberation after the defeat of the 
hardline coup in August of 1991 - but that sense was mixed with deep 
anxiety about the consequences of 'destroying a state': we can not live 
without a state, how can we rebuild it? Looking back at what happened 
next, I conclude that by failing at gradual, evolutionary transformation of 
the old order, and by opting to go through the agony of destruction 
followed by chaos, followed by the beginning of a very difficult 
recovery, Russia has remained true to its old self. 
Among the 27 countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, those that have been transformed along Western lines with 
relatively more success and at relatively less cost, are those where 
elements of the Western model were already in place- market economy, 
civil society, political pluralism. For the Czechs or the Hungarians, the 
logic of the market economy and the language of civil society are 
familiar, traditional things. What it means is that large numbers of people 
in such a society have at their disposal the mechanisms, the knowledge, 
and the habits to participate in the process of change. And the wider the 
active community, the more circumspect the rulers, the more consensual 
the decision-making, the more concern about the costs of change. 
The Russian traditions are different, of course. The main agency 
of change in Russia has always been the state, not the people. If the 
people do become politically active, it is usually to protest against the 
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actions of the state, or to overthrow the state altogether. The people do 
have strong democratic values - but they don't have much chance to 
practice them in day-to-day political life. Contemporary Russia is 
marked by a sense of remarkable disappointment with politics as a 
meaningful, effective citizen action. This leaves the government quite 
free to govern as it sees fit - but at the same time quite limited in its 
ability to affect what goes on in society. Russia demonstrates, albeit in 
new forms, traditional alienation between the rulers and the ruled. The 
rulers, instinctively preferring command to consultation, issue orders, 
which regularly fail to be implemented. The people feign obedience, a 
time-tested survival technique, while doing everything possible to do 
things their own way. In the past, this mutual alienation has not 
prevented the people and the rulers from coming together strongly in 
cases of war - but it has arguably been a major cause of the chronic 
inefficiency of the institutions of civilian life. 
The way Russia was transformed in the 1990s was deeply 
traditional: a top-down, elite-driven overhaul of social relations with 
society's role being that of a mostly passive object, raw material for the 
new system - and the bearer of the huge costs of change. The reformers 
had a program, and the personality of Boris Yeltsin symbolized a 
determination to implement it quickly, at all costs, overcoming resistance 
by all means available. It has been aptly termed 'Market Bolshevism' .2 In 
the early nineties, Russian debates on the speed of change were 
conducted in the form of discussing the question: "Which is the more 
20 Sergei Plekhanov 
humane way of chopping off a eat's tail- bit by bit, or in one chop?" In 
late 1990s, cruelty to animals was criminalized in Russia, but the poor 
cat had already suffered. In China, reformers also used the eat's image to 
make their point, but in a markedly different way: "It doesn't matter 
what colour is the cat, so long as it catches the mice". 
Russian Westemizers, as well as many W estem champions of 
Russia's recent reforms, have bemoaned Russia's resistance to the 
reform project. But actually, the reforms of the past decade have revealed 
a strong convergence between the neoliberal orthodoxy, with its 
insistence on the liberation of market forces, and the authoritarian 
traditions of the Russian state. The orthodoxy could only be enforced in 
Russia by authoritarian means. And the Russian elites have benefited 
from the process so massively - at the expense of the masses of citizens 
- that one almost begins to suspect that the so-called 'Washington 
consensus' was drafted in the Kremlin, not in Washington. 
These days, Russia finds itself in a conservative pause after a 
decade and a half of exhausting changes. The troika is tired. The country 
looks more stable and less disorderly. But few would venture to say that 
a sustainable new political-economic system is already in place in 
Russia. The new system is still an unfinished product, a mix of old and 
new elements that works in some areas and is deeply dysfunctional in 
others. More changes are inevitable. And the crucial question is what 
role Russian citizens will play in the changes, which are bound to come. 
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It is hard to imagine them remaining in the role of passive onlookers and 
patient followers of the elites. Russian society is only beginning to adapt 
to the new conditions in which it finds itself. The Russians have political 
and civic freedoms on a scale historically unprecedented for Russia- and 
the harsh challenges of the market economy force them to defend their 
interests as best they can. 
In Gogol's troika, the people are obviously in the role of the 
horses. Perhaps, Russia will have a better sense of where it is going- and 
become more predictable, - when its people, at long last, assume the role 
of the driver. 
I would like to conclude with a few quotes from the politicians 
of the new Russia. They evoke the memory of the great Russian satirist, 
Saltykov- Shchedrin, whose portraits of Russian officialdom, drawn in 
the middle of the 19th century, look as if they had been painted today. 
Here is a sampling of Russian politicians' tribute to the great satirise 
Alexander Zaveryukha, Minister of Agriculture, Feb. 1994: 
"Russia must feed its farmers". 
Sergei Kalashnikov, Minister of Labour, July 2000: 
"In 1999, we have managed to reduce the numbers of pensioners by 
nearly 700,000 people". 
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Ilya Klebanov, Minister of Defence Industry, Oct. 1999: 
"The defence industry is not any different from the bicycle industry, 
because bicycles have always been produced by the defence industry". 
Yuri Maslyukov, Vice Prime Minister, Mar. 1999, in response to the 
question about the amount of money Russia received from the IMF: 
"This is a great secret, because even I don't know exactly how much". 
Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, May 1999: 
"The improvement of the people's life, which has been achieved at the 
expense of the sharp fall of their living standards, will continue to 
advance". 
Alexander Shokhin, MP, April 2000 
"We must move back from the brink of the abyss at the bottom of which 
we find ourselves". 
Yegor Stroev, Speaker of the Russian Federation Council, Jan. 1999: 
"Who is saying this? Today, people talk too much. Me, I prefer to listen 
to those who don't say anything". 
Vladimir Ustinov, Prosecutor General, Nov. 2001: 
"Every lawbreaker works in a specific government ministry". 
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Yegor Stroev, Speaker of the Russian Federation Council, Sept. 2000: 
"There are many intelligent people in the Federation Council today, but 
the public has many doubts as to how they got there". 
Vladimir Potanin, banker, April 1999: 
"A businessman doesn't know himself what is profitable for him. The 
government must give him some kind of guidance". 
Ivan Anichkin, MP, Oct. 1999: 
"Of two evils, we choose the best and most real". 
A communist speaker at a rally, Nov. 1996: 
"God is with us, comrades!" 
Notes 
1 N. V. Gogol. Mertvye dushi,- in: N.V.Gogol, Sobranie khudozhestvennykh 
proizvedenii v pyati tomakh, tom V, s. 355-356. ("Dead Souls", excerpt 
translated into English by S.Plekhanov). 
2 Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia 's Reforms: Market 
Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, DC: The United State Institute of 
Peace, 2001) 34. The expression was coined by Georgi Arbatov, Director of the 
Institute of USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, in a 1992 article 
published in the International Herald Tribune. 
Zemistye mysli nashikh politikov, vybrannye Konstantinom Dushenko, 
M. Eksmo- Press, 2002. 

Cracking the Enigma Code: Russia's Usable Past 
Professor Richard Pope, York University 
The question has been asked: Can Russia Change? As we have 
seen in today' s conference presentations, Russia has already changed 
amazingly and unimaginably, and it will continue to do so. How it will 
change is the question, and whether it will change for the better or worse. 
There has always been great interest in this 'quo vadis' theme, 
especially among Russians themselves: a nation obsessed from earliest 
times with history and destiny and a sense of moving towards some great 
goal. But nobody knows where the famous troika is flying. Certainly in 
1991 nobody predicted its course. Like Gogol's mad Poprishchin at the 
end of his 'Diary of a Madman', we all simply stood in wonder and 
gawked. 
Let us leave aside what E.H. Carr calls "the teleological view of 
history" and all postulates of some "goal towards which the historical 
process is moving", 1 as well as any ideas that history is progressive or 
has discernible laws, behaving 'zakonomerno' with popularity. 
Let us also grudgingly agree that history does not actually repeat 
itself, though at times it seems to, and that history does not teach any 
clear lessons that can be applied to the future. As Liudmila Jordanova 
points out, in History in Practice, it is simplistic to think "that 
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unambiguous lessons from history exist, which provide simple formulae 
according to which present policies can and should be formulated". 
How, then, can we profit from Russian history? What is Russia's 
'usable past?' How should we approach Russia with an eye to the future? 
Churchill famously described Soviet foreign policy as "a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma". Russia has been notoriously 
difficult for the West to understand. There is a sense, even among 
Russians, of Russia being special and ununderstandable. As the poet 
Tiutchev, put it, "the proud gaze of the foreigner will never understand . 
Russia" (Ne poimet I ne zametit/ Gordyi vzor inoplemennyi). 
Many special problems compound the difficulty: i.e, the problem 
of ' pokazukha' and the Potemkin village; a 1000-year tradition of 
Church and State censorship; and a startling tradition of falsification of 
history, as the opening of the Soviet archives is making only too clear. 
We are dealing with a state that has devoted enormous energy to hiding 
its true face from outsiders itself (i.e, the futurist travel agency set up to 
keep foreigners from seeing the real Russia and Russia from seeing the 
rest of the world). 
So, how can we crack the enigma code? 
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It is, of course, nai"ve to think we can predict how a people or a 
country will act, react, or change. But we can study how it has reacted in 
various situations in the past, examine the pressures that shaped those 
reactions, and then bear them in mind as possible parts of the equation 
when analyzing the present or trying to make educated guesses about the 
future. 
Russia is currently fluid, volatile, vital, but it is not a 
'tabularasa'. Where Russia is going will surely be influenced by where it 
has been. So, the question is not just where is Russia going, but where 
has she been? Where is Russia coming from? 
Let us examine some of the constants that have been shaping 
forces affecting change in Russia's past, that may be affecting her 
present, and that could influence and/or shape Russia's unknowable 
future. 
Factors that May Influence Russia's Future Course: 
1. Consider the concept of 'smuta' - rebellion, agitation, 
disturbance, disorder, alarm, anxiety, the key ingredients of times of 
trouble ('smutnye vremena'). The Russian people have had a recurring 
confrontation with times of trouble beginning in the ninth century (862), 
when, as the oldest Russian chronicle, The Tale of Bygone Years, tells us, 
there was fratricidal strife and civil war as tribe rose against tribe. 
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The period, actually called the 'Times of Troubles', took place 
after the collapse of the Riurik dynasty. 1605-13 was a period of civil 
war, hunger, famine, cannibalism, brigandage, foreign intervention, 
murders, and pretenders. Dark forces were rampant. 
The period after the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, 1917-21, 
was not all that different - civil war, chaos, madness, complete moral 
collapse, terror, bloody violence, population upheaval, refugees. There 
was an apocalyptic sense of Armageddon. 
After the collapse of the Soviet dynasty, people took to the 
streets. So did tanks. At one point the White House, the Russian 
parliament building, was on fire. There was a breakdown of law and 
order - the hallmark of a time of trouble - corrupt police, rampant crime 
and corruption, collapse of the social net and the ruble, and people were 
confused about who had the power - the President or the local 
governors? Who were the oligarchs? Who controls the military? 'Kto 
kogo' (who will get whom)? 
Should we have foreseen anything differently from what 
happened in Russia since 1991 , with the exception that they avoided the 
kind of civil war that occured in the break-up of Yugoslavia? Should we 
have expected orderly change? Or can we see what happened as 'part of 
a continuum' , a recurring pattern, a 'smuta': with the typical spread of 
the moods of pessimism, hopelessness, anger, and alarm as well as the 
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conuption, the sense of chaos ad drift, and the collapse of rationality 
with the usual turn to faith healers, mysticism, astrology and the occult to 
fill spiritual void? 
2. Because of their familiarity with 'smuta' , the Russian people 
have a deep-seated fear of chaos and civil war above all . Perhaps the 
central theme of Russian literature and art, from the Igor Tale to 
Pelevin 's Chapaev i Pustota is ' smuta' and the attempt to make sense out 
of it. 
From Mongol times, this fear of chaos has been accompanied by 
a willingness to submit to a 'krepkity khoziain' - a strong boss. The 
condemnation of princely weakness and squabbling was already a theme 
in the eleventh-century Life of Boris and Gleb. The absolutist lesson of 
the Mongol Khan was not subsequently lost on the likes of I van Ill, I van 
IV, Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin. The enduring desire to feel "that someone 
above ... is firmly in charge"2 has been repeatedly exploited in the past. 
Why might it not be exploited now in a period of insecurity, war, 
and social collapse? Democratic institutions in Russia have always been 
ill-fated: the 'veche', the 'boyar duma', the 'zemskii sobor' , the 'Duma' 
of 1905. The Tartar model of absolutism has always had stronger 
resonance. Tsar' Boris Y elsin, as you may have noticed, had a tendency 
to impose democracy from the top down by ' ukaz' . Top-down 
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imposition of market reform, 'Market Bolshevism', has been much in 
evidence since 1991. 
Putin is no closet democrat. He likes to impose his will on the 
Russian people. He has surrounded himself almost exclusively with 
career bureaucrats, who owe their positions to patronage, rather than 
popular mandate. He is no friend of open media and free speech. His 
KGB background has shaped him. He recently had Stalin included 
among the war heroes in a Kremlin plaque. And yet he is popular 
because of his black belt, power skiing, and perceived strength. Here we 
see the Russian people' s tendency to forgive excesses in exchange for 
order and hoped-for prosperity. It would be vain to predict it, but further 
moves in this direction, if they come, should come as no surprise. 
3. Russia, like all absolutist states, has no history of respect for 
the law; no Magna Carta, no constitution, no laws that bound even the 
leader, no history of power-sharing, no empowering of the commons. 
The leader has always been above the law. Few would argue Putin is 
accountable now. Russian leaders have governed by 'ukaz', not 'zakon'. 
It is still difficult to get justice in Russian courts, especially if you are an 
environmentalist, foreign capitalist, or a relative of a Nord-Ost hostage 
crisis gassing victim. 
But why should we expect respect for law and tolerance of 
dissent to appear overnight in Russia? Russia has always had a tradition 
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of harsh repression of dissent: from lvan and his 'oprichnina' to the 
'Cheka' and the CPSU. 
Putin's moves to suppress the media and free speech are hardly 
surprising from someone accustomed to an age-old tradition of harsh 
censorship. Even Gorbachev's famous 'glasnost' was limited, as 
Chernobyl made clear. Putin's slow strangling of the media and move 
towards a pre-glasnost position is almost to be expected. 
4. The strength of Russian nationalism and the hallowing of 
tradition can hardly be over estimated. The belief in Rus' and the 
'rodina' (native land) and the 'russkaia dusha' (Russian soul), the belief 
that Russia has the true faith, the idea that Russia is for Russians and the 
minorities should be Russified, the romantic/sentimental belief in the 
superiority of the 'narod' (the people)- these are all well-known parts of 
a potent myth. As we know, Stalin, who was not even a Russian, 
understood this well. 
Is it surprising that Putin approved of resurrecting the music of 
the Soviet national anthem and the use of the Red flag by the Russian 
army (that he tolerates the Stalin cult) or that he wages war on 
Chechnya? Not if we believe that myth affects contemporary choices. 
And if it doesn't, just why did the Russians do such things as: rebuild the 
mighty cathedral, Khram Khrista- Spasitelya, exactly where and as it was 
before Stalin dynamited it; or go back to the name St. Petersburg and all 
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the pre-Revolutionary street names; or restore the Throne Room in the 
Kremlin, as Yeltsin had Putin do? This can all be seen as more than a 
mere attempt to reconnect with the beneficial side of tradition. In Russia, 
the importance of traditions transcends the merely symbolic and 
instigat~s action. 
The Russian president, for example, gambled on the Second 
Chechen War to divert hostility on the homefront in tough times, to 
awaken nationalism, foment patriotism, and to increase his popularity, 
just as Nicholas 11 did with the 'short victorious war' against Japan. 
Russia has a history of foreign adventurism in tough economic/political 
times. 
Among other things, the powers that be counted on Russia's age-
old hostility to 'others ' , her distrust of the alien, and fear of the strange. 
To the Russian peasant, everything outside his natal village was chuzhoi 
(strange, alien), even the next village was alien and to be feared. 
Hostility was expected from all who were different. Above all, foreigners 
were to be feared: the Khazars, the Polovtsians, the Mongols, the 
Germans, the Chinese, the Caucasian hillsmen. It is no surprise that so 
many Russians supported the Second Chechen War. 
5. Should it surprise us that the anti-war movement in Russia is 
so small? Or that Russians are not out in the streets protesting against the 
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invasion of Iraq? Or that they are not at the polling booths in huge 
numbers? 
Many Russians are cynical and of little faith that they can 
influence the course of events. There is no robust civil society yet. But 
then for centuries the gap between rulers and ruled was unspannable. 
'Rus' and 'Rossiia' were contrasting cultural poles, at times coexisting in 
complete isolation one from the other with little in the middle. Is this not 
a cause of the current deep alienation among Russians? 
In a memoir in 1994, Y eltsin claimed that he eliminated the 
'seemingly endless gulf between ordinary Russians and their 
government. Sadly he was wrong. Politicians can still get elected without 
building a constituency and enduring grilling by citizens and an 
aggressive press; there is little accountability. Civil rights can be eroded 
almost without protest. Citizens feel disempowered and that they have 
little control over change. Civil society is undermined by authoritarian 
tendency and the age-old gap between the leaders and the led. Anyone 
expecting the Russian people to quickly play a decisive role in directing 
Russia's future path will probably be disappointed. Civil disobedience, 
democracy, and accountability may come, but not quickly. Sergei 
Plekhanov feels that the role of the people in charge is inevitable: "It is 
hard to imagine the Russian people remaining in the role of passive 
onlookers and patient followers." I hope he is right and I am wrong. 
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One thinks of the Russian people's legendary silent obedience 
and passivity, the despair of the populist revolutionaries. The people's 
strong democratic values were a myth. Here, we have a people, for the 
better part of a millennium, isolated in the countryside, oppressed by the 
tyranny of work, poverty, and the influence of the village commune; a 
people whose religion stressed the redemptive value of suffering, non-
resistance to evil, and acceptance of God's will; a people resistant to 
change, who placed great value on tradition and had a naive belief in 
their leader as benevolent, but misinformed. Should we expect a robust 
civil society to emerge quickly among a people thus formed? Should it 
surprise us that according to most recent polls the people have little faith 
in elections and only a small minority support democracy? 
6. When trying to fathom Russia's sometimes-belligerent foreign 
policy, should we not keep in mind Russia's age-old inferiority complex, 
her perceived need to explain her backwardness and lateness, and her 
abiding desire not to appear weak in any way? Now everyone knows that 
Russia cannot feed itself, the housing shortage is still acute, the living 
standard is low, crime is rampant, and the life expectancy is declining. 
Russia has been reduced to washing its dirty linen in public, something it 
rarely does. Humiliation and aggression often go hand in hand in life and 
in politics, particularly Russian politics, and should this not be borne in 
mind lest Western foreign policy needlessly drive Russia into a 
confrontational posture, as it has so often done in the past? 
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Conclusion 
Should we not expect Russia to be influenced by historical 
cultural patterns that have affected here consistently throughout her past? 
I think that we in the West, particularly in North America with its mere 
three or four centuries of tradition, should be keenly aware of the power 
of myth and a millennium of cultural inertia to influence realpolitik, even 
if only to feign sympathetic insight into the difficulties Russia's leaders 
are facing. 
This is the enigma to me: why are our expectations of Russia, 
both present and future, not more firmly based upon the usable past? 
The myths of Russian culture have shaped the "ideas and allegiances of 
Russian politics"3 and foreign policy. There is no reason to think they 
will cease to do so. Russia's past is our main tool for understanding the 
present and possible directions in future. 
Notes 
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2 Hedrick Smith, The Russians, (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book 
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"Oumorit Rossiyou nie poniat ... " 
Professor Anne Leahy, Universite du Quebec a Montreal 
"La raison ne saurait embrasser la Russie, 
Elle ne se mesure pas a l'archine commune; 
Elle est particuliere -
En la Russie, on ne peut que croire. " 
Tioutchev ( 1803-1873) 
Combien de fois ai-je entendu ces vers ceh!bres de Tioutchev au 
cours des annees quatre-vingt-dix lorsque je vivais a Moscou! Le plus 
souvent, ils etaient evoques par des etrangers qui cherchaient a y voir 
clair. On les entendait aussi chez les Russes, qui de leur cote cherchaient 
a faire comprendre leur pays. Ceux-ci se repartissaient, grosso modo, en 
realistes, qui auraient voulu faire mentir Tioutchev en affirmant que «la 
Russie est un pays normal » et en fatalistes et nostalgiques. Ces demiers, 
au contraire, se consolaient aupres du poete a !'intuition que les Russes 
sont uniques. 
Fiodor Ivanovich Tioutchev visait probablement avant tout ses 
propres compatriotes lorsqu'il composa ces vers qui saisissent assurement 
une part de verite. Je crois que la popularite du president actuel de 
Russie, tout pragmatique qu'il soit, tient egalement a cette verite. 11 veut 
redonner a ses compatriotes des raisons de croire en la Russie. Plus 
qu'une simple transformation politique et economique, le deti de la 
metamorphose se situe a ce niveau. 
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Permettez-moi un mot sur Tioutchev. 11 est bien sur poete et 
ecrivain; moins connu est le fait qu'il ait exerce le deuxieme plus vieux 
metier du monde, la diplomatie. Il passa vingt-deux ans a Munich de 
1822 a 1844 avant de rentrer au bercail au ministere des Affaires 
etrangeres a St. Petersbourg. Il a publie plusieurs ouvrages qu'il vaut la 
peine de mentionner tant les preoccupations d'alors sont d'actualite un 
siecle et demi plus tard: "La Russie et l'Allemagne", "La Russie et la 
revolution", "La Russie et l'occident" et "La question de la papaute". 
Tioutchev s'avere done un guide d'experience pour nous qui examinons 
le "Defi de la metamorphose" de la Russie. 
Metamorphose: plus que l'economique et le politique 
Le theme de cette conference a fait l'objet de nombreuses 
analyses, theories et deja de relectures dans cette demiere decennie. 11 est 
facile de regretter les laisses pour compte des reformes, trop vite ou pas 
assez vigoureusement poussees et de deplorer que les vieux demons de la 
corruption regnent en maitre. Au fait, la Russie a-t-elle vraiment change? 
Can Russia morph? pourrait-on se demander sur ce campus bilingue du 
College universitaire Glendon a Toronto. 
Les appreciations de la decennie ecoulee en Russie sont plus ou 
moins severes seton sa conviction que les formules occidentales de 
representation politique, d'implication de la societe, du respect du droit et 
des lois du marche sont transferables a la Russie. La Russie a vecu apres 
1989 une periode marquante de son histoire que certains n'hesitent pas a 
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qualifier de revolution. C'etait certainement au moins une periode de 
"grand derangement", pour reprendre une expression de notre histoire. 
On a observe successivement des dislocations politiques, 
economiques et sociales, un vacuum au centre, une prise en main des 
leviers du pouvoir et eventuellement le recentrage en cours. Beaucoup a 
ete dit sur les politiques suivies par le premier groupe de reformateurs 
autour du president Y eltsine, associe a Y egor Gai'dar. La plus grosse 
faillite de ces reformateurs, les neo-liberaux du style FMI, est d'avoir 
poursuivi une quete de reforme economique sans grand egard a la justice 
sociale, a la repartition equitable des ressources. Meme a l'epoque, la 
politique des privatisations, en particulier la grande braderie des 
ressources naturelles, etait contestable et fut contestee mais peu. 
La critique cinglante de Joseph Stiglitz, alors vice-president 
senior et economiste en chef de la Banque mondiale et la replique de 
Vladimir Mau, figure politique et economiste russe, resument a elles 
seules la desillusion des experts etrangers et la frustration des 
reformateurs russes (respectivement Whither Reform? Ten Years of the 
Transition, Washington, avril 1999 et Russian Economic Reforms as 
Perceived by Western Critics ("Anti-Stiglitz"), 1999). Cette polemique 
nous montre surtout qu'il n'y avait pas, ni pour les experts du FMI ni 
pour leurs interlocuteurs russes, de manuel d'emploi pour ces reformes 
(propos de Vladimir Mau repris par le president Poutine) et que les 
oligarches avaient le dessus au Kremlin ou personne ne pouvait plus 
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enrayer leur cupidite et celles de leurs partenaires. Ceci laisse la Russie 
aujourd'hui avec palmares economique mixte: une grande reduction de 
l'endettement public mais un PIB encore 30% moindre qu'en 1990, un 
faible taux d'investissement et 40% de la population vivant sous le seuil 
de la pauvrete. 
11 y a plus 
Ayant vecu une partie de ces annees a Moscou, je crois qu'il 
importe d'analyser le defi de la metamorphose en gardant bien a !'esprit 
le contexte de l'epoque. 11 faut se rappeler que la transformation ne se 
resume pas a la seule economie. Le comportement des russes, y compris 
suite a la crise du rouble en aofit 98 nous incite etre tolerants dans nos 
analyses. Surtout, nous devons eviter, avec le recul, de porter un 
jugement plus severe sur les evenements tels qu'ils se deroulaient que 
celui que les Russes eux-memes ont porte a l'epoque. 
Le fait le plus marquant pour moi de la deuxieme moitie des 
annees 90 a ete !'acquiescence de la population aux mouvements 
imprimes par les reformateurs de la premiere heure, et ce malgre les 
grandes difficultes materielles qu'elle a endurees. Malgre les fraudes 
financieres, pensons aux pyramides Mavrodi et a la "mere de toutes les 
pyramides" les certificats des Finances de 1998, malgre les 
manipulations electorales, et en depit de l'impunite des oligarches, le 
message populaire exprime aux dirigeants est demeure constant -
poursuivre la transformation du systeme. Et ce, meme lorsque des 1997, 
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les mots « reformateur » et « democrate » etaient devenus pejoratifs au 
point d'etre evites par les (( vrais » democrates liberaux, consequence 
directe de l'exploitation ehontee des ressources de l'etat au profit de 
quelques favoris et au detriment de millions de gens. 
Volonte de croire en la Russie 
Une explication rationnelle ne suffit pas a comprendre cette 
volonte populaire et c'est la qu'intervient Tioutchev. La grande majorite 
des russes (ethniques et citoyens) ou qu'ils se situent socialement et 
politiquement croient fondamentalement en leur patrie. lls ont besoin d'y 
croire. Ce sentiment releve du sacre, un tout autre ordre que le politique 
qui a apporte son lot de tragedies aux russes au cours des siecles, si bien 
decrit par Helene Carrere d'Encausse dans le "Le malheur russe" . 
Le Canadien pourtant familier de la quete d'identite nationale, ne 
peut qu'admirer la persistance des intellectuels russes a travers les ages a 
definir l'"idee russe". Le philosophe Berdiaiev, le contestataire 
Soljenitsyne, l'homme politique Y eltsine s'y sont essayes au vingtieme 
siecle; le premier ministre Poutine s'y est attarde dans son message du 
millenaire. Les grands romanciers d'avant la revolution ont vecu, aide a 
creer et depeint un ideal de la vie russe. Merne si elle se definit mal, la 
certitude d'une "russiste" est profondement ancree chez le Russe et est la 
force qui lui permet justement de survivre aux traurnatismes de son 
epoque. 
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La gouvernance a besoin de confiance 
Un des traits marquants de l'histoire recente de la Russie est ce 
moment de grace du tout debut des annees quatre-vingt dix, lorsque la 
classe politique qui s'est portee au pouvoir a rejoint les aspirations de la 
majorite des russes. Des hommes politiques, Sakharov, Yeltsine etaient 
portes par la confiance des Russes. Ce n'etait plus l'"avenir radieux" des 
communistes. 11 etait plausible d'esperer en des jours meilleurs. Pour un 
instant, on a cru possible de faire avancer la chose publique et instaurer 
une ere de legitimite du pouvoir fonde sur la confiance, element 
indispensable de la gouvemance. 
On connait la suite. La necessite des reformes etait acceptee mais 
les comportements excessifs (le "bespredel") des barons economiques et 
d'une certaine classe politique ont bientot mine la confiance des gens 
dans la volonte des elus a proteger leurs interc~ts. Deja en 1996, cette 
belle periode de 1990 a 1993 (jusqu'a l'assaut de la Maison-blanche) fut 
qualifiee, et sans regret, de "romantique". 
Apres la crise d'aout 1998, la Douma a force le president 
Yeltsine a nommer Yevguenii Primakov, dont )'experience remontait a 
l'epoque sovietique, cornrne Premier ministre. n est vite devenu 
l'homme politique le plus populaire (s'assurant ainsi malheureusement 
un bref mandat) entre autres parce qu'il s'est attaque ouvertement a un 
certain oligarche. On lui preta des intentions de retour a l'arriere, ce qui 
ne fut pas le cas. Des experts neo-liberaux de leur cote, poussaient fort le 
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modele economique argentin et son « currency board )) et firent venir le 
ministre Carvalho pour expliquer aux autorites ses effets en apparence 
salutaires. Heureusement, le modele qui semblait si efficace a l'epoque 
ne fut pas adopte. 
Pendant son mandat, le Premier ministre Primakov disait 
qu'aucun gouvernement ne ferait avancer son programme s'il ne batissait 
pas une relation de confiance avec les citoyens. Autrefois, personne ne 
faisait confiance aux communistes et voila que l'impuissance du 
gouvernement a controler les debordements des oligarches et potentats 
regionaux menait a la meme incapacite politique. 
La cle dans tout cela n'est pas une reforme de plus ou de mains 
ma1s la relation que les politiciens au pouvoir entretiennent avec la 
population. Cyniquement, on peut dire qu'elle n'a jamais ete un facteur 
dans l'histoire de la Russie mais ce ne serait pas tout a fait vrai et ce l'est 
de mains en mains. Les moyens de resistance passive ant toujours 
existe : ils font semblant de nous payer, nous faisons semblant de 
travailler; pas de services sociaux, pas d'impots. Aujourd'hui, il faut 
compter en plus avec les associations de defense de droits de toutes 
sortes qui varient enormement en efficacite mais qui sont presentes. 
C'est la recherche d'un equilibre entre deux facteurs qui permet 
de gouverner la Russie sur la voie de l'ouverture: le pouvoir doit 
manifester qu'il controle les leviers- l'etatisme sera toujours necessaire 
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et le pouvoir doit apprendre a tolerer l'expression des droits et libertes de 
sa population meme si cela peut signifier une altemance au pouvoir. Ceci 
n'est pas encore fait. Et c'est la qu'est notre dilemme car je crois qu'en 
Russie, la force de l'etat et le respect de la nation dans le monde 
primeront sur toute autre consideration. C'est un peu ce que nous dit 
Tioutchev. 
A Cyclical Theory of Russia's Historical Change 
Professor Georgi M. Derluguian, Northwestern University 
An observer situated in 1950 (or in 1960, 1970, and still in 1985) 
would have seen Russia and the Caucasus as completely different from 
what was there before 1917. The political and ideological structures have 
changed substantially, to say the least; the social configurations have 
changed almost beyond recognition; and the landscape itself has 
undergone the transformation from a mostly agrarian and rural to being 
predominantly urban and industrial. In short, the period between 1917 
and 1945 would appear marked by overwhelming discontinuities. 
By contrast, our contemporary observer from the 1990s and the 
2000s might see striking continuities with the epochs before the 
revolution of 1917 if not before the completion of Russian territorial 
conquests in the 1860s-1870s. Some commentators even argue that 
nothing ever changes. On the surface, this is not an entirely false 
impression. Back is the imperial double-headed eagle instead of hammer 
and sickle; the Russian armies are once again trying to subdue Chechnya; 
a former superpower looks impoverished and backward. And like the last 
tsars a century earlier, the new rulers face the intractable dilemma of 
reforms that are opposed by the vested interests of self-serving 
bureaucracies and a small but powerful oligarchic class who at the same 
time remain as the pillars of the ruling regime. It looks like the whole 
twentieth century was a big, bloody waste. 
46 Georgi M. Derluguian 
What we observe, however, is not the re-emergence of 
primordial cultural bedrock after the interlude of presumably deviant 
communist efforts to change history and human nature itself. It is another 
historical phase when Russia is again moving downward in the world 
hierarchy of power and wealth, toward a more peripheral position in 
relation to the leading capitalist sectors of the West. And this is not for 
the first time. 
From the outset the Russian and other East European feudalisms 
were more rudimentary than the analogous social patterns in the 
medieval West. The reasons for the disparity were structural. The eastern 
side of Europe lacked the rich deposits of Roman inheritance (towns, 
roads, etc.) At the same time, unlike the western side sheltered by the 
Alps and the band of thick forests running in the middle of Europe, the 
eastern side was geopolitically exposed to the pressure of predatory 
nomadic cavalries from the Eurasian Steppe.1 
This situation was reversed in the 1480s-1550s after the 
Muscovite grand princes (the ancestors of Tsar !van the Terrible and 
especially the young Ivan himself) succeeded in building an adequately 
strong and centralized patrimonial state. The state-building process 
required the cunning and cruelty that generally characterized 
Renaissance politics. But the particular reliance of Russian state-builders 
on coercion was neither idiosyncratic nor pre-ordained by the notorious 
cultural 'legacies of Chingiz-khan'. The coercion, as Tilly persuasively 
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argues, was not so much a willful choice of early state-builders as it was 
the strategy. Its main reason and advantage was to compensate for the 
relative scarcity of capitalist resources within a thinly populated realm 
like Russia, which was also true of imperial Spain and Prussia.2 
The emergent Muscovite kingdom was a great success within its 
historical class, as judged by its ability to develop the production of 
firearms, create the new service nobility and a standing army, and 
subsequently to push its frontiers far eastward, eliminating in the process 
the Tatar khanates of Volga and Siberia. Another measure of state-
building success is the divergent trajectories of early modem Russia and 
another large and arguably very coercive realm in Eastern Europe, 
Poland-Lithuania. Where the Polish aristocratic confederation de-
industrialized, de-urbanized, and eventually disappeared from the map 
(all despite the Poles' much asserted cultural belonging to the West), the 
less Western but despotically centralized Russia eventually could join the 
European world-system on honorable terms as one of the most powerful 
states of its time. 3 
This second historical achievement of the Russian state came at 
the price of further coercion. Towards the seventeenth century Muscovy 
once again lagged behind in the creation of an absolutist state that 
represented the most advanced technique of power in its epoch. Catching 
up with European absolutism took the vigorous and unabashedly ruthless 
reforms of Tsar Peter in the early 1700s carried on by the enlightened 
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despotism of Catherine the Great in the 17 60s-1790s. The absolutist 
cycle of Russia culminated in the early nineteenth century with the defeat 
of Napoleon, and the brief occupation of Paris, and the acquisition of 
vast territories from Poland to Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and all the way to 
the frontiers of imperial China. 
The Russian absolutist achievement followed the coercion-
intensive path that might look different from the mainly capital-intensive 
path of the Western core states, though not as entirely different as the 
normative-juridical presentations of modem history would make us 
believe. In the analytical scheme of capital- and coercion-intensive paths 
of modem state building, Russia gravitated toward the coercion end of 
the distribution but still remained perfectly within the scope of 
contemporary state 'physiologies' .4 
The scarcity of capitalist resources remained a durable and self-
reproducing constraint. The rulers of Russia, generation after generation, 
had to concern themselves with what elsewhere in the core states of the 
world system was one of the chief functions of the capitalist pursuit of 
profit: the creation and ongoing modernization of production bases. To 
stress the key difference, perhaps at the expense of overgeneralization: if 
in the Western core states the secular trend was the bureaucratic 
rationalization of capitalism plus state coercion, in Russia it was the 
bureaucratic rationalization of state coercion minus capitalism. This 
morphological difference marks the non-belonging of Russia to the core 
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of the capitalist world-economy. Russia has always been only a semi-
peripheral state though at times an inordinately important state, even a 
super-power. This also renders Russia one of the earliest and longest-
running developmental states in history that has been 'developing', i.e. 
catching up with the capitalist core, for nearly five hundred years. 
At the historical peaks achieved in the ascending phases of 
coercion-intensive developmental reforms, the Russian state almost 
caught up and moved closer to the threshold of the world-system's core. 
Military and productive parity was achieved several times in Russia's 
history. But the state's mobility always stopped there. The disruptive and 
traumatic changes seemed no longer necessary because Russia has 
already entered the comfortable plateaus of geopolitical power-prestige 
in relation to the West. Such plateau phases eventually created the 
impression of the internal 'ossification' of Russia as the leading elites of 
each successful period would stabilize socially, entrench themselves 
politically, and begin reaping the fruits of their hard-won position. In the 
meantime, the West would discover yet another more advanced 
technique of rule: absolutism, industrial imperialism, welfare state, or 
neoliberal globalization. The plateau phases of relative parity ended, and 
once again Russia looked as though it was lagging behind by the 
contemporary core standards, though not necessarily weaker compared to 
its own achievements in previous epochs - in the seventeenth century 
Muscovy still was a major power in its neighbourhood; in the late 
nineteenth century the Russian Empire was far better off than Turkey, 
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Persia, or China; in the 1970s the USSR enjoyed the highest-ever levels 
of internal consumption in Soviet history and remained a nuclear 
superpower feared and respected by Washington. Yet the growing gap 
between the aspirations of the Russian state and its diminishing 
capabilities in the evolving world-system, i.e. the renewed relative 
backwardness, haunted the rulers of Russia. 
Even more so, the perceptions of shameful disparity with the 
West troubled the growing number of domestic critics and would provide 
them a basis for their criticism. Such critics and their potential 
constituencies themselves emerged as the result of . prevtous 
developmental efforts. In the ascendant phases, the Russian reformist 
rulers fostered the education of technical specialists and, for the 
prestigious and ideological purposes of state, they also cultivated artists, 
thinkers, and scholars who could imitate and eventually counter the 
contemporary Western achievements in analogous fields. The cultural-
symbolic and expert-technical aspects of the reforms opened new social 
fields and careers that, in turn, attracted active and inventive applicants 
much in excess of what the state ever wanted or could manage. In the 
phases of stabilization, plateau, decline, and crisis the state found itself 
increasingly lacking the means to incorporate and control its mid-ranking 
specialists and the intellectuals who were turning into domestic critics. 
A prototype of this social mechanism is found already in the 
church schism and the tremendous popular movement of radical 'Old 
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believers' (' starovery' ) in the seventeenth century. It was made possible 
by the state centralization of the ecclesiastical field during the previous 
epoch that resulted in the creation of structural tensions and resources for 
the Russian Orthodox version of Reformation and Counter-reformation. 
In the late imperial and again in the late Soviet periods, the state 
developmental reforms gave rise to secular intelligentsias, the famed sub-
elite groups who held the key cultural capitals of their epochs. Eventually 
the intelligentsia began using their position to formulate a strong moral 
condemnation of the ruling classes and the state. As the fissures in the 
dominant bloc grew apparent and different elite factions sought allies 
outside their circle if not an outright opportunity to defect, the 
intelligentsia's moral condemnation gained the opportunity to escalate 
into open political opposition. At least some symbolic capitals of the 
intelligentsia then could be converted into political and later the 
administrative capital, which is probably how Pierre Bourdieu would 
have described a Russian revolutionary sequence. 
Theda Skocpol is certainly right in detecting the causal links 
between triggering events such as war defeat forcing the escalation of 
elite factionalism and thus opening the way for social revolution.5 Lenin 
and Trotsky knew it just as well, but their formulations served rather the 
purposes of non-academic revolutionary theory that they were finally 
able to test in practice. Already the revolution from above waged by 
Peter the Great was in direct response to the earlier signalling defeats at 
the hands of the Turks, the Crimean Tatars, and the Swedes. The 
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revolution of 1905 followed the acute humiliation from the Japanese 
navy that was previously considered a laughable proposition. By the 
beginning of 1917 the imperial apparatus proved patently unable to 
withstand the combined pressures of German offensive and internal 
dissent arising from all sectors of society. At the beginning of 
Gorbachev's reforms in 1985, however, neither the military situation in 
Afghanistan nor at the static Cold War fronts against the NATO and 
China seemed immediately threatening by a possible defeat. Nonetheless 
with all available evidence the contemporary Soviet leadership felt hard 
pressed to act before the situation deteriorated beyond repair (i.e. not 
unlike the young tsar Peter), which indicated the importance and perhaps 
even the relative autonomy of the symbolic and ideological level of 
causality. 
Next in order would be the incorporation into our theory of 
geopolitical regularities empirically detected and theorized in a Weberian 
vein by Randall Collins. 6 The spatial size of the Russian state has been 
growing over its entire history until 1991. (A popular impressionistic 
estimate gives the average rate of five square kilometres a day - over 
nearly five centuries). The territorial expansion inevitably transformed 
Russia from its originally marchland position into a central power, which 
also happened several times, apace with the expansion of the systems of 
military strategic relations in which Russia found itself. The alternation 
of marchland and central power geopolitical positioning of Russia forms 
a cycle of its own. But here we might need to introduce additional 
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mechanisms in order to explain why Russia has been able to escape the 
geopolitical traps. In this, we could draw on Tilly's theorizing of state-
building and on the world-systems analysis, especially Arrighi's 
conceptualization of territorial accumulation as, up to a point, a viable 
alternative to capitalism. 7 
Russia has been overcoming the geopolitical constraint by the 
combination of quantitative expansion of its territorial and natural 
resources base and the qualitative bursts of modernizing reforms. It 
fostered the military and tax-extractive capabilities that matched or 
exceeded the capabilities of Russia's geopolitical rivals. This pattern 
began in the late medieval period when the principality of Moscow first 
transformed itself from a second-rate political unit into the forceful 
unifier and centralizer of Russian lands. The combined resources were 
then used to build the gunpowder empire and internalize the Steppe 
frontier. Peter, followed by Catherine, forced their way into the 
geopolitics of Europe not only by wrestling control over the Baltic from 
the Swedes but mainly by vastly expanding the productive and 
demographic bases in the eastern and southern reaches of their fast 
growing empire. No Western state at the time could match it. And lastly, 
the towering achievement of the Soviet mobilizational economy was to 
end the geopolitical exceptionalism of the United States by mass-
producing nuclear weapons and the rocket means of delivery. Collins's 
geopolitical theory provides a powerful explanatory tool in the first 
approximation. It must be expanded and combined with other theories in 
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order to clarify how the geopolitical regularities mesh with the internal 
dynamics of state transformations and the flow of resources at the levels 
of geoculture and world-economy. This goal seems achievable in the 
near future. 8 
Finally, we shall need to move forward in developing the state-
centered theory of revolutions from the foundations laid by Skocpol, 
Tilly, and their collaborators. They have accomplished a lot. To begin 
with, these scholars achieved the seminal shift away from the canonical 
nineteenth-century views of revolutions as either the popular liberating 
events (or horrifying eruptions of base 'crowd' instincts) which 
summarizes the typical feelings of participants, or, in a more abstract 
generalization, the necessary rapid transitions between historical stages, 
as commonly held by the traditional Liberal idea of 'bourgeois' 
revolution and its Marxist counterpart. Revolutions are now seen as 
predominantly the instances of state breakdown. Whatever causes it, the 
breakdown opens the hitherto unavailable possibilities to perform a 
wholesale restructuring of the state, that may (or may not, or may for the 
time being) solve its previously intractable problems. Put differently, 
revolution begins with the sudden collapse that, if successfully exploited 
by a concerted political force, can result in a radical upgrading of state 
powers. This forms the full sequence that was traditionally singled out as 
the great or, in Skocpol's terms, social revolutions. Such full sequences 
culminating in a successful recomposition of the invigorated state are 
very rare in history. Obviously, a lot can go awry in the chaos of 
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revolutions resulting instead in a half-way conservative restoration, 
protracted stagnation, even the disappearance of the state. Post-Soviet 
Russia is an example. 
Revolutions viewed from the vantage point of state power 
clearly look akin to big reforms. (A Russian satire from 1905 nicely 
captured this connection by portraying the terrorist wing of Social 
Revolutionaries as 'liberals with bombs'). Tilly should be credited for 
drawing the analytical continuum that overcame the exceedingly 
ideological perception of revolutions as being an entirely separate 
species from the rebellions, revolutions-from-above, reforms, and simply 
collapses.9 
But why have revolutions happened at all in the modem times? 
What did they really achieve? If they are not the direct result of 
liberation struggles waged by the downtrodden, and if at the end freedom 
is not what they gain, then what are they or what do they do? Another 
theoretical breakthrough of Theda Skocpol was to overcome the 
traditionally intemalist analysis of revolutions and demonstrate instead 
the salience of external factors that she reduced to military defeat. Even 
if we add further down the sequence the revolutionary revanchiste 
conquests exemplified by Napoleon or Lenin and Stalin or in a latest 
example, Fidel Castro in Angola, this still does not solve the problem. 
We turn for help to Immanuel Wallerstein who does not merely bring the 
external factors into the analysis of revolutions but rather situates the 
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revolutions and their outcomes m the plane of the modem world-
system.10 
Observed from this perspective, the modem revolutions have a 
lot to do with the mobility of states in the geopolitical hierarchy and the 
axial division of labor in the world-system. In simple terms, revolutions 
have been at the radical extreme of the more usual reform efforts 
intended to resist the downward decline of one's group position (country 
or nation) in the world's ranking order. The decline and backwardness, or 
their perceived effects on social, economic, and cultural fields, would be 
countered by restructuring the state and social composition of national 
society. In the countries outside the Western core, the liberal national 
reformers (who sometimes were as revolutionary as, for example, 
Atatiirk) normally adhered to the Hegelian or Durkheimian ideas of 
historical progress and order. Their hope was that the state could foster 
the middle class because the rise of the latter is the explanation for 
European modernity and 'civic culture'. The Marxist-inspired 
revolutionaries rather saw the answer in the state-creation of industrial 
proletariat because their ideology associated an industrial proletariat with 
modernity and universal salvation. 11 Of course, these are quite different 
programs. What they had in common, however, was the view of the state 
as the key to catching up. 
The main distinction was in the political means. Revolutions 
differ from reforms not in what they achieve - the strengthening of state 
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structures to direct the socioeconomic and military changes. 12 The 
difference is really in how the modem revolutionary contenders 
proceeded to achieve these goals: by mobilizing the masses to destroy 
the old political and social order that they blamed for causing the decline 
and perpetuating backwardness. The Russian revolutions represent the 
dramatic destructive-constructive routes toward the transformation of 
first the state and then, the society. They were the moments when the 
dam burst, opening way to new streams that occurred in the situations 
when old regimes failed to overcome themselves. In Russia such bursts 
happened twice during the twentieth century: first, after 191 7, and again 
in 1989-1992. The results were obviously different. 
Generally, the successive modernizing leaps of the Russian state 
required the obliteration of social structures and the associated classes 
that, ironically, once served as the basis of the previous leap. Each time 
the transformation amounted to a revolution waged whether from above, 
by the monarchical reformers, or else - not entirely from below but 
rather by the contenders emerging from the middle-ranks of pre-
revolutionary society who sought to channel the energies of the revolts 
from below. Ivan the Terrible murderously eliminated the decentralized 
feudal patterns. Peter the Great massacred the old guard of 'streltsy' , 
created from scratch the new army, subordinated the church to secular 
bureaucracy, expanded by nearly ten-fold the ranks of service nobility, 
and built on a swamp, the new oceanic capital of St. Petersburg in order 
to leave behind the stalwarts of old order in the landlocked Moscow. Yet 
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the last two tsars who assumed the reigns in the late nineteenth century 
could no longer risk radical reforms without provoking a revolution and 
alienating their shrinking social base - mainly the conservative and 
myopic nobility of ranking bureaucrats, military generals, and 
landowners whose ancestors a century earlier provided the dynamism 
and force to the absolutist reforms of Peter and Catherine. When in 1881 
the revolutionary terrorists assassinated the reformer Alexander 11, 
although his death was shocking, it was widely perceived by the ruling 
elite as the tsar's own fault. Thirty years later, the elite reaction to the 
killing of Prime-Minister Stolypin, the last reformer of the Old Regime, 
was nearly identical. Ultimately, the logjam created by Russia' s Old 
Regime on the road to industrialization was eliminated in the revolution 
of 191 7 and the Russian Civil war. 
In the last decade the most recent attempt to reform and 
revolutionize the Soviet and then the Russian state foundered in the 
counter-rebellion of the communist nomenklatura who essentially took 
the state apart and privatized its most valuable assets. The unfinished 
business of reform or revolutionary transformation left the post-Soviet 
Russia at a nadir where it languishes now and threatens to slide further 
down to the periphery. It remains to be seen whether the structural trends 
of Russian state history can continue to operate in a world-system where 
the global trend of recent decades has been toward decreasing the 
salience of states. Yet the re-centralizing authoritarianism of Colonel 
Putin indicates that the same mechanisms are still running. It remains to 
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be seen whether Putin or someone else will be able to batter the 
bailiwicks carved by the new-old oligarchy, repossess the looted state 
assets, and catch up with the core once again. 
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Elections and Democracy in Russia1 
Professor Joan DeBardeleben, Carleton University 
Elections are one instrument of democracy, but political 
scientists disagree about whether free competitive elections themselves 
are adequate to warrant classifying a country as a democracy. In 
attempting to assess Russia's progress with democratization, 
understanding the role and importance of elections in this process is an 
important question. 
Analysts have suggested several criteria by which to judge 
whether democracy has been 'firmed up' or consolidated. One is whether 
elections are 'the only game in town' to determine transfer of political 
power.2 In other words, do political actors acknowledge their legitimacy 
and reject other extra-legal methods for gaining power. Also do political 
actors accept uncertain outcomes as the legitimate nature of democratic 
politics? By both of these criteria, Russia seems to qualify as a legitimate 
democratic system; even opposition parties seem to accept the necessity 
of working within the system and have not appealed to extra-legal 
measures when they have lost elections or been excluded from real 
political power following elections. 
By another criterion, whether there has been a real turnover in 
power through the electoral process, 3 Russia does not meet the criterion 
of being a 'consolidated' democracy. This suggests that the process of 
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democratization could · still be reversed, or that it is still on possibly 
shaky ground. When Boris Y eltsin resigned as President, power was 
turned over to a 'designated successor' who was subsequently confirmed 
in office through a popular election. Vladimir Putin did not represent the 
political opposition, and it is still unclear whether all political forces 
would accept a transferrance of political power to the Communists if an 
election outcome went in this direction. 
By yet another measure, whether elections have brought change 
in government or in policies, Russia again scores weakly. Despite the 
fact that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation got the largest 
number of votes in the 1995 and 1999 Duma elections, no change in 
government or prime minister followed. Elections in Russia have also 
been inefficacious in setting a mandate for new government and have 
been only weak vehicles of accountability. It is hard for citizens to know 
how to call their government to account, given the current structure of 
the political system. Elections have had, at best, an indirect effect on 
policy. Part of the reason lies in the weakness of Russian political parties 
as vehicles of governance and the continuing importance of patron-client 
relationship and personalism in Russian political life. 
What do Russian themselves think about the state of Russian 
democracy and the role of elections in it? Survey data shows that while 
support for democratic values is relatively high by several measures, 
Russians are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their 
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country. Elections themselves are apparently not viewed as effective 
instruments of democracy. This raises the question of 'why'. Prima facie, 
citizen dissatisfaction may suggest underlying inadequacies. Of course 
this dissatisfaction may also be rooted in inflated expectations or an 
unclear vision as to the proper role of elections. Following examination 
of the nature of this dissatisfaction, we draw some preliminary 
conclusions about obstacles to elections acting as effective vehicles of 
democracy in Russia. We should note at the outset that the analysis 
developed here relates exclusively to the national level and does not 
explore electoral arrangements or visions in the regions. 
Citizen Views 
Many surveys of public opinion have explored aspects of voter 
opinion or have sought to explain voting behaviour in Russia.4 Other 
analysts have examined support for democratic values and democratic 
institutions.5 Studies generally show fairly high levels of popular support 
for democratic values in Russia, although findings are more mixed when 
particular dimensions of democratic culture are examined. At the same 
time it is clear that many Russians are quite dissatisfied with the way 
democracy is actually practiced in Russia. Opinion surveys carried by 
Carleton University in conjunction with Russian partners provide a 
picture of this ambivalence about Russian democracy. 
A problem faced by researchers is to determine what respondents 
understand the word 'democracy' to mean. Democracy is a particularly 
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contested term in Russia, so it .is necessary to try to understand how 
respondents understand the term before soliciting their assessments. So 
as not to assume a particular understanding of democracy among our 
Russian respondents, we gave them the opportunity to define democracy 
for themselves, through two vehicles. One was an open-ended question, 
"What comes to mind when you hear the word 'democracy' in Russia 
today?" A second measure was a close-ended question that asked 
respondents to relate particular institutional features to their 
understanding of the word. Answers reveal that Russians are quite 
cynical about democracy in practice but at the same time see democracy 
as embodying many features commonly associated with the term in 
liberal democratic countries of the West. As Table 1 reveals, almost 60% 
of Russian respondents have negative associations with the word 
democracy and many of these suggest ineffective governance involving 
features such as confusion, anarchy, distortion, lawlessness, crirninality, 
and demagoguery. 
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Table 1: What comes to mind when you hear the word 'democracy' in Russia 
t d ? o ay.
Russia Russia 
1995/1996 2000 
General Positive Associations 7.1 6.1 
Freedom 4.0 3.9 
What We Are as a Country 
Positive Political/Legal Associations 11.7 14.2 
Freedom of Speech, Press 5.0 5.9 
Free Elections, Parties, Participation 2.3 0.7 
Freedom of Religion, Conscience 2.0 2.0 
Rule of Law, Equal Rights 
Government 
Positive Socio-Economic Associations 0.8 0.6 
Market Economy, Prosperity 0.4 
TOTAL POSITIVE ASSOCIATIONS 19.6 20.9 
General Neeative Associations 30.9 
Confusion, Chaos, Disintegration, Anarchy 16.7 11.9 
Absence or Lack of Democracy 5.4 7.1 
Mockery, Distortion 3.9 6.2 
Negative Political/Legal Associations 23.9 21.4 
Lawlessness 6.2 6.6 
Criminality, Corruption, Dishonesty 4.1 6.6 
Demagogues, Dictatorship, Control From the Top 3.5 2.9 
Neeative Socio-Economic Associations 3.3 3.6 
Poverty, Inflation, Unemployment 1.5 
Inequality, Unfairness 
TOTAL NEGATIVE REFERENCES 58.1 57.1 
Other 6.0 3.9 
Nothine, Don't Know No Answer . 27.8 28.4 
Sample Size 2080 2409 
" 
• Analysts of the 1995 data ts from Jon Pammett, "Electtons and Democracy m Russta, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (1999), p.47 based on a Carleton 1995 Post-
Election Survey. The survey involved a representative sample collected in 19 regions of 
Russia. The 2000 survey is from the Carleton University Regions, based on a 
representative sample in four regions of Russia. 
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Although levels of conf1dence in the honesty of elections are 
increasing, in 2000 almost half of respondents were still unconvinced 
about the integrity of electoral processes. 
Table 2: Belief that Elections Were Carried Out Honestly in Russia*% of all 
Respondents 
o- ..-. - ~ '0 ::!. a: ri a: ~ :::!. a: ri a: "'~N c: \C -\C) === '-CI,C :!~a=-~~ :!a=-~~ !3 ~ I.Cet~ :!== ~QC ~= ..... ~---~= ..... ~== D; QC "'Cl 
"< = ..... '<N.,,... "< "'Cl 
.._, = = .., .._, D; QD; .._, .., ~ ~ 
"' 
..... = ..... 
"' 
0 0 
Yes &/or 11.5 11.9 23.8 24.6 28.5 Definitely 
Probably 26.9 19.0 26.6 25.8 27.4 
Probably 23.2 20.0 10.5 10.5 12.5 Not 
Definitely 25.4 30.3 14.2 13.7 17.7 Not 
No 
Answer 
&/or 13.0 19.8 30.0 25.4 16.9 
Hard to 
Say 
No 1902 1931 1931 2410 2410 
*1995 data are based on a Carleton 1995 Post-ElectiOn Survey that mvolved a 
representative sample collected in 19 regions of Russia. The 1998 and 2000 are from the 
Carleton University Regions 1998 survey and the Carleton University Regions 2000 
survey based on a representative sample in four regions of Russia (five in 1998, 
including,Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug). 
Russians show rising and quite high levels of trust in particular elected 
officials who were identified by name (Table 3), but positive feelings for 
elected institutions are much lower (Table 4), suggesting a personalistic 
basis for political support. 
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Table 3: Trust in Political Leaders At Various Levels of Government% that 
h express trust or more trust t an distrust 
"Cl "Cl 
Noo(IJ C'J C'J ., N~ No ..,.o .... ~ 
\C) ~. = ~. o~=- o< \C< 
'CQ. OQ. o'g 9 ~ Q~ \C~ QO~ Q~ Q~ loo)~ o3 oo3 
= = 0 0 
- -
., ., 
Orlov oblast 7 (1) 84 (50) 66 (35) 87 (49) 88 (41) 
Stavropol 24 (10) 89 (59) 60 (21) 65 (32) 78 (40) krai 
Nizhegorodsk 35 (7) 84 (50) 51 (16) 62 (23) 73 (21) 
aia oblast 
Khanty- 31(5) 90 (57) 74 (24) 95 (63) 71 (19) Mansiisk 
• ('trust fully' m parentheses) 
• Selected Russian Regions, 1998 
• Data excludes those not answering or those indicating 'hard to say' . 
Table 4: Thermometer Score for Elected Institutions and Elected Officials in 
Russia 
Putin Governor State Duma Regional (Named) (Federal) Lee:islature 
Orlov oblast 6.87 7.38 3.65 4.42 
Stavropol krai 7.80 5.01 3.76 4.19 
Nizhegorodskaia 7.04 4.37 3.88 3.65 
ob last 
Khanty-Mansiisk 7.63 7.59 4.16 6.40 A.O 
Total 7.33 6.11 3.86 4.68 
.. 
• The quest1on asked respondent to rate each mdlVldual or mst1tut10n on a scale of 1-10 
where I is 'cold' and 10 is 'warm', in 2000. 
When asked about general satisfaction with the level of democracy in 
Russia, about three-quarters of those answering expressed dissatisfaction. 
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T bl 5 L a e eves o f s . f: atis action 1 .R USSla emocracym 
Russia 1995 Russia 1998 Russia 2000 
Satisfied 1.8% 1.6% 3.5% 
More Satisfied 8.8 6.4 11.5 Than Not 
More 38.5 37.1 34.9 Dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied 50.9 54.9 50.1 
Total N 1659 1685 2165 Respondine: 
•% of those respondmg, column percentages 
*1995 data are based on a Car1eton 1995 Post-Election Survey that involved a 
representative sample collected in 19 regions of Russia. The 1998 and 2000 are from the 
Carleton University Regions 1998 survey and the Carleton University Regions 2000 
survey based on a representative sample in four regions of Russia (five in 1998, 
includingYamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug). 
In contrast to negative assessments of the current state of Russian 
democracy, the vast majority of Russian respondents express support for 
the idea of democracy and the adoption of a democratic model in Russia. 
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. Table 6: Support for Introduction of Democracy in Russia 
Yes, Definitely 
Ill QC = er- er- = er- er- = 
...... ...... N 
Orel 42.1 32.5 25.5 
Stavropol 35.6 30.4 36.5 
Nizhnii 41.0 34.3 47.2 Nov2orod 
Khan-Man 49.4* 46.2 36.1 Okrug 
More No than Yes 
Ill QC = er- er- = er- er- = 
...... ...... N 
Orel 14.6 18.5 18.0 
Stavropol 22.6 13.2 16.9 
Nizhnii 8.3 13.0 11.1 Novgorod 
Khan-Man 9.0 8.0 13.7 Okrug 
* Selected Russian Regwns- 1995/96,1998, 2000 
* Row percentages 
More Yes than No 
Ill QC = er- er- = er- er- = 
...... ...... N 
31.7 35.0 43.5 
24.7 37.7 33.3 
44.4 42.9 33.5 
36.7 40.2 40.2 
Definitely Not 
Ill QC = er- er- =· er- er- = 
...... ...... N 
11.6 14.0 13.0 
17.1 18.7 13.3 
6.3 9.8 8.8 
4.8 5.5 10.0 
* 1995 values are for a survey carried out in Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamal-Nenets Okrugs 
But what vision of democracy are they inclined to embrace? 
Other questions in the survey help to clarify this question. While many 
Western studies identify 'liberty' as the key association with democracy 
in post-communist Eastern Europe, in our study we explored institutional 
correlates of Russians' democratic vision, with one of our measures 
directly focusing on the role of elections. We asked our respondents to 
rate the importance of a number of institutional features for their 
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understanding of the true mean~ng of democracy. Comparisons between 
Russian responses (which are remarkably consistent over time) with data 
from a Canadian survey carried out in the year 2001 reveal some 
intriguing contrasts (Table 7). 
T bl 7 H a e IEhfhFII h Id fD ow mportant s ac o t e o owmgto t e eao ? emocracy·, 
Russia Russia Canada 
1998 2000 2001 
Written Functionin£ Constitution 78 78 68 
Independent Courts 72 72 52 
Freedom of the Press 69 69 69 
Right to Private Property 50 56 75 
Regular Competitive Election 52 50 60 
Assemblies at Which Citizens Make 50 49 43 Decisions 
Referenda on Important Questions 44 44 44 
Competing Political Parties 31 32 58 
Division of Power Between the Centre 26 
and Ree:ions 
• (% saYJng very important or very essential) 
• The 1998 data if from the 1998 Carleton University Regions survey and the 2000 data 
is from the Carleton University Regions 2000, survey based on a representative sample 
in five and four regions of Russia, respectively. The Canadian data is from the Kroeger 
College (Carleton)/Polaris 2001 survey. Thanks to Jon Parnmett for access to this data. 
Russians seem less convinced than Canadians about the importance of 
competitive elections and competing political parties, and more 
persuaded about the importance of 'rule of law' features such as an 
effective constitution, an independent judiciary and freedom of speech. 
While the latter may not be surprising as a reaction to the sometimes 
arbitrary nature of party/state power in the communist period, the lesser 
commitment to elections as democratic vehicles is troubling. Experience 
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with elections as instruments of democracy has apparently not been 
satisfactory. Russians also seem to adhere to a somewhat more 
participatory vision of democracy, rating assemblies almost as high as 
elections, and higher than their Canadians counterparts. 
When asked specifically about what elections mean to them 
personally, Russians were less inclined to identify elections as 
instruments of accountability and policy influence than British 
respondents6 and a significant proportion of Russian respondents 
indicated that elections are vehicles of deception. This scepticism toward 
elections may have to do more with personal experience than with 
political vision (or lack thereof). At a minimum one can conclude that 
Russian respondents are more sceptical about the efficacy of elections 
and their importance to democracy than are their Canadian and British 
counterparts, that they may have a more participatory vision of 
democracy, and that elections as vehicles of democracy are, in practice, 
viewed with a jaundiced eye. 
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Table 8: Views of Meaning of Elections in Russia 
T ha d l . th ti ll ll OW t extent o e ecttons mean e o owmg to you persona Iy: 
they mean a lot, as a way to ... Russia Russia Britain 1993 1995 1987 
1. influence policy 27% 45% 60% 
2. state an opinion about the situation in 29 43 60 the country; 
3. choose leaders based on personal 31 36 
qualities· 
4. deceive the people; 31 34 
5. hold leaders accountable; 23 33 48 
6. promote the interests of a social class· 16 33 28 
7. keep politicians honest· 22 25 28 
8. promote the interests of me and my 18 25 34 
family; 
9. promote the interests of a national or 8 11 
religious group 
* All-Russta survey, December 1995/January 1996 
• Based on the Carleton 1993 and 1995 elections surveys. The 1993 survey was carried 
out in three regions of Russia; the 1995 survey was an all-Russian representative sample 
drawn from 19 regions. Data cited from Jon H. Pammett and Joan DeBardeleben, "The 
Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine," 
Electoral Studies, 15.3 (1996): 363-381 and from Jon H. Pammett, "Elections and 
democracy in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (1999): 45-60. 
Russians also appear to. be sceptical of the main national representative 
body that they elect, the State Duma (the lower house of the national 
legislature). Surveys carried out by the All-Russian Centre for Public 
Opinion report that half of Russian respondents in a 2002 survey 
indicated that the Duma "mainly spends time on unnecessary decisions 
and squabbling".7 
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Institutional Design and Russian Democracy 
What explains the widespread dissatisfaction with democracy in 
Russia? We have already alluded to some factors, which may be 
important. These include inflated expectations and the failure of 
parliamentary elections to influence the composition of the government. 
But are there more fundamental issues relating to Russian institutional 
structures that may contribute to an explanation? 
A first and very important factor relates to the weakness of 
political parties in Russia. Only three political parties have won 
consistent representation in the Duma through the party list portion of the 
ballot since 1993 (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the 
Yabloko party, and the Liberal Democratic Party or Zhirinovsky Bloc); 
none of these has ever been in the governing coalition. Neither Russian 
president has formed his own political party nor made himself 
accountable to a political party. This position was apparently amatter of 
principle of Boris Yeltsin, who seemed to desire the appearance of a 
politician standing above partisan concerns, a stance reflecting the 
Khruschevian legacy, who defined the Communist Party as representing 
'the whole people'. One consequence was the fragmentation of the 
liberal reform political forces, which continues to this day, since Yeltsin 
allowed his allies to squabble among themselves about political party 
formations. Putin, on the other hand, has, to some degree, associated 
himself with the Unity Party, but he has not defined himself as its leader 
or representative. This position frees him from accountability to a 
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political party organization and also makes it harder for citizens to see 
li!lkages between political parties and the way policy and power is 
structured. 
An additional institutional feature, which may contribute to 
Russian cynicism about democracy, is the inefficacy of elections as 
instruments for bringing about changes in government or policy. This 
has, in part, to due with the structure of Russian political institutions, 
namely the dual executive. While other countries, most notably France, 
have a dual executive structure, the Russian case has its own unique 
features, which may make accountability even more difficult to realize. 
The President, who is directly elected, appoints the prime minister and 
the Russian legislature is in a weak position to exercise control over the 
holder of the post. While the lower house of the Federal Assembly, the 
Duma, must confirm the appointment, failure to do so eventually can 
lead to the dissolution of the Duma itself. Thus, the strongest force in the 
Duma has only a weak capability to exercise positive influence on the 
government. 
Because the prime minister is answerable only in a conditional 
sense to the Duma and primarily to the President, a model of responsible 
party government clearly does not apply to the Russian case. Neither the 
President nor the Durna is an agent of responsible government. On the 
one hand, while the President is elected on a majoritarian principle, he 
cannot act effectively and legitimately without gaining the acquiescence 
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of the legislature.8 On the other hand, the Duma cannot take effective 
policy leadership, but can rather effectively bloc government initiatives. 
As was demonstrated in the Yeltsin years, a failure to court opposition in 
the Duma can lead to immobilism. A certain measure of bargaining or at 
least cooptation is required for the government or President to gain 
acceptance of its policies. The government must attend to the Duma, win 
it over, bargain, and thus achieve adequate support in order to gain 
acceptance of its legislative program. Most frequently the Duma's 
influence has taken an obstructive form. President Putin has managed to 
win more cooperation from the Duma than did President Yeltsin, but it is 
not clear the degree to which the public can. feel represented. Public 
influence through the Duma is relatively weak precisely because political 
parties themselves are such weak vehicles of public representation. 
Furthermore, the rules of the Duma do not assure influence of the 
opposition on policy and can lead to some fairly divergent outcomes, 
depending on particular political circumstances. The ability of opposition 
deputies (particularly Communist deputies) to influence policy-making 
depends on particular political configurations. 
Conclusion 
The trony of current Russian political development is that 
although institutional features make it difficult for elections to serve as 
very effective vehicles of representation, neither Russian citizens nor 
politicians seem to question their legitimacy. It could well be argued that 
elections have had an impact over time by moving the policies of the 
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government away from the radic~l market reform position toward a more 
centrist position. These changes were likely made in response to the 
obstruction to government policies offered by opposition deputies. 
Weaknesses in effective representation derive at least in part 
from the institutional structures, which place the Russian legislature in a 
weak position to do more than offer a veto point. Other sources of weak 
representation have to do with the generally weak institutionalization of 
political parties and their linkages to the public. Exclusion of 
independent and opposition groups from decision-making can easily 
occur within the Russian institutional structure. Surprisingly, however, 
most opposition parties and groups have been eo-opted to accept the 
current institutional structures, suggesting that possibilities for influence 
have been sufficient to prevent rejection of the rules of the game. Thus, 
while democracy has not been consolidated and elections are not very 
effective vehicles of democracy in Russia, they do seem to be 'the only 
game in town'. 
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The Russian Presidency and the Process of 
Democratization 
Carlos Canales, Undergraduate Student, York University 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced 
enormous political, economic, and social instability as decades of 
communist rule, one party-political system, and a centrally planned 
economy became part of its past. This country urgently needed new 
institutions and methods of governance that would guarantee a smooth 
transition towards democracy and a capitalist economy. Nevertheless, in 
Russia, there was no previous experience with an institutionalized form 
of government that would aim for the above. 
This quest for a new democratic system began, in fact, before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union under the auspices of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
The Soviet ruler championed the creation of a new institution for the 
Soviet Union that had not existed under communist rule - the 
Presidency. Mikhail Gorbachev was to become the first and the last 
President of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it is under the works of Boris 
Y eltsin' s leadership that the Russian Presidency was created, 
consolidated, and strengthened to the extent that it became the most 
important political institution in post-communist Russia. Paradoxically, 
while parliamentary institutions as well as structures of civil society 
continue to be very weak in Russia, a powerful executive institution has 
emerged, reflecting the country's strong tradition of authoritarian rule. 
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Not surprisingly, the Russian Presidency has received much 
attention from scholars, politicians, and political analysts. And, thus, 
much has been written on this subject from various perspectives. The 
objective in this particular study is two-fold: a) to examine the Russian 
presidency in terms of its evolution as well as its institutional design and 
b) to analyze its contribution to the development of democracy in Russia. 
Russia's Political Past and its Legacy 
Upon studying today's Russia, it is . important to understand 
where this country is coming from in political terms. Its political history 
is most definitely an indicator of current and future developements. 
Russia is a country with a strong heritage of both positive and negative 
traditions, which penetrate all spheres of political life. 
According to many critical Western scholars, "Russia does not 
have a democratic tradition". 1 And indeed, Russia's "persistent tradition 
of absolutism in government, the recurrent use of revolutionary violence 
to solve political problems, and the lack of experience with democratic 
institutions and constitutional procedures"2 are some of the attributes that 
can be invoked. To this executive authoritarian legacy can be added the 
exclusive position of the 'nomenklatura' and other powerful economic 
elites as well as the traditional weakness of representative institutions, 
rule oflaw, and civil society. 
It can also be noted that many key principles of Western-style 
democracy have traditionally been absent in Russia. In fact, during the 
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Communist period, notions such as multi-party politics, competitive 
elections, and accountable government, among others, were either non-
existent or not fully developed. Furthermore, before Communism, "there 
was no pre-communist constitution, as there had been in each of the 
Baltic republics. There were no pre-communist parties ready to step out 
of the history books into the centre of public life. And there were no 
traditions of political organisation and electoral competition, as there had 
been in most of East Central Europe".3 
Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that authoritarian 
governance is also a phenomenon familiar to Western political 
experience. In fact, most of the developed Western democracies have 
gone through authoritarian phases in their history. Russia, can, therefore, 
overcome its authoritarian past and follow its own path towards 
democracy as other nations have. Russia has, in fact, already overcome 
some of these constraints on democracy. As Howard Wiarda points out, 
"Russia has at present a democratically elected government and many of 
the classic freedoms",4 even though it has "a powerful antidemocratic 
and authoritarian tradition".5 
Having made some progress towards democracy, Russia can 
continue to do so following its own path. The challenge is not so much to 
westernize Russia as to overcome its authoritarian legacy through the 
development of democratic institutions, which need to be and should be 
Russian in nature. 
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Russia's New Presidency: From Gorbachev to Putin 
The role of the executive is of utmost importance as a guarantor 
and promoter of democratic rule within the framework of the rule of law. 
Its position at the peak of all decisional bodies gives it both the privilege 
and responsibility to play this role. In Russia, this privilege has been 
taken for granted and the power of the executive has been overtly 
abused. 
Prior to the current presidential system; the top leadership of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU, was the decision-making 
body in the Soviet Union. At the peak of this party-state apparatus was 
the Communist Party General or First Secretary, who could also occupy 
the post of the head of state. Between the CPSU and the population 
existed the soviets, which "were popularly elected bodies in which, 
according to Soviet doctrine, legislative and executive power were 
fused".6 The CPSU "exercised its power through the soviets and through 
the executive bodies that were nominally accountable to the soviets".7 
This system was not abolished all at once; rather, there was a 
generally gradual transition towards the presidential system of today's 
Russia. The process in which this was done was, however, not the most 
democratic or transparent. In fact, "The transformation of Russia's 
political system after the fall of Communism was determined exclusively 
by the logic of the political battle being fought at the time, and not by 
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any long-range plans for state-building or by strategic agreements among 
the main political actors".8 
Mikhail Gorbachev took the initiative by introducing maJor 
changes in the Soviet political system. Handicapped by political 
instability, economic crisis, and loss of legitimacy, Gorbachev' s reforms 
involved the creation of new legislative and executive branches of 
government. "Gorbachev created a complicated four-tiered parliament 
for the USSR, consisting of a huge, 2250-member Congress of People's 
Deputies, which elected a smaller, full-time parliament called the 
Supreme Soviet. In turn, the Supreme Soviet was guided by its 
Presidium, which was overseen by a Chairman".9 Elections to this new 
governmental body were held in 1989. In 1990s, elections to similar 
bodies were held in all 15 republics of the Soviet Union. 
Subsequently, Gorbachev also created the office of the President 
of the Soviet Union. "To overcome the objections of some republican 
leaders to the establishment of a presidency, Gorbachev agreed to grant 
them membership in a new body, the Federation Council, which would 
review policies on inter-ethnic and inter-republican relations" .10 
Moreover, "unwilling to risk personal defeat or the strains that a 
competitive election campaign would place on the nation, Gorbachev 
insisted that the Congress select the first Soviet president, with 
subsequent presidential elections to be decided by direct popular vote". 11 
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After the Congress of People's Deputies was elected in the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1990, Boris Yeltsin was 
chosen as its Chairman. Yeltsin and his supporters persuaded the 
Congress to create a popularly elected Presidency of the Russian 
Federation, and as a result of the 1991 presidential election, Yeltsin 
became Russia's first democratically elected head of state. However, it 
should be noted that "if many Russian deputies supported the 
introduction of the presidency, it was only because the Congress of the 
People' s Deputies was still legally the supreme organ ofpower"!2 
After the creation of the Presidency, Yeltsin and his close 
supporters sought to concentrate as much power as possible in the new 
institution. "Yet while willing to use power as needed, he also came to 
rely on the public for support at critical junctures. Thus, while late Soviet 
period statutes made the Russian president subordinate to the elected 
legislature, Yeltsin moved forward after the failed August 1991 coup 
effort to secure extraordinary powers to introduce a radical reform 
programme". 13 Once again, the means utilized to achieve this goal were 
quite authoritarian. 
The nse of this opportunistic presidency led to a critical 
confrontation between the executive branch and its legislative 
counterpart: "A constitutional crisis mounted until the fall of 1993, when 
Y eltsin issued a decree suspending the parliament, establishing a new 
legislative body, and calling for new elections in December. [the 
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parliament persisted, and] Yeltsin ultimately called in Russian troops to 
storm the parliament building. After a brief battle the remaining 
parliament members surrendered" .14 As Yeltsin had indicated, elections 
for a new parliament and a referendum on the draft Constitution took 
place on December 12, 1993. 
Given the circumstances, which included the abuse of both 
political and military power by the presidency, the elections for 
parliament and the referendum for the new constitution had questionable 
legitimacy. The population that did go to the polls did so because they 
needed a parliament and a Constitution to rely on in spite of the political 
unrest. Moreover, according to election specialists "in all there took part 
in the elections of December 12, 49 million out of 106.2 registered 
voters, or 46.1 percent of the total". 15 It was also acknowledged that 
"last-minute changes to the draft constitution dramatically strengthened 
presidential power at the expense of parliament". 16 
Thus, Boris Y eltsin created an office that was well above any 
other governmental or non-governmental body. The presidency has a 
privileged position due to all the powers that were assigned to it as well 
as to its superior status vis-a-vis other governmental institutions. This 
resulted in a very lopsided institutional balance. The predominance of the 
presidential office adheres to the traditional Russian practice of 
concentration of power in the hands of the top political executive, be it 
the Tsar, the Communist Party's General Secretary, or the President. As 
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Archie Brown points out, "the presidency was a completely new 
institution in Russia's political tradition, but still, by a circuitous route, 
through the twisted paths of the political struggle, it led back to the 
autocratic tradition" .17 Brown also states that the creation of the 
presidency "was a movement in a direction typical for Russia, towards a 
system where power is personified completely and embodied in one 
person". 18 
In the evolution of events, the ultimate outcome was a winner-
takes-all scenario. Thus, "the president predominates constitutionally 
over parliament not because of some coherent idea of the proper role of 
the chief executive, but because it was the Supreme Soviet (the State 
Duma's predecessor) and not the presidency that lost the great 
institutional power struggle of 1993".19 This was a battle that could not 
be constitutionally, politically or even morally justified: "Above all, it 
imposed a strongly presidential system for which there was no national 
consensus, and which raised political and constitutional difficulties of its 
own".20 
Moreover, "Yeltsin and his supporters shaped the post-Soviet 
system and created an all-powerful presidency, with Y eltsin' s own 
constitutionally legitimated transfer of power to Vladimir Putin at the 
end of the 1999 setting yet another precedent in the consolidation of the 
new system".21 Once Putin took power, he made no effort whatsoever to 
reverse any of the authoritarian developments that had taken place prior 
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to his tenure of office, au contraire, he envisioned concentrating even 
more power in his office. "Shortly after assuming the presidency on 7 
May 2000, he delivered a television address to the nation that called for a 
dictatorship of law to restore strong and centralized government".22 With 
concrete actions, the new president "introduced bills that promised to 
return Russia to a more traditional Moscow-centred and one-man-centred 
sty le of rule" .Z3 
Although the specific political events differ from one ruler to the 
next, in essence the actions taken are quiet similar. They include 
autocratic-type rule, abuse of power leading to excessive use of force in 
some instances, and using citizens not as active participants in policy-
making, but as the mass base for realization of projects ordered from 
above. It is, thus, of crucial importance for the future of Russian 
democracy to reform the political system so as to control and counteract 
this authoritarian tendency. 
The Institutional Design of the Russian Presidency 
The new Russian constitution, like many constitutions of modern 
democratic states, "specifies a separation of state power into three 
branches, ensures 'ideological pluralism' by proscribing any state-
sponsored ideology, and maintains a separation of church and state".Z4 
These are basic principles that are shared by democracies around the 
globe in their attempt to avoid the possibility of the rise of authoritarian 
regtmes. 
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Nonetheless, in Russia the actual division of powers among the 
branches of government is unequal. The executive has overwhelming 
powers over the legislature and the judiciary. It is imperative to 
emphasize at this point that this is a political design that can function 
well elsewhere, but not necessarily in Russia. 
As Stephen White argues, "the formal powers of the Russian 
president are extremely far-reaching. He makes appointments to almost 
all positions of importance, including the powerful Security Council and 
government itself (he appoints the prime minister 'with the agreement of 
the State Duma', and on his proposal appoints and dismisses other 
ministers)" ?5 In practice, "as the experience of Y eltsin regime aptly 
demonstrated, the president has the power to appoint and dismiss the 
prime minister, deputy prime ministers and other ministers, as well as 
dismiss the government overall"?6 What entitles the president to such 
extensive power is the fact that "unlike the French system of possible 
"cohabitation", where a prime minister heading the government has a 
power base at least partially independent of the president, the Russian 
prime minister must maintain the president's confidence to remain m 
office".27 
Moreover, ''the president has the power to dissolve the Duma 
and call new elections"?8 He/she also has "the right to issue decrees that 
have the force of law"?9 And, "indeed, many controversial political 
decisions, such as the September 1993 dissolution of parliament and the 
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December 1994 intervention in Chechnya, were taken by decree".30 
These presidential decrees are not only used to impose political actions 
of great magnitude and controversy but are also excessively utilized, as it 
was demonstrated with over 1,500 decrees issued during the Yeltsin's 
regime alone. 
The president's role is not limited to the executive function; 
he/she is also at the core of the legislative process. The president can, in 
fact, initiate and reject legislation. Should the president reject a bill, a 
two-thirds majority vote from both houses is needed to override the 
presidential veto- a majority difficult or impossible to achieve, given the 
degree of control the President has over the legislature. 
Moreover, the President also has the power to appoint members 
of the Constitutional Court. Further, "the Constitution permits the 
President to use 'reconciliatory procedures' to settle differences between 
the federal and regional authorities.31 President Putin used this power 
actively to recentralize Russian state authority. "In several particularly 
egregious cases of a conflict of laws, Putin acted immediately to annul 
regional legislation or send warning letters to govemors".32 
As for institutional means to control the presidency, they are 
almost non-existent. John P. Willerton Jr clearly and appropriately 
indicated in his work on the Russian presidency, "what makes the 
presidency hegemonic is not only the fact that its position is legally 
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superior to that of other bodies, but the institutional independence and 
freedom of manoeuvre the president possesses".33 It is true that ''the 
president must be elected; but he is not accountable to the Federal 
Assembly, and can only be removed from office for 'high treason or 
other grave state crime' after a very complicated process has been 
invoked"34, which involves both houses of parliament as well as the 
Constitutional Court. Moreover, "If the Duma passes a vote of no 
confidence in the government, the president may either dissolve the 
Duma or dismiss the government".35 
Thus, the Russian presidency has enormous power subject to 
very few limitations. One might argue that the features of the Russian 
presidency are similar to those of Western presidential systems, for 
instance, the American system - and that if this design functions well in 
other democracies, it should also be viable for Russia. But this argument 
reflects the questionable westernization assumption that what is good for 
the West is good elsewhere. This institutional design is not placed within 
a vacuum but within a very specific historical and cultural context. In so 
far as democratic development in Russia continues to be hampered by 
strong authoritarian traditions, the current institutional design does not 
impede such tendency but rather facilitate it. Thus, the president's 
extraordinary role in Russian politics presents a very serious challenge to 
the development of Russian democracy. 
The Russian Presidency and the Process of Democratization 93 
The Russian Presidency and the Process of Democratization: Are 
They Compatible? 
The Russian presidency has, as John P. Willerton Jr. indicates, 
"evolved into a powerful institution affecting all aspects of Russian 
political life".36 Unfortunately, the evolution of the Russian presidency 
did not result from any strategic plan for democratic development. As 
discussed by a critical scholar of post-communist Russia, "rather than 
study the complex and subtle ways in which democratic institutions 
shape incentives and sustain themselves over the long haul, Russian 
leaders have preferred to indulge in superficial manipulations aimed at 
securing immediate advantages for themselves and their factions".37 This 
was most definitely the case of Boris Yeltsin and, to a certain extent, 
Vladimir Putin, who accepted the existing setup and strengthened the 
Presidency even more. 
But what is democracy precisely? One of the best known 
definitions is given by Robert Dahl, who emphasizes three aspects: "1) 
organized contestation through regular, free, and fair elections; 2) the 
right of virtually all adults to vote and contest for office; and 3) freedom 
of press, assembly, speech, petition, and organization".38 Although, all 
these elements of democracy have been questionably fulfilled in Russia, 
this country cannot be perceived as a complete democracy. Neil Munro 
and Richard Rose offer an interesting approach to identifying 
democracies, which complements Dahl's definition. Their approach is 
also appropriate for states such as Russia, which are currently going 
through the process of democratic development. According to Munro and 
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Rose, "a completely democratic state must meet two conditions: it must 
be a modern, rule-of-law state and the government must be chosen by 
free elections. If only one of these conditions is met, then a regime is 
incompletely democratic".39 
Under such definition, Russia is not yet a completely democratic 
state. Munro and Rose note that "leaders of new regimes are often more 
concerned with building their own power than with institutionalizing a 
rule-of-law state that imposes constraints on · the power they claim by 
virtue of election".40 Rule of law enables a strong presidency while 
constraining possibilities of its abuse. If there are no constraints, the 
chief political executive is free to rule with absolute power. "In framing a 
government, which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself'.41 
Russia is at a crucial moment in its process of building a 
democratic state since the relatively undemocratic constitutional system 
recently created by Boris Yeltsin is still in place. President Putin had the 
option of proposing constitutional reforms, which would limit 
presidential powers and thereby further the process of building both the 
rule of law and democracy. Instead, he continued to follow the path 
dictated by Boris Y eltsin. Moreover, "should Putin succeed in the 
campaign to strengthen the presidency and the central state, there is a 
risk that an attempt to rationalize state authority may degenerate into a 
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new authoritarianism. One cannot rule out the rise of a future leader- a 
statist with a world-view uncluttered by liberal values-who is willing to 
use the heightened powers of the Russian presidency to silent all 
opposition.'"'2 This goes back to the authoritarian Russian tradition "of 
accountability to the tsar rather than by the tsar".43 
How can Russia overcome this authoritarian legacy at the 
executive level? Most definitely, the answer is not to import a democratic 
tradition from elsewhere. The solution to this problem must be found at 
home. Unfortunately, "post-soviet Russian society continues to wrestle 
with this historical past of executive domination and public submission, 
yet in the midst of ongoing turbulent transformational politics, many 
Russians continue to desire - as consistently revealed in opinion surveys 
-a strong, stabilising hand at the state's helm".44 
This situation needs to be dealt with at all levels of state and 
society. Both the government and the governed must come to the 
realization that what is needed is not a strong (authoritarian) leader but 
one that is willing to govern with all the limitations that the virtue of 
elections provides. Thus, what is needed is a leader that submits 
him/herself to real rule of law. In order to achieve this, the institutional 
design of the government needs to be reworked, especially in terms of 
limiting the power of the presidency and its dominance over the other 
government institutions. Such constraints should be based on the 
limitation of executive powers and institutional accountability. 
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These changes might seem unattainable in Russia, especially 
because this revolution must come from above, as the executive must 
give up power. However, we can cite the precedent set by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who initiated liberal reforms which were considered 
unthinkable at the time. The civil society, interest groups, and the 
representative bodies of the state must all work together to make the 
President acknowledge that changes need to be made. In spite of their 
prolonged weakness, it is imperative to start "by slowly nurturing home-
grown, local, and indigenous institutions, which are often the only viable 
ones in the society, and carefully cultivating them meanwhile 
encouraging economic, social, and political growth - until they have a 
chance to flower into full-fledged democracy".45 After all, home-grown 
democracy has a better chance to prosper and last than imposed or 
imitated democracy.46 
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Reforming Russia's Judiciary 
Professor Peter H. Solomon, Jr., University of Toronto 
As of the start of 2003, the process of judicial reform in the 
Russian Federation was in high gear. This was due in large part to the 
priority given by President Putin to the strengthening of courts and law, 
as reflected in: the Federal Program for the Development of the Courts, 
political support for the adoption of new procedure codes, and the efforts 
to establish legal hierarchy (through the harmonization of laws and the 
distribution of governmental functions through law). Today, I present 
some of the highlights of the current court reform project, placing it in 
the context of the past decade; and then argue that the ultimate success of 
these efforts at institutional change depends upon the degree to which 
they are accompanied, sooner or later, by cultural changes and changes 
in the nature of governance. 
The Y eltsin Legacy 
In the Yeltsin years, much was done to reduce the dependency of 
judges upon outside forces, such as local and regional bosses, and to 
empower the courts. Judges on most courts received life appointments 
and became subject to removal only for cause by Judicial Qualification 
Collegia composed only of their peers. The financing of the courts 
became an exclusively federal responsibility, and new judicial 
departments subordinate to the judiciary took over court administration 
from the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, courts assumed a great 
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deal of new and important jurisdiction, ranging from constitutional and 
commercial matters to the crucial domain of administrative justice. 
Citizens gained the right to complain about the legality of acts of 
officials and even normative acts themselves. By the end of the decade, 
they were bringing a huge number of suits against the government (in 
regular, arbitrazh and military courts), and for the most part successfully. 
Nonetheless, there remained obstacles to the achievement of 
independent and powerful courts. From 1997 regional governments again 
had a voice in judicial selection, and could veto the promotion of judges 
to higher courts or the appointment of chairs of courts. The failure of the 
federal government to deliver all of the funds assigned to the courts led 
court chairs in 1997 and 1998 to seek and obtain supplementary funding 
from local and regional governments and even froni private sponsors -
thereby raising the specter of renewed dependencies. The authority of 
courts, especially in the constitutional and commercial realms, was hurt 
by difficulties in assuring implementation of their decisions. As if this 
were not enough, a significant part of the public did not trust the courts, 
viewing them as inefficient if not also corrupt. 
Putin and the Courts 
Vladimir Putin was determined to change this situation and 
achieve courts in Russia that would be respected and trusted, as well as 
provide a reliable framework for investors. During the winter of 2001, a 
high level commission under deputy head of the presidential 
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administration Dmitrii Kozak wrestled with this challenge and produced 
a set of recommendations most of which were realized in legislation at 
the end of the year. To strengthen the accountability of judges (and the 
appearance that corruption and inefficiency were being addressed), 
jurists from outside the judiciary were added to the Qualification 
Collegia, the rules for removing judicial immunity from prosecution 
simplified, and chairs of courts limited to fixed terms in office. To 
strengthen the independence of judges, regional governments were 
removed from the appointment and promotion process. But the most 
significant change was the adoption of the Federal Program for the 
Development of the Courts for 2002 to 2006 that dramatically increased 
federal funding of the courts. The program has raised the salaries of 
judges significantly and phased out most of their perks and benefits, 
some of which were given at the discretion of the court chair. The 
program has also provided funds for hiring new judges (especially 
justices of the peace) and clerks (pomoshchniki suda), for the education 
of judges, and for repairing and modernizing court buildings and 
computerizing the court system; and paid for the extension of jury trials 
to regional and republican level courts through the Russian Federation. 
The extraordinary new federal funding is meant not only to improve 
court operations but also to reduce financial dependency on regional and 
local governments. 
Among the reform initiatives currently underway are two of 
special importance and interest - the justice of the peace courts and the 
1 02 Peter H. Solomon, Jr. 
new Criminal Procedure Code. Although, conceived as a revival from the 
Tsarist past that would bring justice closer to the people, the 
establishment of JP courts from late 1999 fulfilled the desire of top 
judges to expand the judicial system and relieve caseload pressure; and, 
as of the end of 2002, some 5,000 justices (each serving a geographical 
district) had begun handling a high volume of cases of low complexity. 
Justices of the peace in Russia are regular, full time professional judges 
whose salaries are paid by the federal government, but whose courts 
belong to the subjects of the Federation, which are responsible for 
financing their administration and selecting their justices. The JPs 
jurisdiction includes most divorce and family cases, disputes over wages 
and failures to repair apartments, violations of tax law, all suits of 
moderate value, and the bulk of criminal offences bringing punishments 
of no more than three years confinement, as well as all administrative 
infractions. As a result the JPs are hearing on average 70% of civil cases 
and 30% of criminal cases, thereby relieving the district courts of a lot of 
caseload, and giving their judges time to consider complicated cases 
more carefully. Admittedly, district courts take cases on appeal from the 
JPs, but only three percent of their decisions are challenged. In many 
places, the JPs are becoming strained, and at the start of 2003 plans were 
underway to expand the system to 9,500 justices, or one third of the 
whole judicial corps in the Russian Federation. Already, JPs have 
become the court with whi~h most citizens have contact. But their quality 
varies dramatically, depending upon the degree of support provided by 
the various subject governments. 
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After more than a decade of struggle, a new Criminal Procedure 
Code went into operation in July 2002, some of whose provisions were 
revolutionary, and whose implementation is still being opposed by the 
police. The expansion of trial by jury (which routinely produces 
acquittals rates in the double digits as opposed to a fraction of one 
percent) is well known. But there are more important novelties. One is 
the fulfilment of the constitutional requirement of exclusively judicial 
approval of pre-trial detention. In practice, this has led to a sharp and 
apparently lasting drop in the number and percentage of accused persons 
placed in custody, partly because of judge refusals (15% of the time) but 
even more because procurators are unwilling to request detention where 
the grounds are shaky. Given the horrible state of the investigatory 
prisons (SIZO), this is a big achievement. As part of its emphasis on 
adversarial procedure, the new Code also requires that procurators argue 
every case in court and approve all indictments, and the Code eliminated 
a favourite ending of cases that came apart, the infamous return to 
supplementary investigation. As a result, procurators have started to 
screen cases coming from the police, and now throw out weak or poorly 
prepared cases, so that the overall number of criminal cases has 
decreased. Even so, the rate of acquittal has doubled since last summer 
(now averaging close to 2%), and many more cases are stopped by 
judges. The fairness of criminal justice in Russia is increasing, for weak 
cases presented by police (often incompetently prepared or launched 
under pressure) are no longer as likely to result in convictions. Another 
novelty in the new UPK is a shortened trial following confession. To be 
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sure, Soviet style plea bargaining is limited to charges bringing up to five 
years, but it is working well in practice and producing sentences of 
greater leniency than required by the law. To ensure that the UPK is 
properly implemented and adjusted where appropriate, a major 
monitoring is taking place under the guidance of Duma deputy Elena 
Miziulina. 
I have touched on only a small number of current judicial reform 
initiatives. Efforts also are underway to strengthen the 'arbitrazh' courts 
that handle commercial disputes, including the taxation of firms, to 
implement a new civil procedure code, and to ~stablish new brand 
administrative courts. And there are a number of projects funded by 
Western governments (including especially Canada) and by the World 
Bank aimed at modernizing the functioning of courts and inter alia 
removing from judges and chairs of courts non-judicial functions that 
interfere with the impartiality of adjudication. 
Meta-institutional (Cultural) Challenges 
To succeed in achieving courts that are fair, efficient, trusted and 
respected, judicial reform needs to produce cultural change and to benefit 
from cultural changes within public life; more generally. 
To start, there is the challenge of changing the mentalities of 
judges, to ensure that they (and especially younger judges) internalize the 
concept of judicial independence, judicial ethics, and above all a 
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commitment to applying legal principles and rights that exist beyond the 
letter of particular laws. Judges need to reach beyond the strict positivism 
of the civil law tradition and absorb the newer European recognition that 
law (pravo) consists of more than the laws of the state (zakony) and 
gives pride of place to rights of a transcendental kind, which have been 
built into European wide legal documents that the Russian Federation has 
endorsed. Despite the ambitions of the new Academy of Justice, so far 
newly appointed judges receive only a one month training course; this 
does not promote the values I refer to. 
Even more serious is the lag of public appreciation of the courts 
behind the real advances in their performance. In the new millennium 
polls record public attitudes toward courts in Russia as ambivalent and 
sceptical, if not downright negative. How a public perceives its courts 
reflects concern with the fairness of the courts' decisions; with 
accessibility to the courts; and with the efficiency of court operations. 
Obviously, if the public believes judges to be corrupt or serving the rich, 
it will not hold courts in high esteem. Accessibility also matters. A 2001 
survey by VTsiOM found that 80% of well off persons in Russia 
believed that courts would defend their rights, but that less than 20% of 
persons with low education and incomes shared this belief. At the same 
time, poll data from Western countries indicates that the perceived 
efficiency of courts correlates closely with their standing in the mind of 
the public. In countries like Denmark, Finland and Austria, around half 
of the public sees courts as efficient and even more trust their courts. In 
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Belgium, where only 17% see their courts as efficient, only 22% trust 
them. 
How can Russia, a country where the social legitimacy of courts 
was never high, become less like Belgium and more like Finland? On the 
one hand, it is vital to improve the actual fairness, accessibility, and 
efficiency of the courts. On the other hand, it is important to better 
inform the public about how the courts are improving. Too often the 
Russian public is ignorant about what the courts can do. A poll 
conducted in 1997 revealed that only 20% of Russians thought that they 
were likely to succeed if they complained in court against a government 
official, whereas the actual rate of satisfaction stood around 80%! As I 
argued in Moscow last week at a roundtable meeting of Russian judges 
and court administrators with Western donors, public education about the 
courts represents a key response. Press officers need to be established not 
only in judicial departments but also in large courts; and courts of all 
kinds should place more of their decisions on websites (now done only 
on an experimental basis). In short, improving public esteem for courts in 
the Russian Federation requires a new level of transparency about their 
operations - however foreign this may be to Russian and even European 
traditions. 
Finally, the achiev~ment of fair and trusted courts cannot happen 
independently of changes in other parts of government that connect with 
law. One is overcoming the traditional weakness in Russia of legal 
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prerogatives. Too often roles and agencies have functions rather than 
legally defined powers, and relationships among actors and governments 
are defined through personal connections rather than rules. President 
Putin's current effort to use law to specify the concrete responsibilities of 
different levels of government in the RF represents an admirable if 
partial response. Another law-related challenge is the need to transform 
the work of government officials in Russia so that they become a public 
service based upon the application of rules (a Weberian bureaucracy) 
rather than an amalgam of fiefdoms based upon clientelism serving for 
the most part sectoral and private interests. Perhaps, through 
compartmentalization it is possible to have in Russia fair and respected 
courts coexisting with public administration that is, or is perceived to be, 
corrupt. But I would not count on it. 
Conclusion 
In their classic treatise on democratic transitions Juan Linz and 
AI Stepan argue that consolidated democracy requires rule of law, but 
offer no hints as to how that blessed and ill defined state of affairs might 
emerge in a country where law had served as a mere instrument of rule 
and courts were dependent on political authority. A satisfactory theory of 
legal transition has yet to be developed, although elements of one are in 
the air. That there must be demand for law among key elites, and not 
only a supply of good laws and legal institutions, is accepted by many. 
And, as I have suggested, legal and judicial reform will not reach 
fulfilment should they take place in a vacuum. Changes in public 
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attitudes and changes in the practices of government itself must sooner or 
later come to reinforce and support changes in the institutions of the law. 
All this suggests that the battle for the courts will be one of 
decades rather than years. Just as the successes of the Judicial Reform of 
1864 were recognized and celebrated only in 1914, after fifty years, so 
the real meaning and impact of the efforts of reformers under Y eltsin and 
Putin will be clear only well into the future. 1 
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Engendering Democracy in Russia 
Professor Valerie Sperling, Clark University 
Building democracy in Russia is a gendered process. This paper 
briefly treats three aspects of Russia's ongoing struggle with 
democratization, showing that each of these aspects is gendered, and 
asking where women are in each of these processes. First, I discuss 
political representation, exploring women's participation in the decision-
making bodies of the country. Then, I examine women's representation 
'outside' of high politics, looking at civil society and women's 
organizations in particular, and at the challenges they face in trying to 
gain financial support and a popular 'constituency' -a concept crucial to 
democracy. Finally, I describe a Russian women's organization called the 
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, which is struggling to bring about one 
of the central aspects of democratization, namely, implementing the rule 
of law. 
Political Representation 
Women's representation in the political bodies of the Russian 
state - in the parliament, the executive branch, and in local government -
is limited. One concept that can be useful here is the 'gender gap' -a 
shorthand way of describing the under-representation of women in 
political positions. I should say from the start that the proportion of men 
and women as elected and appointed politicians in nearly all countries is 
highly skewed, with men dominating the political field across the board. 
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This is true of Russia as well. The gender gap is so dramatic that 
Russia's political elite has been described as a 'male club'. As one 
illustration of that exclusivity, between 1996-1999, there was only one 
woman in the upper house of Russia's parliament. 1 
The story of women's representation in the lower house of 
Russia's parliament over the last ten years is not entirely linear. Back in 
October 1993, after Yeltsin had the military shell the Russian parliament, 
it was announced that there would be elections in just a few months to a 
new legislative body, the Duma. At that time, one of the women's 
organizations in Russia wrote to all of the parties that were planning to 
field candidates, to inquire as to what their party platforms were going to 
say about women's concerns; these concerns included disproportionately 
female unemployment, the low representation of women in politics, and 
widespread violence against women, among others. Only a few political 
parties bothered to respond, and the most memorable response came 
from Zhirinovsky, who said his party's position on women's problems 
was that, if his party won the elections, it would provide a man for each 
woman; it would make sure that no woman would be left without a man. 
This was a way of dismissing women's concerns, claiming that women's 
problems could be reduced to the presence or lack of a 'muzhik', of a 
man, in their lives. This women's organization found Zhirinovsky's 
response and others to be rather unsatisfying and decided to form their 
own electoral bloc for the 1993 elections, called Women of Russia. In a 
surprising development, Women of Russia attained roughly 8% of the 
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vote, and their bloc crossed the threshold into the Duma. That success 
brought the percentage of women in the Duma to just over 11 percent 2 • 
However, the percentage of women in Russia's Duma has declined since 
then, and today is only about 7 percent, so there is a gender gap in 
women's representation at the national level. 
There is also a gender gap at the regional level in Russia, where 
parliamentary bodies are dominated by men. As of June 1997, 
legislatures in several of Russia's regions contained no women at all. In 
four of Russia's 89 regions women's representation reached 30%, but, 
overall, across Russia's subnational legislatures, only 9 percent of the 
deputies were female as of February 1999.2 Relatively few women are 
being elected to Russia's law-making bodies. 
Within the executive branch, the gender gap is even more 
dramatic. In 1999, there was only one woman among Russia's governors 
and heads of republic governments and administrations (the governor of 
the Koriak autonomous okrug). Within the state bureaucracy, the 'glass 
ceiling' largely keeps women at lower levels of power. And as of 1999, 
women occupied just over one percent of the leadership positions in 
Russia's executive bodies, working as ministers or heading state 
committees.3 
Women are clearly disadvantaged within Russia's state 
administration, and that disadvantage may increase under Putin. One 
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Russian sociologist, Olga Kryshtanovskaia, has argued that 
approximately one third of new appointees at the deputy minister level 
under Putin's administration over the last three years were formerly 
employed in the military or intelligence fields. 4 Those fields are highly 
male dominated. If Russia's military and security/intelligence institutions 
are becoming an increasingly significant route to political power, then 
women ' s path into decision-making positions may be necessarily limited. 
Civil Society and Women's Organizations 
Citizens, however, have alternative ways of getting their voices 
heard in politics. And although women are often excluded from high-
level politics, they tend to play a large role in the nongovernmental 
(NGO) sector, which is less prestigious and lower paid than the business 
sector or high politics. But the NGO sector is nonetheless crucial for the 
development and entrenchment of civil society. And civil society is an 
essential element of any stable, consolidated democracy; it can serve to 
put a check on state power by encouraging citizen responsibility and 
activism, and thereby promoting civic engagement. American sociologist 
Myra Marx Ferree refers to the work of civil society as the 'housework' 
of politics, the unrecognized, largely unrewarded backbone of a 
democracy that keeps the politicians in check, keeps them responsible to 
the people, and thereby keeps democracy working. 5 
What have women been doing in this realm of civic activism in 
Russia? Since the start of Gorbachev's glasnost policy in the late 1980s, 
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women's groups have been organizing. In 1991, approximately 200 
women joined together for the first independent women's conference in 
Russia, the Independent Women's Forum. The organizers chose the term 
"independent" to reflect the fact that the conference was not organized 
by the communist party; it was organized from below, through women's 
networking. Organizing this conference was a fairly risky venture - after 
all, at the time, in 1991, grassroots organizing had been illegal until quite 
recently, and the state was still troubled by the idea of women - or 
anyone else - organizing on their own. On the eve of the conference, a 
popular newspaper published an article saying that the conference was 
going to be a meeting of 'overexcited lesbians', and parents in the town 
where the conference was to be held were warned to keep their children 
off the streets.6 Now, just over a decade later, there are hundreds of 
women's organizations operating in Russia, ranging from small women's 
studies research centers in Moscow and St. Petersburg and other major 
cities, to political advocacy groups that lobby on women's issues, to 
organizations of women journalists and other professionals; to women's 
employment training organizations, businesswomen's clubs, charities, 
and single mothers' groups - and there are a growing number of rape 
crisis centers and domestic violence hotlines in Russia' s major cities. 
The slogan of the First Independent Women's Forum was 
'Democracy minus women is not democracy', suggesting that one central 
aspect of women's organizing in Russia has been to provide a voice for 
women in the public sphere, to raise problems that male politicians seem 
114 Valerie Sperling 
content to ignore. Such problems include the dramatic collapse in 
women's social, economic, and political status in Russia since the early 
1990s. 
There is no lack of issues for women's movement groups in 
Russia to pursue. But the women's movement is beset by many 
challenges, including a lack of organizing experience, a lack of financial 
support, and one challenge that confronts every social movement, 
namely, how to frame the issues so that they will draw the attention of 
the public, and resonate with the public in order to get widespread 
support. 
The challenge of fundraising is a particularly interesting one for 
the women's movement in Russia. 7 In the mid-1990s, in the course of 
carrying out research for my book on the women's movement, every 
women's group I interviewed complained about a lack of money. For 
these organizations, even the cost of a fax machine was too high, and 
only a very few could afford an office. One of the reasons for this is that 
the women's groups are not involved in fundraising within Russia 
because the fundraising tactics that most organizations use in the West 
are not likely to be effective or even plausible for Russia. Whereas 
NGOs in the West want to raise money, they generally reach out to their 
members, or to a list of people that they believe might be inclined to 
donate some money to them - and they request such donations through a 
direct mail campaign. Those who receive the mailing and choose to 
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donate are likely to write a check, and put it in the mail, or to give the 
NGO permission to take a certain amount of money through a credit 
card. This process of 'checkbook activism', long familiar in the West, is 
not yet established in Russia, and the costs of a direct mail campaign 
would be beyond the realm of possibility for Russian women's groups. 
As a partial result of this economic-structural issue, many 
women's groups are funded by grants from foreign foundations, such as 
the Open Society Institute (Soros) and the Ford Foundation, and from 
foreign governmental funds (such as US government funds, distributed 
through USAID, and Canadian government funding). This funding is 
critical for Russian women's organizations; civil society, in order to 
function as a check on the state, needs money in order to organize. Yet 
there are unexpected side effects of this funding process. 
One side effect is a certain amount of competition between 
women's groups for foreign grants, since many groups find themselves 
applying for the same, limited pot of money. Another relevant side-effect 
of foreign funding is that many of the Russian women's movement 
activists have learned to use an English-language vocabulary to describe 
their work, in part because that work may benefit from the support of 
foreign feminists as well as foreign funders. Given the absence of 
domestic support for their organizations, this is an adaptive choice. 
Women's movement activists, especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
refer to 'gender issues', having adopted the word 'gender' from English 
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directly into Russian- as 'gender' -because there is no equivalent term 
in Russian. One of the problems for constituency-building, then is that 
some of the vocabulary of the women's movement will be inaccessible to 
the average Russian citizen. 
Thus, there are incentives for women activists in Russia to speak 
to their English-speaking audiences abroad, rather than to their potential 
mass audience at home. This can become a vicious circle for a social 
movement. If the focus remains on doing outreach to foreigners for 
funding, then domestic support from women at home may never be built. 
This has ramifications for democracy and the building of a constituency. 
The women's movement in Russia is sometimes dismissed as 
being a non-Russian phenomenon, a movement imported from the West, 
a movement that does not belong. This happens not only in Russia -
feminism or any ideology that promises to change the existing balance of 
power is almost always blamed on outside agitators, in countries across 
the globe. However, the fact that women's groups are targeted in this 
way as being 'foreign' is reinforced by the fact that many women's 
organizations in Russia are largely detached from a domestic 
constituency. These organizations are not mobilisational - they are not 
mass organizations, and they tend to lack dues-paying members, for the 
above-described reasons. 
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This phenomenon of a lack of domestic constituency for the 
women ' s movement in Russia echoes a similar problem among Russia's 
political parties. They tend to be weak when it comes to defining their 
programs, and they tend to be disconnected from constituencies. This 
only exacerbates the detachment of the population from politics, and 
bodes poorly for the democratization process in Russia on the whole. 
Democratization and The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers 
The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers is one women's 
organization active in Russia at present, which enjoys a grassroots base.8 
But the Committee's goal does not concern improving women' s status; 
rather, it is focused on repairing several gaps in Russia's democracy. The 
Committee got its start in the late 1980s, protesting against the Soviet 
Union 's war in Afghanistan, and against the brutal hazing process within 
the military. At this point, their main activities still include tracking 
deaths and injuries from hazing; they also counsel draft-age men and 
their parents about their rights, and they lobby for alternative service for 
those who do not want to serve in the Russian military. With regard to 
the current war going on in Chechnya, the Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers tries to spread accurate information about the war, by holding 
demonstrations, and press conferences. They further argue that the war in 
Chechnya is violating human rights, especially against civilians.9 
The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers argues that such acts are 
incompatible with democracy. Instead, they call upon the state to obey 
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the rule of law, to be transparent and honest with the population, to 
uphold human rights, and freedom of information. And in their actions 
the Soldiers' Mothers model this behaviour. When they lobby draft 
boards on behalf of their clientele, they argue strictly on the basis of 
Russian laws. Representatives of the Russian military and state have 
predictably responded to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers by 
labelling them as CIA agents. 10 
This presents another instance of portraying a women ' s 
organization as ' foreign ', as being alien to Russia, because they are 
challenging the state and the existing power hierarchy. 
In sum, I would argue that it is precisely this kind of challenge to 
the state that is a crucial aspect of building democracy. The more women 
organize on critical issues, the more citizens will become accustomed to 
the idea that the state, ultimately, should be accountable to them. This is 
a concept that was obviously anathema to the Soviet state, and one that is 
all too distant even from established democracies. Without a strong 
judicial system to hold executive power in check, and in the absence of a 
media that is able to safely portray the seamy underside of executive 
actions, it is inevitably up to the people to hold their elected leaders 
accountable, and to overcome whatever hesitations they may have about 
being actively engaged in the public sphere. This is one of the challenges 
central to the democratization process in Russia. 
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Circumstances Versus Policy Choices: Why Has 
Economic Performance of FSU States Been so Poor? 
Professor Vladimir Popov, Carleton University 
After the Soviet Union collapsed (December 1991) and market 
reforms were initiated, the economic performance of the successor states 
was more than disappointing. By the end of the 1990s output (GDP) had 
fallen by about 50% as compared to the highest pre-recession level of 
1989 (fig. 1 ), investment dropped even more, income inequalities rose 
greatly so that real incomes declined dramatically for the majority of the 
population, death rates increased by about 50%, whereas life expectancy 
declined markedly. In Russia output fell by 45% in 1989-98, death rates 
increased from 1% in the 1980s to 1.5% in 1994 and stayed at this high 
level thereafter, which was equivalent to over 700,000 additional deaths 
annually. Over the period of several years such population losses could 
be likened to the impact of the big war. 
During the Second World War, national income in the USSR fell 
only by 20% in 1940-42, recovered to its 1940 level in 1944, fell again 
by 20% in 1944-46 (during the conversion of the defense industry) but 
exceeded its 1940 level nearly by 20% already in 1948. In some of the 
FSU states that were affected by military conflicts (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Tajikistan) GDP in 2000 was only 30 to 
50% of its pre-transition levels; in Ukraine even without the military 
conflict GDP fell by nearly two thirds (fig. 1). In another comparison, in 
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East European countries (EE) the reduction of output continued for 2-4 
years and totaled 20 to 30%, whereas in China and Vietnam there was no 
transformational recession at all - on the contrary, from the very outset 
of reforms economic growth accelerated. 
' Post factum ', the reduction of output that occurred in the FSU 
during the 1990s should be considered as the exceptional case in world 
economic history. Never and nowhere, to the best of my knowledge, has 
there occurred such a dramatic decline in output, living standards and life 
expectancy without extraordinary circumstances, such as wars, 
epidemics, or natural disasters. Even during the Great Depression (1929-
33) GDP in Western countries on average fell by some 30% and by the 
end of the 1930s recovered to its pre-recession levels. 
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Why has the reduction of output and incomes in FSU been so 
deep and so long? To what extent was this collapse caused by the initial 
conditions and circumstances, i.e. predetermined and hardly avoidable, 
and to what extent it was 'man made', i.e. became the result of poor 
economic policy choices? If it is the wrong economic policy that is 
mostly responsible for the collapse, future historians may refer to the 
FSU transition as the biggest "man made" economic disaster ever to 
happen. 
The ubiquitous and virtually universal feeling is that "things 
went terribly wrong" and that with different policies it could have been 
possible to avoid most of the misfortunes that struck the former Soviet 
republics in the 1990s. After all, the majority other transition economies 
did better that the FSU states and it is difficult to accept the idea that the 
exceptional length and depth of recession in post Soviet states was 
predestined and inevitable. 
However, when it comes to the discussion of particular policies, 
there is much less agreement among the scholars. The question of why 
the FSU had to pay a greater price for economic transition is answered 
differently by those who advocate shock therapy and those who support 
gradual piecemeal reforms. Shock therapists argue that much of the costs 
of the FSU reforms should be attributed to inconsistencies of policies 
followed, namely to the inability of the governments and the central 
banks to fight inflation in the first half of the 1990. On the other hand, 
124 Vladimir Popov 
the supporters of gradual transition state exactly the opposite, blaming 
the attempt to introduce conventional shock therapy package for all the 
disasters and misfortunes. 
Quite a number of studies were undertaken with the intention to 
test whether fast liberalization and macro-stabilization pays off and 
finally leads to better performance.1 To prove the point, the authors 
regressed output changes during transition on liberalization indices 
developed in De Melo et al. (1996) and by EBRD (published in its 
Transition Reports), inflation and different measures of initial conditions. 
The conventional wisdom was probably summarized in the 1996 
World Development Report (WDR) From Plan to Market, which 
basically stated that differences in economic performance were 
associated mostly with 'good and bad' policies, in particular with the 
progress in liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. "Consistent 
policies, combining liberalization of markets, trade, and new business 
entry with reasonable price stability, can achieve a great deal even in 
countries lacking clear property rights and strong market institutions" -
was one of the major conclusions of the WDR 1996? 
At a first glance, there seems to be a positive relationship 
between liberalization and performance (fig. 2). However, a more careful 
consideration reveals that the link is just the result of sharp difference in 
the magnitude of the recession in EE countries, as a group, and FSU 
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states, also as a group (fig.2). Within these groups the correlation, if any, 
is much weaker, not to speak about China and Vietnam, which are 
outliers. The Chinese index of economic freedom (measured on a scale 
from 1 to 5 by the Heritage Foundation) was about the same in recent 
years as the Russian one, but the performance of the two countries 
differed markedly (fig. 3). Overall, attempts to link differences in output 
changes during transition to the cumulative liberalization index and to 
macro stabilization (rates of inflation) have not yielded any impressive 
results. Studies that tried to take into account a number of initial 
conditions (repressed inflation - monetary overhang before deregulation 
of prices, trade dependence, black market exchange rate premium, 
number of years under central planning, urbanization, over 
industrialization, and per capita income) found that in most cases 
liberalization becomes insignificant.3 
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The alternative explanation of the collapse of output in the FSU 
accepted in this paper is that the speed of reform 'per se' (shock versus 
gradual transition) did not matter a great deal. The unique magnitude of 
the recession was caused primarily by three groups of factors. First, by 
greater distortions in the industrial structure and external trade patterns 
on the eve of the transition. Second, by the collapse of state and non-state 
institutions, which occurred in the late 1980s - early 1990s and which 
resulted in chaotic transformation through crisis management instead of 
organized and manageable transition. And third, by poor economic 
policies, which basically consisted of macroeconomic instability and 
import substitution, no matter whether the pursued reforms were gradual 
or radical. 
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In the first approximation, economic recession that occurred in 
the FSU states was associated with the need to reallocate resources in 
order to correct the industrial structure inherited from the centrally 
planned economy (CPE). These distortions include over-militarization 
and overindustrialization, perverted trade flows among former Soviet 
republics and Comecon countries, excessively large size and poor 
specialization of industrial enterprises and agricultural farms. In most 
cases these distortions were more pronounced than in Eastern Europe, 
not to mention China and Vietnam- the larger the distortions, the greater 
the reduction of output. The transformational recession, to put in 
economic terms, was caused by an adverse supply shock similar to the 
one experienced by Western countries after the oil price hikes in 1973 
and 1979, and similar to post-war recessions caused by conversion of the 
defence industries. 
The additional reason for the extreme depth of the 
transformational recession was associated with the institutional collapse 
- here differences between EE countries and FSU are striking. The 
adverse supply shock in this case came from the inability of the state to 
perform its traditional functions - to collect taxes and to constrain the 
shadow economy, to ensure property and contract rights and law and 
order in general. Naturally, poor ability to enforce rules and regulations 
did not create a business climate conducive to growth and resulted in 
increased costs for companies. 
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It is precisely this strong institutional framework that should 
be. held responsible for both - for the success of gradual reforms in China 
and shock therapy in Vietnam, where strong authoritarian regimes were 
preserved and CPE institutions were not dismantled before new market 
institutions were created; and for the relative success of radical reforms 
in EE countries, especially in Central European countries, where strong 
democratic regimes and new market institutions emerged quickly. And it 
is precisely the collapse of the strong state and institutions that started in 
the USSR in the late 1980s and continued in the successor states in the 
1990s that explains the extreme length, if not the extreme depth of the 
FSU transformational recession. 
To put it differently, Gorbachev's reforms of 1985-91 failed 
not because they were gradual, but due to the weakening of the state 
institutional capacity leading to the inability of the government to control 
the flow of events. Similarly, Yeltsin reforms in Russia, as well as 
economic reforms in most other FSU states, were so costly not because 
of shock therapy, but due to the collapse of the institutions needed to 
enforce law and order and carry out manageable transition. 
Finally, performance was of course affected by economic policy. 
Given the weak institutional capacity of the state, i.e. its poor ability to 
enforce its own regulations, economic policies could hardly be 'good'. 
Weak state institutions usually imply import substitution and populist 
macroeconomic policies (subsidies to noncompetitive industries, budget 
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deficits resulting in high indebtedness and/or inflation, overvalued 
exchange rates), which have devastating impact on output. On the other 
hand, strong institutional capacity does not lead automatically to 
responsible economic policies. Examples range from the USSR before it 
collapsed (strong import substitution and periodic outbursts of open or 
hidden inflation) to such post Soviet states as Uzbekistan and Belarus, 
which seem to have stronger institutional potential than other FSU states, 
but do not demonstrate better policies (macroeconomic instability, for 
instance). 
It turns out that the FSU transition model (with partial exemption 
of Uzbekistan, Belarus and Estonia) is based on a most misfortunate 
combination of unfavorable initial conditions, institutional degradation, 
and inefficient economic policies, such as macroeconomic populism and 
import substitution. 
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Causes of Failure: Why Russia's Oil Industry Did Not 
Attract Large Scale Foreign Investments? 
Lilly A. Lo Manto, Undergraduate Student, York University 
After the collapse of the Soviet Communism, many experts were 
expecting to see large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI)1 into the 
Russian oil industry. However, the volume of FDI remained, until very 
recently, quite low. This essay will outline the causes of this failure. 
Factors such as fluctuations of the world oil market, the rate of Russia's 
capital depreciation and the impact of economic geography will be 
discussed. The main focus of the paper is on the role of the federal 
government and oil industry executives in the privatization process and 
the relations between them. Conflicts of interests over resource rents 
between the centre and the periphery, as well as the inability of the newly 
reconstructed federal government to create secure and transparent tax 
and legal frameworks fostered financial instability that dispelled any 
foreign investment incentives. Meanwhile, failed governance led to the 
transfer of decision-making power to the economic elite whose short-
term interest in wealth accumulation precluded the involvement of 
foreign investment. 
In the early 1990s, the West had high hopes for the role FDI 
would play in Russia's fiscal recovery, transition to a market system and 
reintegration into the world economy.2 Working closely with state 
agencies, foreign oil majors would introduce universal standards, 
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encourage local research and development, and offer scientific and 
technical training3 - all of which the state energy complex required in 
order to function and develop.4 Moreover, by increasing production 
capacity, providing training and employment, and "introduce[ing] a 
demonstration effect to domestic producers regarding world standards in 
terms of marketing, production, and service provision",5 FDI would give 
Western firms a direct stake in the success of the reform process.6 Major 
Western multinationals were particularly attracted by the potential of 
Russia's untapped hydrocarbon reserves, so as to meet the energy 
demands of the European and rapidly growing Asian markets.7 Indeed, 
high earnings could be garnered from Russia's oil resources, which 
ranked second in proven recoverable reserves8 and fed seventeen percent 
of the world's crude oil consumption.9 Additional investment incentives 
included cost reductions, through access to a low-cost but highly skilled 
labour force and lax environmental production standards. 10 
From the outset, however, three factors limited the participation 
of foreign investment in the Russian oil sector: the country's economic 
geography, the volatility of the international oil market, and the rate of 
Russia's inherited capital depreciation. Indeed, "severity of climate, 
distance (including the location of population as compared to natural 
resources) and the preponderance of costly land transport over cheap sea 
transport" 11 served to amplify the costs of Russian oil production. 
Furthermore, plentiful oil supplies led to a decline in world oil prices in 
the 1990s.12 In fact, abundant supplies and dwindling prices created 
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challenges for petroleum suppliers who were forced to "focus their 
efforts on reducing cost and improving productivity, effectively using 
new technology and building on their core competencies and competitive 
advantage". 13 Such tasks were difficult to accomplish in Russia, 
considering the country' s declining capital stock14 inherited from its 
previous regime whose penchant for water-injection technology, while 
boosting the rate of short-term extraction, increased damage to oil wells, 
thus effectively limiting long-term productive capacity.15 
Understanding the policies of the former Soviet Union 
concerning both oil production and foreign investment is, as C.H. 
McMillan maintains, necessary for understanding the role played by FDI 
in Russia's emerging petroleum sector in the 1990s.16 In the Communist 
era, the oil industry was among the most important productive sectors,17 
providing the main source of foreign currency earnings that were used to 
finance the imports of consumer goods, equipment and machinery.18 
However, accounting standards were primitive, management was 
insensitive to costs, services were provided on poorly defined contractual 
bases, and deliveries were made to traditional customers regardless of 
ability to pay or cost considerations. 19 Moreover, by the end of 1985, the 
fall in world oil prices seriously undermined the regime's external 
financial position. As the volume of oil production and export dropped, 
Soviet policy-makers considered the application of foreign technology, 
through FDis, as a viable method of revers.ing these downward tums.20 
Championed by Communist Party General, Mikhail Gorbachev, this 
134 Lilly A. Lo Manto 
approach fostered government policies of openness and facilitated 
economic reforms. 
It is important to note that Gorbachev's reforms, known as 
'Perestroika', "amounted to no less than a complete reversal of a strong 
ideologically motivated aversion to Western capital",21 encouraging the 
formation of cooperatives, small businesses and joint ventures (Nsi2• 
Indeed, several new laws, adopted in early January 1987, reopened the 
Soviet economy, for the first time since the 1920s, to limited forms of 
foreign equity investment by capitalist firms. Three years later, the 
government permitted the establishment of wholly foreign-owned 
companies in the form of branches or subsidiaries, and, less than six 
months before the dissolution of the USSR, the-newly elected President 
of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, signed a comprehensive foreign 
investment law that would survive the Soviet Union's collapse.23 
Although the USSR did experience an increase in foreign investment,24 
in the second half of the. 1980s, such growth was modest. In addition to 
being affected by the confusing regulatory environment for FDI, 
investors were leery to invest in a climate of political and economic 
turmoil characteristic of the Soviet Union's final years.25 In the end, 
Gorbachev's endeavours to create 'organic links' to the global market 
mostly fostered foreign enclaves, separate from the national economy?6 
Indeed, in 1992, when Boris Yeltsin, President of the newly 
independent Russian Federation, asked for decree powers, noting that 
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economic reforms were "impossible to carry out without sufficiently firm 
measures by the entire system of executive power"/7 there were little 
more than two thousand foreign investment projects in Russia.28 In the 
same year, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MINTOP) was established. 
Charged with the legal and administrative regulation of the fuel and 
energy complex, the new federal agency was to secure jurisdiction over 
the newly privatized companies and assure the flow of taxation revenue 
to the central treasury29• Nonetheless, by the autumn of the same year, 
following the dissolution of Soviet ministries, there was a marked shift in 
political control from the centre to the periphery.30 Together, enterprises 
and organs of local administration began to assert their own sovereignty, 
as regional governments became active promoters of local oil enterprises, 
being interested in the collection of taxes.31 Power struggles between 
Moscow and the republics ensued over the regulation of high profit-
earning sectors. Such tensions stymied Russia's emerging federalism and 
served as the political backdrop to the privatization process.32 
Guided by the ideology of liberal market capitalism,33 the first 
phase of Russia's privatization, was aimed at fostering a more open 
economy.34 President Yeltsin stated in June 1992: "We hope to 
accommodate foreign investment to the tune of hundreds of billions of 
dollars".35 However, the government's rather lax monetary policy, 
characterized by the extensive financing of bankrupt ventures and the 
printing of large amounts of roubles led to serious financial instability.36 
The state's inability to create an institutional structure for a market 
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economy was further exemplified by the results of the first privatization 
auctions, where competitions to privatize low stock market value state 
enterprises37 through the use of vouchers38 invariably turned out to be 
"management-employee buy-out program[s]".39 Despite the presidential 
decree of November 1992 that stipulated the state's majority ownership 
rights, in the following year the privatization of the Russian oil industry 
was typified by governmental passivity.40 Top Russian oil majors began 
to affirm their control through the minority stakes the state put up for 
sale, while foreigners were only permitted to purchase up to fifteen 
percent of a stock in a Russian petroleum company.41 Consequently, 
managers of local enterprises and regional government leaders began to 
take over assets in the oil industry,42 with no major external 
participation.43 Indeed, by the end of 1993, there had not been a single 
major foreign investment in the industry, since the Soviet Union's 
collapse, leading experts such as McMillan to conclude: "a foreign 
investment boom in Russia is not just not around the comer".44 
In mid-1994, as power overwhelmingly flowed to the hands of 
the managerial elite, what Daniel J. McCarthy et al. term as the 
'nomenklatura' stage of privatization45 effectively began. For the 
following three years, the official governmental goal was to help create 
funds for the restructuring of newly privatized Russian enterprises.46 In 
truth, revenues earned from the piecemeal cash privatization of valuable 
firms engaged in the production of raw materials and utilities were used 
to finance growing federal budget deficits.47 Scholars such as Allen C. 
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Lynch blame the political and administrative sphere for Russia's 
prolonged economic decline in the 1990s.48 This period was marked by 
the existence of a political regime built around the presidency and the 
prime minister49 that lacked the necessary state apparatus for effective 
taxation - essential for fostering a sound investment climate.50 Russia's 
tax system, largely inherited from Soviet times, was characterized by the 
proliferation of tax offsets and the growth of a web of tax exemptions 
and deferrals granted by various levels of government51 • Although 
Y eltsin' s government maintained the Soviet tradition of subsidizing the 
industrial sector via the revenues garnered from resource-rich areas, 
Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham note that the "unwillingness of 
people in certain areas of Russia and certain individual enterprises to 
subsidize the federal government" amounted to a virtual tax revolt.52 
Indeed, during this period, oil producers resisted paying their full share 
of taxes. 53 Furthermore, the frequent changes in the tax system not only 
impeded domestic planning and compliance - fostering "powerful 
incentives to evade taxes"/4 - but also served to undermine financial 
incentives established to attract foreign investrnent.55 By the end of 1996, 
total tax concessions amounted to over seven percent of GDP. 56 The 
state's inability to raise sufficient tax revenue hindered the government 
capacity to regulate of the macro-economy and to honour domestic and 
foreign fiduciary obligations.57 The inevitable outcome was a weak 
central state that permitted "its leaders to pass over control of parts of the 
. • " 58 economy to pnvate mterests . 
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The desire to use privatization as an alternative to revenue 
collection acted as an incentive for such a reversal of power and 
culminated in the program that came to be known as 'loans-for-shares'. 59 
In this scheme, adopted by presidential decree on 31 August 1995,60 
Russian investors would take over for a specified period a part of the 
government's share in trust management, in exchange for supplying the 
state with credit.61 If the state could not repay, the lender would then 
auction off the stock collateral to the highest bidder, keep a fraction of 
the proceeds equivalent to the value of the loan, and return remaining 
revenue to the government. 62 A consortium of new Russian banks 
participated as lending parties. Since the government was consistently 
unable to make the credit repayments, the banks seized the opportunity to 
organize auctions to their own financial advantage,63 involving 
"predetermined transfers to friends and insiders, with only a fig leaf of an 
auction or market sale".64 Indeed, as Marshall I. Goldman noted, rarely 
did more than one bidder materialize. Each of the bidders represented an 
organization associated with the bank conducting the auction, while all 
other bidders, even if they offered a higher price, were disqualified on 
some or other technicality. Ultimately, the state was the invariable loser, 
receiving only a fraction more than the original price of the loans.65 
The oil sector was not an exception to this, but rather its perfect 
example. By 1996, a major reconstruction of the industry had taken place 
whereby the government was no longer the majority owner in many 
holding companies.66 One such entity was Russia's second largest oil 
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corporation, YuKOS.67 On 8 December 1995, the Menatep bank initiated 
an investment 'loans-for-shares' auction, through which it procured 78% 
of YuKOS shares through an intermediary company named Luguna. The 
only other bidder permitted to participate was Reagent, another Menatep-
sponsored company.68 Both Luguna and Reagent were formed mere days 
before the auction, with the bank's financial backing. The following 
year, in order to pay off a two trillion-rouble wage and tax debt,69 
Menatep initiated, with the government's participation, a state-shares 
auction. 70 At which time, the bank effectively decreased its exposure but 
retained both direct and indirect control of ninety-four percent ofYuKOS 
shares. However, the state's revenue from the auction was insignificant, 
for, as Valery Kryukov and Arild Moe write, "the conditions for the 
competition were 160 million dollars plus an investment program of 200 
million dollars, approximately the same amount stipulated in the 
conditions for the loans-for-shares auction a year earlier".71 
Ultimately, in order to solidify their power and wea1th,72 large 
conglomerates known as financial and industrial groups (FIGs), mainly 
controlled by former Communist party functionaries put in charge of 
managing state oil enterprises, would set aside a portion of the 
government's oil assets for privatization while maintaining positions as 
executive officers and major stockholders in newly formed petroleum 
companies. 73 Ken I. Kim and Anna Yelkina estimate that "more than 
seventy percent of the shares of privatized companies wound up in the 
hands of such individuals"/ 4 who considered themselves sovereign and 
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capable of pursing a hegemonic role within the industry. 75 FIGs formed 
interest lobbies which, through insider managerial collusion, ensured the 
provision of collective state benefits, 76 in the form of discriminatory 
transfer pricing, share swaps within holding companies, restricted access 
to shareholder meetings, and share dilution,77 and thus preserved control, 
avoided outside ownership78 and invariably circumscribed the entry of 
FDI into the Russian oil sector. 
It is also very important to note the government's inadequate 
attention to designing legislative and contractual frameworks 79 through 
the development of production sharing agreements (PSAs).80 
Fundamentally, the adoption of PSAs would have attracted FDI by 
promoting: 1) investor shares of exportable production; 2) investors' 
access to pipelines; 3) local regulations; and 4) tax calculations.81 
Ultimately, the implementation of PSAs would have granted foreign 
investors equality of interests in the sharing of output and revenue, 82 
while insulating them from the risks of changing legislation and tax 
rates.83 Yeltsin struggled to convince the Duma to formalize the rules 
governing PS As in Russia, 84 but "conservative and nationalist opposition 
to the agreement... blocked their path at almost every turn". 85 
Nevertheless, in July 1997, Yeltsin signed one of the key pieces of 
legislation required for the implementation of PSAs. In the same year, 
confronted with serious budget deficits, Yeltsin lifted not only the 
restriction on the sale of oil assets but also the fifteen percent legal limit 
of shares that foreigners could own.86 Consequently, foreign investors 
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came to possess more than twenty percent of share capital in the Russian 
oil giant LUK.oil and a further fifteen percent planned investment tender, 
both of which exceeded the eight percent stock required for placement on 
the board of directors. 87 In addition, ' case-by-case' privatization was 
introduced requiring sales to be carried out under the control of the 
Russian State Property Ministry (GKI), observing the principles of 
publicity and openness. 88 The financial crisis of 199889 pushed Yeltsin to 
make a series of declarations on protecting minority shareholder rights, 
abolishing tax offsets, and promising tax reforms - all of which would 
provide a friendlier climate90 for FDI, albeit with increased state 
involvement and intervention in the economic arena.91 
However, these measures could not offset the adverse economic 
effects of explicit and tacit collusion practiced between the managerial 
and state elites throughout the 1990s.92 In general, collusion between 
Russian political and economic actors was to be expected, for, as 
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss explains: "the more highly concentrated (in terms 
of assets, labour, and productive output) a region's economy is in a 
particular economic sector (oil...for example), the more consensus there 
is between political and economic elites regarding developmental 
goals".93 But, in this case, long-standing capital reinvestment objectives 
were sacrificed for immediate personal financial gains - actions that 
invariably promoted the development of corruption networks.94 Such 
associations facilitated both the laundering of illegal profits made from 
oil smuggling and investment of legal revenues overseas in order to 
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avoid domestic taxation and obtain lucrative investment opportunities.95 
In particular, Russia's oil industry engaged in illegal capital transfers 
abroad that, according to the World Bank (WB), exceeded the total 
volume of capital flowing into the country.96 In fact, conservative WB 
estimates show that, from 1993 to 1997, 88.7 billion dollars fled 
Russia.97 Ultimately, the general "dearth of foreign capital investment" 
that characterized the state of Russia's economy throughout the 1990s,98 
was a result of the state's failure to attract mass foreign ventures.99 
Although FDI was sectorialized, with most funds going to the energy 
sector, 100 oil production still decreased from eleven million to under 
seven million barrels per day: apart from Saudi Arabia, an amount 
equivalent to the total output of any other member of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)103. 101 In fact, foreign investment 
in Russia was "essentially 'enclave' investment that [did] not produce a 
general transformation in national economic fortunes but creat[ ed] 
distortions in economic structure similar to those produced in a shift to 
dependency", suggesting that FDI actually remained stagnant throughout 
the so-called post-communist economic transformation. By the end of 
1998, despite its privatization blitz, Russia occupied but a peripheral 
position in the global economy, reduced to a raw material supplier. 102 
In conclusion, despite promtsmg revenue possibilities, from 
1990 to 1998, foreign investment did not play a significant role in 
shaping the post-Communist oil sector. The period's political instability, 
characterized by opaque rule of law, a weak taxation system, 
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bureaucratic infighting, macroeconomic instability and collusion 
practiced amongst and between economic and state elite, served as major 
impediments against any significant FDI. Invariably the inhospitable 
investment environment limited the flow of foreign capital and 
technology required to modernize the Russian economy. 
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Section 4 
Russia in the World 

Canada-Russia Relations: A Canadian View 
Honourable Bill Graham, Minister ofForeign Affairs of Canada 
Je vous remercte de votre invitation a prendre part a cette 
conference. En tant que Torontois et francophile, vous comprendrez que 
j'ai une affection particuliere pour le College Glendon, une institution 
construite a partir de deux ideaux qui me soot chers, soit le bilinguisme 
et le biculturalisme. 
Je dois avouer que le fait de discuter de l'etat actuel des relations 
canado-russes me place devant un certain dilemme. Normalement, dans 
ces occasions, j'aime debuter par une citation marquante sur la question 
dont nous sommes saisis. Il n'y a pas si longtemps, j'aurais pu me 
presenter devant vous en citant Winston Churchill, qui comparait la 
Russie a « une devinette enveloppee dans un mystere a l'interieur d'une 
enigme ». En 2002 toutefois, il appert que les citations pertinentes sur la 
Russie se montrent difficiles a trouver, en raison du rythme fulgurant 
auquel des changements remarquables se sont produits dans ce pays. 
Ainsi done, les grands esprits et les specialistes ne semblent pas encore 
avoir pu prendre la pleine mesure de ces changements, du moins pas 
assez pour produire des phrases dignes de faire l'objet de citations 
(( lumineuses )) ou (( eblouissantes ». 
Je debuterai done aujourd'hui par une observation - c'est-a-dire 
que, en contraste avec les autres enjeux importants qui sont ces jours-ci a 
l'ordre du jour international, notre relation avec la Russie se caracterise 
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surtout par des possibilites et des developpements que je n'hesite pas a 
qualifier d'essentiellement positifs. En realite, d'un point de vue 
canadien, les crises actuelles de I'Iraq et de la Coree du Nord mettent en 
evidence l'evolution remarquable de notre perception du role de la Russie 
dans le monde. En termes plus directs, nous voyons la Russie comrne 
faisant non pas partie du probleme, mais plutot, et de plus en plus, 
comme etant une partie de la solution dans les affaires mondiales. 
Aujourd'hui, avec d'autres pays du monde, le Canada reuvre de 
concert avec la Russie afin d'apporter des solutions pacifiques et durables 
aux defis poses par l'Iraq et la Coree du Nord. Et il ne fait aucun doute a 
mes yeux que cette cooperation entre nos pays aidera a faire face aux 
autres crises qui surgiront dans l'avenir. Done, si nous avons pu 
participer et assister aux progres des relations canado-russes au cours des 
deux dernieres decennies, je souhaite aujourd'hui que nous abordions 
ensemble ces realisations sous l'angle des progres que nous sommes 
appeles a accomplir ensemble dans les annees a venir. 
Au risque de retomber dans le role devolu par mon ancienne vie 
de professeur, permettez-moi d'aborder d'entree de jeu le contexte 
historique dans lequel les relations canado-russes se sont developpees, 
tout en relevant quelques-uns des grands themes qui en ont decoule. 
Depuis que les gouvemements canadien et russe ont commence a 
s'interesser l'un a l'autre au debut du xxe siecle, les relations entre nos 
deux pays se sont surtout caracterisees par deux dimensions distinctes. 
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L'une d'elles decoulait de la dimension mondiale de la securite 
internationale ou, pour des motifs ideologiques sinon militaires, la 
Russie, plus souvent qu'autrement, representait un sujet principal de 
preoccupation pour le Canada et ses allies. L'autre dimension etait notre 
dimension bilaterale, ou les flux migratoires et les contacts sportifs, de 
meme que les territoires nordiques qui font de nous des votsms, 
permettaient de faire entendre une tonalite plus positive. 
11 est vrai que l'alignement geopolitique de l'apres-Deuxieme 
Guerre mondiale a place le Canada et la Russie dans des camps opposes 
pendant plusieurs decennies. Cependant, une caracteristique a neanmoins 
distingue le Canada des autres pays occidentaux pendant cette periode : 
en effet, nos deux pays ont pu tout de meme travailler ensemble, et 
combler les fosses politique et ideologique, notamment par la 
cooperation mutuelle dans des domaines d'interet commun. 
Ainsi, en depit de la guerre froide, cette tendance distinguant le 
Canada a pu se manifester des la visite en Union sovietique, en 1956, du 
secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires exterieures, Lester B. Pearson. 11 vaut 
certes la peine de souligner que c'etait la une premiere visite en URSS de 
la part d'un ministre des Affaires etrangeres d'un pays de l'OT AN 
(Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord). Le Canada a aussi ete, des 
les annees 1960, le premier pays occidental a signer d'importants accords 
de ventes de cereales avec !'Union sovietique. De plus, nous avons ete le 
premier pays de l'OTAN a avoir rompu un boycott impose au moment de 
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la crise tchecoslovaque, et ce, en invitant au Canada le ministre 
sovietique des Affaires etrangeres Andre"i Gromyko. 
La difference canadienne s'est encore exprimee au moment de la 
visite officielle de Pierre Elliott Trudeau en Union sovietique en 1971, 
ainsi que lors de plusieurs autres visites ministerielles, y compris le 
voyage en Siberie en 1971 de Jean Chretien, qui etait alors ministre des 
Affaires indiennes. Cette visite a d'ailleurs eu des incidences 
significatives a long terme, car elle a permis de designer la cooperation 
dans l'Arctique et dans le Nord comme l'un des defis communs pouvant 
rapprocher nos deux pays, et ce « en depit », selon le langage de 
l'epoque, « de divergences ideologiques ». 
La disposition du Canada a developper des liens de cooperation 
avec !'Union sovietique s'est averee encore plus evidente avec l'arrivee au 
pouvoir de Mikha"il Gorbatchev, qui a d'ailleurs eu lieu tres peu de temps 
apres sa visite memorable au Canada. A la veille des bouleversements 
qui ont secoue l'Europe de I'Est en 1989, la visite officielle du premier 
ministre du Canada en Union sovietique en novembre de cette meme 
annee a egalement permis aux relations entre nos deux pays de franchir 
une nouvelle etape, tout en donnant le ton pour les annees a venir. Ainsi, 
lorsque la Russie a decide de se defaire du dogme communiste et de ses 
structures d'economie dirigiste, bon nombre de Canadiens ont acquis la 
conviction que la nouvelle Russie meritait notre appui pour traverser la 
periode de transition qui l'attendait. Le programme d'assistance technique 
de l'Agence canadienne de developpement international [ACDI] a 
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d'ailleurs fourni beaucoup d'aide a cette fin , particulierement pour 
renforcer la sphere qu'on appelle aujourd'hui la societe civile, qui est 
essentielle a la vitalite de toute societe democratique. 
In the past decade, the Canada-Russia relationship has grown far 
beyond the relatively narrow intergovernmental dimensions that had 
characterized our relations with the U.S.S .R. On the political side, senior 
officials from both countries have annual meetings on strategic stability 
that now cover the whole range of international security and 
disarmament 1ssues. On the econom1c side, we have the 
Intergovernmental Economic Commission, first convened in 1995, which 
is an industry-led bilateral forum aiming to foster trade, investment and 
the transfer of technology. Although it is called intergovernmental, this 
Commission in fact g9es beyond strictly intergovernmental relations into 
broader areas of trade and investment. 
Both the Canadian and Russian governments are keen to 
heighten the economic dimension of our bilateral relationship to match 
the level of our political ties. The relatively undeveloped level of 
business familiarity and comfort is partly a function of the fact that, until 
recently, Canada has not had a large Russian-speaking community. 
However, there has been an enormous increase in the Russian-speaking 
community over the past decade in places such as Toronto - a fact 
reflected by the recent opening of a Russian Consulate-General in this 
city. This development should improve matters by bridging the language 
gap, promoting business contacts, and improving mutual knowledge. The 
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Intergovernmental Economic Commission will be important in taking 
advantage of this change, so that Canadian and Russian business 
communities will be brought closer together. 
Building a climate of investor confidence and stability will also 
be helped by the structural reforms that President Putin and his team are 
carrying out, including their drive to bring Russia into the WTO. But 
already there are successes reflected in the growth of high level bilateral 
contacts, including a strong personal relationship between Russian and 
Canadian leaders, that began with President Putin's visit here in 
December 2000. And as for the Team Canada mission to Moscow in 
February 2002, while its economic impact will be measured more 
precisely in a year or two, its impact can already be felt in terms of our 
perception of Russia as a dynamic business environment. 
At the multilateral level, Canada took on the goal of integrating 
Russia into the G7 during the Halifax Summit, in 1995; and at the 
Kananaskis Summit, in 2002, the process concluded with a decision to 
have Russia assume the G8 presidency and host the Summit in 2006. 
Canada has also promoted a NATO-Russia relationship that would better 
reflect new realities; and, in fact, the creation of the NATO-Russia 
Council last year also stems from a Canadian initiative. 
On every level, I can say that relations between Russia and 
Canada have never been as good as they are at present. I could give you a 
long list of examples in support of this claim, but I can also attest to it 
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through my own experience as Chair of the House of Commons 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and now as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Following my visit to Moscow last November, I can assure you that 
relations with my Russian colleagues are excellent, and that the openness 
and quality of our dialogue leaves nothing to be desired. 
And beyond the intergovernmental level, Canadian provinces, 
municipalities, universities and other organizations have established a 
growing network of relations with their Russian counterparts, opening up 
contacts in the commercial, cultural and academic spheres. 
Canada and Russia are also well-placed to be partners in the 
global community. We are working together on many issues such as the 
International Criminal Court, and the prevention of an arms race in outer 
space; and a central element of our international security relationship 
with Russia will come through our participation in the G8 Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction. We will also be trying to engage Russia productively at 
other G8 discussions, in the context of the NATO-Russia Council, as 
well as in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and 
at the Conference on Disarmament. On all of these fronts, collaboration 
will be greatly helped by the deep respect for multilateralism and 
international law that Canada and Russia share. 
And on other issues of global concern, Canada and Russia are 
also working together: for example, through CIDA we are helping Russia 
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face its growing AIDS crisis; and we are tackling environmental issues 
through the Arctic Council and through a Russia-Canada joint working 
group on climate change. In the face of international terrorism and the 
terrible hostage-taking at the Moscow theatre by Chechen rebels last fall , 
Canada has emphasized to Russia the importance of responding to 
national security threats while respecting human rights. I raised these 
concerns with Foreign Minister Ivanov while in Moscow, particularly in 
respect of the internally displaced people who are at risk. It's a tribute to 
the maturity of our relationship that we are able to share our concerns 
about highly sensitive issues such as these in a spirit of mutual respect." 
Mention of these large global issues brings me finally to the 
topic of Canada's foreign policy consultations. In January, I launched 
these consultations in order to update our foreign policy in face of 
changes and challenges that have arisen over the past decade, since our 
last major review. I'm asking Canadians to look at a discussion paper 
we've released, called A Dialogue on Foreign Policy, and to give me 
their views on a list of twelve questions. Many of these questions, in fact, 
bear closely on the sorts of issues I've touched on today: what kind of 
security arrangements we'll need in view of new types of threats, and 
how we can work bilaterally and multilaterally with Russia and other 
nations to meet these threats; what kind of global measures we can take 
to fight disease, environmental degradation, and the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction; how Canada can best promote our prosperity by 
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forging new economic relationships; and how we can better promote 
Canadian values and culture in Russia and elsewhere. 
In view of your interest and expertise in foreign affairs- and in a 
country as important as Russia - I hope that all of you will take the time 
to contribute to this consultation process before it wraps up on May 1. 
You can download the Dialogue paper and give your answers on-line, if 
you wish, by going to our Web site, which has excellent interactive 
features and information resources. The Web site address is: 
http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/. The views of engaged Canadians 
such as yourselves will be crucial to our efforts at updating Canada's 
foreign policy for the years to come. 
So in conclusion, I thank you for having invited me here today to 
speak on such an important topic . The Russia of today would have been 
unimaginable fifteen or twenty years ago, and Canada and the world 
certainly benefit from the developments that have taken place in Russia 
over the past decade. We look forward to strengthening the ties between 
our countries in the years to come. And of course a great asset in that 
effort will be a pool of informed Canadians who will have the knowledge 
to facilitate political, economic and cultural exchanges. So I congratulate 
the student organizers of this conference for choosing to focus on these 
issues today, and on behalf of the Government of Canada I welcome the 
contributions that your studies, as well of those of the experts here today, 
will make to the well-being of both Canada and Russia in the years to 
come. 

Canada-Russia Relations: A Russian View 
His Excellency Vitaly Churkin, Ambassador of the Russian 
Federation to Canada 
Yesterday, over dinner I was told many interesting things about 
Glendon College. One of them is that you happen to be a perfectly 
bilingual College, but today I want to come up with a major initiative: I 
heard more Russian spoken this morning than maybe the two other 
languages, English or French, so the initiative is that maybe starting from 
today we could call it a perfectly trilingual College. In fact I am tempted 
to deliver my remarks in Russian. I am sure that most of those present 
would understand me without any problem and much of the content is 
going to be reflected by Mr. Graham's speech as well. 
If there is a need for further proof of the excellent state of 
relations between Russia and Canada, this will definitely be the 
participation of Minister Graham in today's discussion. We are certainly 
privileged to be in his company today. I would also like to note that in 
my history book Ms McDougall does play a very special role as I vividly 
remember her welcoming President Y elstin during his first visit to 
Canada in February of 1992 when Ms McDougall was heading Canadian 
diplomacy, so in a certain way she was part of the creation of new 
relations between our countries. In fact, President Yeltsin liked the trip 
so much that just five months later in July 1992, he returned for a big 
state visit, which is a very rare occurrence in diplomatic practice. On that 
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occasion a major treaty was signed between Canada and Russia, which 
marked a new beginning in a new relationship between Russia as a 
democratic country and Canada as an old friend. I am also glad to appear 
today on the same panel with Anne Leahy. She was the one who, as 
Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, gave me a farewell lunch and best 
wishes on my trip to Canada. Thank you very much, Anne, I have been 
just fine! So your wishes have not been wasted on me! 
Something surprised me just months after I arrived in Canada as 
Ambassador in the fall of 1998. We all know there are quite a few things 
in common between our two countries: the climate, the large territories, 
the natural resources, etc. But it came as a surprise to me that our 
countries, despite their different political backgrounds and the fact that 
they are located on different continents, they ·see the world in many 
respects in the same way. There are fundamental principles, which 
Canada and modem democratic Russia share as they look at the world, 
and that is what makes our cooperation in the international arena so 
important and productive. 
We share a respect for international law and an understanding of 
the importance of upholding this international order. We also share an 
understanding of the importance of the United Nations in this world. We 
share an understanding of the importance of arms control demonstrated 
in our attempts to preserve and enhance the regime, which was created in 
order to produce a more peaceful and secure world. 
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Just to give you a few examples of our shared principles, first of 
all, Russia and Canada are at this point very active diplomatic partners in 
trying to work out an international agreement, which would prevent the 
militarization of outer space. Our two countries are also active partners in 
a number of international forums. The G8 summit in Kananaskis, which 
was presided over by Prime Minister Jean Chretien; resulted in very 
important decisions as far as Russia is concerned. One is that Russia is 
becoming a full member of the G8 and is going to hold the presidency in 
2006, including the summit and other G8 meetings. Secondly, a major 
program was adopted for global partnership in the prevention of 
proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The 
importance of this program for Russia is that, among other things, we 
have inherited from the Soviet Union a lage stockpile of completely 
unnecessary weapons of mass destruction - mostly chemical weapons 
and also de-commissioned nuclear submarines - stationed in the northern 
and far eastern seas, threatening to pollute the environment. So, a major 
international effort has been launched, which will begin to deal with that 
legacy. Moreover, Russia and Canada are important members of the anti-
terrorist coalition, and along with dealing with this issue internationally, 
we have established a number of bilateral channels between our 
countries, where our experts share information and help chart the course 
of our joined struggle against this curse of the 21st century. 
On the economic front, things are not as cheerful as we would 
like them to be. Russian-Canadian trade ranges at US $100 million 
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dollars, which is, of course, a negligible sum, compared to the potential 
of our countries. Investment levels are not impressive either. The 
problem, I think, as we analyze our nations is that there is not one single 
major project, which would symbolically represent our economic 
relationship. 
Nonetheless, many important things are happening in our 
economic relations. SLCC, a Montreal-based company, is involved in as 
many as a dozen projects in Russia, and I think some of them are very 
promising. Bombardier is present in Russia both with skidoos and in the 
railroad renovation industry. There are some disappointments; we are not 
always off to a very good start. For example, it is logical for Canadian 
mining, oil, and gas companies to be heavily involved in Russia, and 
they did start to create a presence in the early 90's, but the experience 
was not very successful. Sometimes mistakes were made on their behalf; 
sometimes they encountered competition; and sometimes numerous 
complaints were made about (and this is a serious complaint, which we 
recognize) our legal system. The Russian government considers the 
reform of the legal system a major priority and as rule of law is 
consolidated in Russia, foreign companies will have better conditions to 
invest. 
I must tell you fran.kly that Russians have similar problems with 
Canada, so please do not think of it as unilateral grievance, which 
Canadian businessmen have in Russia. We are very disappointed that our 
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exports of steel into Canada have dwindled to zero. It used to be Russia' s 
major export article totalling US $200 million dollars annually, but these 
exports have been hit by anti-dumping moves, some of which were not 
always fair. We have some other problems which could have been solved 
more rapidly to the benefit of our economic relations. However, this is 
what the embassy, the diplomats, and the governments are for. Our job 
includes trying to help businesses deal with such issues. 
On the governmental side, of course, we are trying to facilitate 
Russian-Canadian economic relations, and periodic meetings are held to 
discuss these matters. The major highlight of our business relationship 
was, of course, the visit by Prime Minister Chretien to Russia in 
February 2002, which resulted in the signing of dozens of contracts, not 
only in economic, but also in academic and cultural fields. Most recently, 
the Russian and Canadian Chambers of Commerce signed their first 
agreement, which we hope will make contacts and cooperation between 
business people easier and more productive. 
There are plenty of other areas of very important cooperation. 
Cultural cooperation is flourishing. The Hermitage is having an 
exhibition in Montreal. There was a Hermitage exhibition in Toronto 
before, and there will be another one in Toronto later. I am also proud of 
the fact that the Russian Consulate General has opened in Toronto. 
Believe it or not, Russia did not have any diplomatic presence at all in 
Toronto, which has a very special significance because not only it is a 
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financial and economic centre, but also the seat of a large and, I must say 
with gratitude, very friendly Russian community. 
As a sign of increasingly close cooperation between Russia and 
Canada, the past two years have seen most members of the two 
governments get in touch and get to know each other. Minister Graham 
made a very important visit to Russia last November and President Putin 
was here on a state visit two years ago. The Russian Prime Minister 
Kasyanov visited Canada. Let us hope that the positive trends in Russian-
Canadian relations will develop even more vigorously in the coming 
years. 
Russia in Search of a Place in a Changing World 
Doctor Nikolai Zlobin, Centre for Defense Information 
Nearly everything in Russia has changed over the past twelve 
years. The Soviet Union was a country where changes, if they occurred 
at all , tended to proceed at a glacial pace. But after 1991, visitors were 
shocked by how different things looked. 'Each visit is like seeing a 
whole new country', was the typical reaction. But with time, it became 
increasingly clear that rapid change does not indicate deep-rooted 
change. Behind the new fa~ade, real life was changing much more 
slowly and hesitantly than it first seemed. The running joke was that 
'Russia is a country in which everything changes and everything remains 
the same' . Certain facets of Russian life and political culture lagged 
behind others, and a socio-political disequilibrium increased in intensity, 
exposing contradictions between areas of life and government where 
changes were obvious, and those . where ·everything stayed nearly the 
same. The latter ones, moreover, included such important areas of 
government as agriculture, the banking system, military reform and 
foreign policy. 
After 1991, Russian foreign policy, despite all the changes in 
rhetoric, is not characterized by any new fundamental approaches or 
systemic conceptualizations. In many ways, it is still based on 
perceptions of the world that had formed in the years of the Cold War.' 
AsK. Gadzhiev writes, "Russia cannot help but be a great power for the 
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simple reason that it holds a special place in the geopolitical structure of 
the world"? To this day, the major focus of activity for the country's 
foreign policy structures is national security, in the narrow sense of the 
word. It is the yardstick by which Russian diplomats and politicians 
measure the modem world. "For Russia", continues Gadzhiev, "the issue 
is about security in all its aspects and measurements: global, regional, 
national, as well as political, economtc, social, ecological, 
informational. .. The major strategic task for Russia's foreign policy 
organs is to ensure a stable and safe environment".3 
Such an approach, more fit for the Defense Ministry, sets 
Moscow apart from the European powers, whose foreign policy has long 
been based on other principles and priorities, primarily social, economic, 
and humanitarian ones.4 But after September 11, national security, 
homeland defense, and the protection of national interests became the 
main foreign policy agenda of the US as well. Russia, it seemed, had 
gained the most powerful of potential allies. 
When Russian President Putin spoke of full and unqualified 
support for the US, this was viewed as a strategic choice, made by the 
Russian leadership, and suited the interests of both countries, as well as 
'a revolution in Russian foreign policy' . Russia took the American 
tragedy as its own; thousai).ds of people bearing flowers surrounded the 
US embassy in Moscow. The talk around town was that 'America would 
now understand Russia better; it will be much easier for us to find a 
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common language' . On the same day, NATO invoked Paragraph 6 of is 
charter, regarding the collective response ofNATO members to an attack 
on a single member. And thus, in one day, Russia found itself in the 
company of the most powerful countries in the world, united by a 
common vision of global problems and threats. But in just a few months, 
Russian-American relations went into a severe decline. Europe began to 
actively push Russia away, and Russia herself took a position that 
facilitated the European split, a result which clearly contradicted Russia's 
security interests. Neither Europe nor the US can be held blameless for 
the foreign policy mistakes and miscalculations of the past two years, but 
in this article, I will concentrate on Moscow's foreign policy positions. 
'The strategic choice of 9111' has not, so far, turned out to be 
strategic. For the past two years, the Kremlin has failed to put into 
practice Russia's 'strategic choice', as it has also neglected to convince 
Russian society and political elites of its rationale. In truth, the Krernlin 
has not taken any visible steps toward realizing that choice. If such a 
revolution did take place, it was contained within the presidential 
cabinet. It seems after all that "Russian geopolitics is not endowed with 
the necessary economic and organizational resources". 5 
Russia in the System of International Relations 
The end of the Cold War invalidated a system of international 
relations and a political philosophy that had existed over the past half 
century. But within that system, Russia was able to play a leading role, 
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acting as a countervailing force to the US.6 The Cold War acclimated us 
to predictability, stability, and a primitive foreign policy. It prevented the 
outbreak of a hot war - that has been its historic merit. America required 
more than ten years after the collapse of the USSR to define new 
principles of national security and to begin to realize the degree of her 
own responsibility in the world. Europe has been unable to formulate its 
foreign policy, and lives in a self-constructed reality. It's difficult to 
imagine how many years it will take for Russia to find its place in this 
new world. 
Nearly all concepts in international relations demand revision. 
Until recently, the necessary criteria for an international alliance was the 
unity of social values, for instance: democracy, free markets, or 
socialism. Now, alliances are built around practical concerns, 
geopolitical opportunities, and common geopolitical goals. These 
conditions present difficulties for Russia. First, internal weaknesses make 
Russia a less appealing partner. Second, countries that have traditionally 
been a part of the Russian sphere of influence or sought a close 
relationship with her - Uzbekistan, Georgia, the Baltic states, Poland, 
and Bulgaria - have expressed increasing interest in a partnership with 
the US and NATO. Under these conditions, there are limited places 
Moscow can look to form independent blocs - parts of Central Asia, 
Belorussia, and Armenia. 
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The fundamentals of international alliances have shifted. They 
now have a much more ephemeral character, since none of the partners 
wants to make long-term promises and live with the consequences; the 
situation is changing so fast that the national elites are unable to 
comprehend the true meaning of events as they occur. The response of 
Russia' s foreign policy elites toward American actions in Iraq are a 
typical example. Alliances are formed to solve concrete, limited 
problems, after which countries can feel free to go their own ways. Who 
knows, next time they may meet as enemies. Yet this is unacceptable to 
Russia, who wants a much more formalized mode of relations, especially 
with the US. The agreement to reduce nuclear weapons, which has little 
meaning in practice, was concluded in May of 2002 at Moscow's 
insistence. The US offered an informal agreement. Moscow insists on a 
formal rejection of the Jackson-Vanick Amendment and the 
formalization of all agreements with the European Union. 
The concepts of war, security, and military strength have all 
changed, which creates new threats for Russia - a country that has lost 
her military superiority and the opportunity to independently ensure her 
security. Wars are now conducted, as a rule, without much contact 
between the forces. The focus is not on a surprise attack on the enemy, 
but upon its forces of communication. The goal is not military victory, 
but a change of the regime or its policies. There is nothing unique about 
this: regime changes took place in Russia, in the countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR of the 1990s. 
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Moscow and Washington have fundamental disagreements on 
the topic of which countries present the greatest threat to the world. 
Moscow thinks that these countries include Georgia, Saudi Arabia, or 
Pakistan, whose rockets can reach its territory, while Iraq did not present 
any direct threat. But the Russian army is unable to conduct a modem 
war, and any traditional war in which it participates would not lead to 
stability in dangerous regions. This adds to Moscow's existing economic 
and political weakness. That is why its role in making these kind of 
decisions is today quite minimal. 
Russia and International Organizations 
The Second World War demolished practically all international 
organizations that appeared in the first half of the century, and replaced 
them with new ones. The UN was born to replace the League of Nations, 
which proved ineffective in times of conflict, and to guarantee that no 
one from the Allied coalition would conclude a separate peace with the 
Axis powers. In 1945, the UN Security Council included five victorious 
nations, and its composition at the time seemed logical and fair. 
But given the current situation, it ts hard to justify the 
international importance of a country based on the outcome of World 
War 11. The second and third largest economies in the world- Japan and 
Germany - play a much more important role in global governance than, 
say, Russia, but are nevertheless excluded from the Security Council. 
Also excluded is India, with almost a billion people, and Indonesia, the 
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fifth most populous country in the world. Globalization, the formation of 
the European Union, the technological revolution, and nuclear 
proliferation speeded up the breakdown of the post-war hierarchies to an 
even greater extent. In many world capitals, today's UN appears illogical 
and unjust. Long before the collapse of the USSR, the UN had become a 
bureaucratic structure that concerned itself not with political issues but 
with global welfare, education, and health. The enormous changes in the 
world system over the past 15 years have occurred without any UN 
involvement. 
The UN's strength is to a large extent based on the lack of 
competition and on long-standing ties with the national elites of many 
countries who use the UN to make cosmetic improvements to their 
international images, something they cannot accomplish with changes in 
policy. The recent debates over the war in Iraq demonstrated this 
perfectly. After the Kremlin had become an insignificant political player, 
it became acutely obvious that the UN was unable to solve the major 
political problems of modernity, the nature of which had been drastically 
altered. The UN was unable to deal with Chechnya, international 
terrorism, genocide in Serbia and Ethiopia as well as the Middle East, 
Afghanistan, n~clear proliferation, the drug trade, etc. 
What is needed is either a truly radical reform of the UN, or its 
replacement by a fundamentally new international organization that can 
adequately respond to the changing global order. Moscow, however, 
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takes a very cautious view on this position, championing the 'leading 
role of the UN' while skirting the issue of its ineffectiveness.7 The fight 
against international terrorism could become the beginning of the 
collapse of the UN in its present form, which corresponds to the 
historical logic as well as to the desires of the US administration. Any 
UN reforms would inevitably diminish Moscow's status even more, a 
result that Moscow would oppose to the bitter end, since the Security 
Council is Moscow's last bastion to exert influence in the international 
pantheon. For Russia to attain such a high level of importance is simply 
impossible in the foreseeable future. That is precisely why Putin states 
that any UN reforms must proceed "not only within a UN framework, 
but also with the use of procedures, implicit in the norms of international 
law as recognized by the UN"~8 In other words, with Russia's decisive 
participation. 
Upon coming to power, Putin proclaimed, "Russia should build 
its foreign policy on the basis of a clear delineation of national priorities, 
pragmatism, and economic effectiveness".9 After WWII, the USSR took 
an extremely calculated and active position, thereby ensuring for itself all 
the influential positions in all the major international structures. This 
allowed the USSR to play a key role in the world during the second half 
of the 20th ceritury. Today, the scenario is partially replaying itself. 
Russia, of course, doesn't have the advantages that the USSR held at the 
time. And yet before Iraq, it was in the same camp as the US. The 
alliance with Washington is crucial for Moscow in many respects. The 
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EU plan for accepting 12 new members from Eastern and Southern 
Europe will be the last expansion of that organization for the near future. 
The same can be said for NATO. Europeans will not be concerning 
themselves with Russia's place in Europe for at least the next half-
century. 
But the Russian position on Iraq was also an obvious deviation 
from Putin's proclaimed pragmatism. By taking a stand against the 
American actions, Moscow intensified the crisis within the Security 
Council. If the US and, following them, England, exit the UN or simply 
refuse to take a part in its activities, then Russia will be the biggest loser. 
In attempting to prevent war, Russian succeeded in marshaling the march 
towards it, unwittingly facilitating the schism in the UN and weakening 
the EU's position, which runs contrary to Russia's own interests. Her 
position exacerbated the contradictions within NATO, and led to an 
increased role of NATO's East European members, which complicates 
the execution of Russian foreign policy's agenda toward Europe. 
Moscow's actions helped create a deep and perhaps intractable crisis in 
the Security Council. 
At one time, 'the Big Seven' was an attempt to find a new 
method of coordinating Western interests outside of UN structures. But 
with the end of the Cold War, the political importance of these countries 
rapidly diminished, and their agenda underwent some fundamental 
changes. Paradoxically, with the inclusion of Russia as a permanent 
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participant in 2001, as well as the invitation to China to attend its 
meetings, the 'Big Eight' now has another chance to become a place for 
serious international discussion on the most important issues of the day. 
Russia, which now holds one of the leading positions in this group, will 
undoubtedly try to not only submit its agenda and actively participate in 
the meetings, but also transform these meetings into a vehicle for 
addressing global problems important to Russia. 
We could suppose that, in attempting to compensate for the 
depth of its presence on the global scene, Russia will strive toward 
quantity over quality, and express an interest in participating in various 
international organizations and structures that it may have once ignored. 
Significant foreign policy efforts will be directed toward that goal. 
Russia and the Bush Doctrine 
Traditionally, politics are built on agreements and relations 
among sovereign states. In the past twenty-five years, globalizing forces 
in economics have taken the economy beyond the control of individual 
states. Multinational corporations easily broke down the barriers of 
traditional financial and labour markets. Russia found itself completely 
removed from this process. The euro now supplements the dollar as a 
, 
transnational currency. Technological developments in the sphere of 
communications and the proliferation of the Internet have threatened the 
existence of national media structures, and with that, the possibility of 
soveretgn governments to control their country's media, and 
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consequently, the national ideology. The freedom of movement of goods, 
people, money and information have led to the state's loss of its 
traditional spheres of control. For the leadership of a weakened Russia, 
this has created a host of new problems. 
Numerous political players have appeared on the international 
scene who are not formalized in the form of states, and not subject to any 
sovereign government. One example of such structures is al-Qaida, or the 
terrorist organizations in Chechnya. They cannot sign treaties or 
exchange ambassadors; they cannot be penalized with sanctions or 
embargoes. Some governments offer them assistance, but it's nearly 
impossible to catch someone red-handed. Certainly, they cannot be 
defeated via traditional methods at least in part because they do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of international law, which only applies to 
sovereign states, The Geneva Conventions, for instance, do not mention 
terrorists at all. Russia's methods for restoring order in Chechnya cause a 
storm of indignation in the West. 
But the world society does not have the means to combat these 
structures. The old doctrine of containment, and the system of 
international law that formalized it, turned out to be unfit for the task, 
since it was based on the containment of one state by another, and 
functioned through the accumulation of political influence and military 
power by various states. But terrorist acts in the US showed that neither 
an enormous military budget, nor an ultra-modem and technologically 
180 Nikolai Zlobin 
enhanced army, nor a computerized police system, is able to protect its 
people from an attack. The most developed state, whose military budget 
exceeds the military budget of the next 12 countries put together, could 
not perform its basic function - the provision of security for its citizens. 
America was the best-equipped country to protect itself from any other 
state, but the attack did not come from a state-based entity. Russia has 
also encountered this problem, both in its counter-terrorist measures and 
in Chechnya. 
The inevitability of a stand-off between sovereign states and 
transnational non-governmental entities who reject the very idea of 
national sovereignty has become a common problem. One can demand a 
cessation of terrorist actions from the Chechen leadership, but it is not 
clear whether they control their own territory. Vladimir Putin is right, in 
his own way, for refusing to negotiate with Asian Maskhadov, who is to 
a great degree a 'virtual' leader. But, on the other hand, Putin himself 
does not control all the structures operating within Russia. 
' Limited sovereignty' is becoming the new reality of a 
globalized world. If previously, the emergency of a new threat could be 
counteracted by strengthening border defence and bringing the army to 
an alert state, then today such actions are meaningless. Hence the notion 
of a pre-emptive strike as a way of ensuring national security. 
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It would be incorrect to say that this idea refutes the doctrine of 
containment, or that it is something entirely new. Preventive actions and 
limited sovereignty were for a long time a part of the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
and were invoked to justify actions by the Soviet Union in socialist 
countries, like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But before 
the main focus was on a counter-strike. The aggressor knew that in case 
of an attack, he could expect a response. Today, if he refuses to disarm 
despite the demand of the international community, he can expect a pre-
emptive strike. Of course, this concept is highly debatable and 
dangerous, and fraught with unpredictable consequences. But it is not a 
manifestation of an imperial mindset but rather an admission that after 
the Cold War, the containment doctrine is no longer able to prevent 
conflict and, moreover, to effectively disarm the developed countries in 
the face of a new threat. This is an admission of the fact that modem 
states are continuing to lose their traditional functions, and are no longer 
able to ensure either their own or their allies' safety, and that their 
borders and defence systems are becoming less reliable. To prevent the 
doctrine of pre-emptive strike from becoming the dominant mode of the 
global order, a new conceptualization must be proffered. This new 
approach must practically replace the doctrine of containment, which has 
passed into history, but not represent an effort to return the US to the old 
legal framework, as some experts suggest. 10 
For many reasons, this question is more relevant for Russia than 
for many other parts of the world. That is why any criticism that Russia 
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puts forth of the pre-emptive strike doctrine focuses not on the idea itself, 
but on the question of methods, and the circumstances under which such 
a decision can be made. In Moscow's opinion, the UN should be the 
decision-making body, and should, as Evgeny Primakov wrote, "be 
maintained as the only organization that sanctions the use of force."11 
But it could also be assumed that Moscow will accept the basic elements 
of the Bush Doctrine as the major instrument of foreign policy in the 
world today, as long as it allows Russia a prominent voice in the 
decision-making process, either on a bilateral level or within the G-8 
framework. 
Russia and International Terrorism 
Russia and the US diverge in their understanding of the nature of 
international terrorism. Moscow will have to make its choice in the near 
future. Until Iraq, the Russian position was close to the European one, 
but the Euro-Russian union did not develop after the end of the military 
operations in Iraq by the US and UK troops. 12 
Russian leadership treats international terrorists mostly as a new 
type of criminal, or criminal elements united into certain structures. 
Chechen fighters or al-Qaeda are seen as a kind of modern mafia, Islamic 
rather than Sicilian, but with other connotations intact. Moscow believes 
that this threat should be combated by strengthening the police, laws, and 
the passport' s regimes, as well as increasing control over the territory 
through periodic 'clean-outs', or sweeps. Chechen fighters are depicted 
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as criminals who benefit by exploiting the Chechen people's desire for 
independence. 
Washington, on the other hand, vtews modem international 
terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon, an international movement 
that is political and ideological, rather than criminal, in nature. They see 
a movement that vies neither for economic gain nor for concessions from 
particular governments, but for the destruction of the very fundamentals 
of our civilization, the replacement of one system of basic values for 
another. They must be opposed, therefore, not as basic criminals, but as 
sworn foes, using all the military force available. A particular threat is 
the potential for terrorists to come to power, as occurred in Afghanistan. 
Russia, incidentally, supported the elimination of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan from the very beginning, viewing it as a real threat to its 
national security, albeit for different reasons. The alliance of terrorists 
and governments greatly enhances terrorism's destructive capabilities, 
complicates any struggle against it, and facilitates terrorists' access to 
weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist Islamic groups that possess such 
weapons pose the greatest threat to global security now. 
The US views contemporary Islamist extremism and terrorism 
through the same lens as communism and fascism - a perspective, which 
Russia, with her proximity to Islamic territories and a large Muslim 
population, cannot afford to adopt. Yet Moscow cannot forget that al-
Qaeda considers (and has used) the old continent not as an object for 
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attack, but as a base of preparations for new assaults, potentially on 
Russia as well. The Russian approach, aimed at fighting particular 
groups in response to particular acts, is at odds with the White House 
strategy of unfolding a wide-scale war against Islamic extremism and 
terrorism. 
Russia' s strategy of fighting international terrorism is only now 
taking shape. As G. Pavlovsky notes, "none of the existing structures of 
international security - including NATO, the EU, CIS, OSCE, the 
Collective Security Agreement - can fully guarantee Russia a place in 
the world that would place it at ease, from a strategic viewpoint."13 
Iskander Khisamov suggests that Russia cannot "fit into any of the 
existing global alliances" .14 Islamist extremism is bent on revenge of 
historic proportions, attempting to recapture what it lost under the last 
few centuries of Western domination. Only naivete would suggest the 
violence will stop at the Russian border because of the Kremlin's threat 
to veto the Security Council resolution on Iraq. Still more naive is the 
supposition that Europe will suddenly concern itself with the problems of 
Russian security, when it is already in no hurry to assist the US. 
Russia and the US after Iraq 
The US-Russian summit held in St. Petersburg in June 2003 was 
a troubling symptom of the lack of fundamentals in Russian-American 
relations. It once again revealed a tendency to ignore deep-seated 
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problems and serious mutual disagreements, which have brought today's 
strategic partnership to the verge of bankruptcy. 
Relations between the two countries are at their lowest point in 
the past ten years. "Russia and the US no longer compete for spheres of 
intluence",15 noted Colin Powell. And yet the differences over Iraq have 
forced us to see what we had previously ignored. There are sharp, 
fundamental , perhaps even insoluble differences between Russia and the 
US - in their approach to building a new world order and a system of 
global security, in their understanding of contemporary threats and how 
they must be met, and in their attitude toward international law. Russia 
has been moved to the bottom of Washington's list of countries that the 
American establishment considers key potential partners. The Russian 
foreign policy establishment, for its part, has had to abandon the long-
cherished myth that America is in vital need of an alliance with Russia 
and would be unable to take decisive action anywhere in the world 
without it. 'The trustworthy partnership' , of which Putin spoke in July of 
2002, has not materialized. 16 The conflict over Iraq ended an entire era of 
productive relations. After a period of searching for a strategic 
partnership, we have entered a period of possible cooperation on a 
number of issues where the two countries' interests coincide. It's not a 
secret that practically all these common interests revolve around security 
and energy, but this does not yet guarantee their success. 17 
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Despite the sustained criticism of the Bush Administration's 
handling of foreign policy, we must face the facts: Russia's stance on 
Iraq resulted in a loss it could ill afford. Moscow's position was removed 
from simple pragmatism; it did not correspond to the country's economic 
or national interests. It was, therefore, in direct contradiction to Russia's 
proclaimed foreign policy principles. This cannot be blamed simply on a 
unilateral approach to bilateral relations, which the US has indeed 
sometimes demonstrated, from steel protectionism to Jackson-Vanick, to 
forcing Russia out of Afghanistan, for example. 
The situation with Iraq demonstrated that Russia not only lacks 
an understanding of today's global developments, but does not even have 
a strategically focused foreign policy. The president is not the only one 
to blame for this. Russia has neither the infrastructure nor the intellectual 
potential to prepare an adequate analysis of global events, provide 
realistic forecasts, or develop an optimal behaviour model for the country 
on the international arena. The individuals and institutions assigned to 
these tasks were unable to handle them. There is absolutely no evidence 
that Putin is powerful enough to persist in his wishes alone. Moscow 
demonstrated an unacceptable amount of improvisation, and as is well 
known, an unpredictable friend is worse than a predictable foe. Taking 
into account Russia's nuclear status, an improvisational foreign policy is 
more than a sovereign policy, but also one that could detrimentally affect 
other global developments. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, I protested against the thesis of 
'the necessity for improving Russian-American relations', trying to show 
that one cannot improve something that was created for different political 
and international realities. 18 We should not try to improve relations that 
are not, by definition, improvable, but form new bilateral relations on a 
fundamentally different conceptual basis, one that has yet to take shape. 
One can improve a steam engine up to a certain point, but after that, the 
engine requires a qualitative jump to the next power source. Both sides 
spent more than a decade 'improving the steam engine', and yet today 
have no coherent policy toward each other to show for their efforts. 
The conflict over Iraq became the conceptual bankrupting of the 
model of Russian-American relations that we have pursued over the past 
decade. And when there is no overarching conception for relations, when 
there are no fundamentals, then any disagreements - whether over Iraq or 
poultry - expand to an enormous size, since we have no fulcrum with 
which to position ourselves in search of a solution. We can already see 
that the nearing conflict over lran19 has the potential to become much 
more serious.Z0 
George Bush sympathizes with Putin outside the context of 
bilateral relations; his affinity for the Russian president transcends the 
political relations of the two countries. Clinton was also friends with 
Yeltsin, as he believed Y eltsin would be able to bring democracy to 
Russia. Bush's attitude toward Putin is based on personal factors and 
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does not rely on an ongoing evaluation of political processes in Russia. 
Bush is the most pro-Russian US president in modem history, and in the 
absence of cultural or political unity or significant economic cooperation 
between these two countries, mutual trust of the presidents is vital capital 
indeed. But as important as the Bush-Putin friendship is, it is not what 
Russia needs right now. It needs not only a well thought-out, solid 
foreign policy and a fresh elite that can develop one, but also a properly 
institutionalized structure for its effective implementation. Otherwise, 
when Moscow makes a strategic decision, sometime in the future, its 
implementation ones again will not extend beyond the president's office. 
Russia's Choices 
Of course, there are a number of very important directions in 
Russian foreign policy that I have yet to touch upon. Relations with 
China or Europe21 , for instance are critically important, and require a 
separate discussion. Russia's positions on Iran or North Korea are in a 
state of change and their outcomes may have profound consequences. 
Russia has many interests around the world. As D. Trenin writes, Russia 
can be described as a country that' s "Euro-Pacific, open to the outside 
world and striving for 'special relations' with the global leader- the US. 
In the West, the EU has become the major regional partner, and in the 
East, Japan may and should become such a partner as well"?2 But all 
these strains in the Russian national interest are united by one factor -
they are all secondary, derivative of the issues I have already mentioned 
here. Russia must first define the fundamental questions of the new 
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world order, and decide what place Russia wants (and can realistically 
secure) in the new century, and how it can ensure her own unity, 
security, and well-being. 
Russia's military weakness is a new factor, and it needs to be 
rectified. Can Europe compensate for it? G. Pavlovsky notes that Russia 
has more unregulated issues with Europe than with the US?3 Europe's 
military weakness is not a new phenomena - it was obvious immediately 
after the Second World War. But until recently, this weakness was 
camouflaged by the tremendous military support that Europe was offered 
by the US. For Russia, it is important that transatlantic tensions do not 
undermine international security, since it is situated much closer to the 
world 's powder keg than either Europeans or Americans. Recently, the 
Chairman on the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy S. Karaganov 
concluded that Moscow should "revise its policy toward Europe, since it 
is based on an unrealistic conception of trends in the Old World"?4 
A serious, non-ideological discussion on foreign policy questions 
is desperately lacking in Russia today.25 Debates take place within a 
now-traditional framework of criticizing Washington's hegemony. Putin 
criticizes the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq, but does not provide 
evidence that a (say) Euro-Russian occupation would be more successful. 
Moscow is against a unipolar world because it functions without Russia. 
But there is no evidence that a multipolar world would provide Russia 
with more security than a unipolar one. Multipolarity is less stable and 
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predictable, and it will not necessarily lead to a greater global role for 
Russia, which can no longer be an independent power center. But if 
Russia and the US can agree on a new relationship paradigm, then Russia 
has a much greater chance of gaining from a unipolar world without 
having to engage in certain, undesirable compromises. 
Only recently, it seemed that the Russian elite was on the brink 
of an intellectual breakthrough, but instead, Moscow intellectuals 
engaged themselves in a discourse on how, if Russia is to ally with 
America, Russia should be the head while America should be the fist and 
the bankbook. The talk of empire has emerged once again. A. Dugin 
assures that Russia is "an empire, by geopolitical logic, that this time 
around should surpass USSR, the previous variant, both strategically and 
territorially. The new empire, therefore, should be Eurasian, continental, 
and global in perspective"?6 S. Karaganov thinks that the main weakness 
of Russia ' s foreign policy is the weakness of the Russian economy.27 
Others speak of Russia taking a middle stance between Europe, Asia, and 
the US, becoming politically equidistant to the great world powers. 
Russia today, says V. Lukin, "returns to Europe with the accoutrements 
of totally new relations with the US. This gives Russia an historic chance 
to occupy the niche of a 'transatlantic integrator' - a country that exists 
in the political space between two analytic opposites, taking upon itself 
the mission of eliminating diplomatic lacunae, attempting to become the 
catalyst and the initiator of trilateral political actions" ?8 Lukin is 
convinced that no one else can claim such a role. S. Rogov says that 
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Russia can only be rescued by a "middleman position on the geopolitical 
map ofEurasia".29 1t is unclear why the powers need such a middleman-
and if they do need one, why would they turn to Moscow, which is 
notorious for being unable to reach compromises in foreign relations? 
After the war in Iraq, Russia faces the difficult task of 
overcoming the consequences of its only serious mistake in foreign 
policy over the past ten years. It needs clear positions on the theories of 
building global structures, theories that are incubating now in the White 
House. At the same time, the Krernlin cannot become a hostage of the 
political struggle among the various factions in the White House 
administration.30 The issue here is Russia's place in the new world order, 
in the new system of global security that will replace the one that had 
existed for the last fifty years. The major question is whether Russia -
either in a close alliance with the US or without one - can ensure an 
optimally advantageous position in the world and safeguard the strategic 
security of her interests. A clear answer has yet to be articulated. 
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Continuity and Change in Russian Foreign Policy 
Professor Sergei Plekhanov, York University 
Russia's foreign policies since the fall of the USSR have been 
evolving under the influence of two basic imperatives: the imperative of 
systemic transformation and the imperative of geopolitical position. The 
requirements of Russia's systemic transformation into a capitalist-type 
society (the market imperative) and the realities of her historic-
geographic position as Eurasia's core state (the geopolitical imperative) 
may interact in a number of ways. 
They can be mutually reinforcing, making it possible to achieve 
significant foreign policy gains. They can be mutually exclusive, forcing 
Russia's leaders to make hard choices between them, which makes 
policy setbacks likely. And they can be managed through tradeoffs, 
which, of course, requires great political skills, significant and diverse 
power resources, and effective institutions. 
There is also the question of choices and balances between 
market and geopolitical considerations in Russia's international 
behaviour. If the market imperative is considered decisive, Russia can be 
expected to try to market its geopolitical assets - that is, to achieve 
economic gains through a skillful use of its unique geopolitical position. 
Alternatively, if the geopolitical imperative becomes uppermost in 
foreign policy, Russia may adopt mercantilist stances and use market 
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interactions with other countries to achieve maxtmum possible 
geopolitical gains. Needless to say, different forces within Russia favour 
different market-geopolitical balances. 
Generally speaking, post-communist Russia's foreign policy is 
conservative, cautious and pragmatic, serving as a stabilizing factor in an 
international situation characterized by high degrees of tension and 
unpredictability. 
Russian Foreign Policy Constants 
POST -COMMUNIST ECUMENISM. Despite the disappearance 
of the USSR with its global ideological claims, Russia remains a state on 
a par only with the United States in terms of the breadth of its 
geopolitical interests, which continue to involve Russia in nearly every 
major international issue which exists today. The geopolitical factor, 
reinforced by the factor of nuclear parity, contributes to the maintenance 
of the US-Russian axis as one of the most important bilateral 
relationships in the post-post-Cold War world. But geopolitics also 
makes it imperative for the Russian state, and for Russia's political and 
economic elites, to pursue active policies in all directions. It would be 
imprudent for Russia to develop its partnership with the US, for instance, 
at the expense of her relations with China, or to participate in the 
'antiterrorist coalition' in ways which could alienate Russia from the 
Islamic world. 
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THE POWER GAP. Russia's real (usable) power in world 
politics is, of course, limited out of proportion to the breadth of Russia's 
global interests. This power gap compels Russian elites to act with 
caution and pragmatism (in particular, Russia cannot afford to have 
strong enemies anywhere). But the mismatch between needs and 
resources may create vacuums and situations of overextension, pregnant 
with potential for policy blunders. 
THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMICS. Russia's foremost foreign 
policy interests lie in the economic sphere: struggle for markets, 
achieving successful integration into the global economy, and a revival 
of Russia's national economy on a capitalist basis. This orientation is 
underpinned by the interests of Russia's post-communist elites, 
determined to secure and enhance their gains of the past decade, and to 
seek business opportunities in every part of the world. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIT. Given the insifficient 
institutionalization of Russia's political system, the process of foreign 
policy making is characterized, on the one hand, by the absolute primacy 
of the President, and, on the other hand, by uncertainty with regard to his 
actual control over the implementation of his decisions. In a highly 
institutionalized democracy, effective pluralism in the making of a 
decision gives way to effective, streamlined process of implementation 
of the decision which has been made. In the Russian case, the ability of 
the President to make decisions without broad and structured 
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consultations is accompanied by the ability of bureaucratic and business 
elites to distort and even sabotage the President's chosen course. 
The Two Transitions 
In the past few years, a new relationship began to form between 
Russia and the US, as part of the process of the political transitions 
taking place in the two countries 
In Russia, the transition from Y eltsin to Putin signified the 
beginning of restoration of a strong state. Stabilization of the Russian 
domestic scene has been accompanied by an economic recovery and the 
promotion of a neoliberal economic reform agenda. Russia no longer 
looks like a basket case as it did throughout the 1990s. Whether or not 
these trends should hold for long, there is a new and growing global 
perception that Russia seems to have begun to recover from its prolonged 
transition crisis through reliance on a combination of capitalist 
economics and a reasserted political authoritarianism. In the area of 
foreign policy, the formation of the Putin coalition has symbolized the 
emergence of a new pragmatic consensus between Western-oriented and 
Eurasianist-oriented elites. 
The transition from Clinton to Bush, which came on the heels of 
the Russian transition, had important political implications for Russia. 
On the one hand, the emergence of a colder, more unilateralist and 
potentially more dangerous America did present a serious challenge to 
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Russia' s interests and thus generated alarmed reactions in Moscow. On 
the other hand, as a result of the two transitions an unusual ideological 
affinity arose between the dominant mindsets in Moscow and 
Washington: commitment to laissez-faire economics, emphasis on 
geopolitics, and a stronger assertion of national interests (in the US case, 
as a manifestation of strength, in the Russian case, as a function of 
weakness). And the end of the Clinton-era rnicromanagement of Russian 
reforms allowed the Russians to feel a little more in control of their 
country' s policies than they did in the 1990s. 
As the weaker party, more concerned about the deterioration of 
relations between the two countries than President Bush, President Putin 
actively sought a new dialog with the new US Administration, and, after 
a few setbacks, achieved success. Months before 9/11, the Bush 
Administration's initial attitude of neglect of (and near-contempt for) 
Russia began to give way to a growing perception of Russia's potential 
usefulness to the US. The Bush-Putin summits in Genoa and Ljubljana 
signified the start of a new partnership. Without those summits, Putin's 
reaction to 9/11 might have been different. 
Different Readings of the Post-9/11 Balance Sheet 
As noted by many analysts, Russia benefited from the events of 
September 11 in a number of ways: 
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1. The attack, with its implications of a wider global conflict 
between the West and lslamist radicalism, highlighted Russia's 
vital geopolitical role. Russia's stability, security and strength 
(both economic and military) became important international 
concerns. 
2. In the post-9/11 situation, the US found itself in dire need of 
allies in the new global confrontation. In at least two important 
respects, Russia became more important to the US as an ally than 
NATO or Japan: a) successful US operations in Eurasia require 
Russia's cooperation and help; and b) Russia may serve as an 
important alternative supplier of energy to the US in case of 
disruption of supplies from the Persian Gulf. 
3. Putin's early focus on the global threat of Islamist terrorism 
was to some extent vindicated. After 9/11, what looked in 1999 
as a crude attempt to justify Russia's crackdown in Chechnya 
began to look as a realistic threat assessment. This took some 
international pressure off Russia's Chechnya operations. 
4. The refocusing of US foreign policy on the war on Islamist 
terrorism has partly relieved the geopolitical pressures Moscow 
had felt before 9/11, when many in Russia's foreign policy elite 
were inclined to see the 'Western threat' (NATO expansion, the 
New Great Game over Caspian oil, etc.) compounded by 'the 
Islamist threat' to Russia's interests in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. 
5. Russia has gained a voice in NATO, an official status of a 
market economy, an upgrading of her status in G8, and support 
for her entry into WTO. 
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6. Joining the US in the 'antiterrorist coalition', Russia in her 
new role as a key US ally has gained some freedom to pursue its 
own interests in other areas (including its relations with countries 
like Iran and North Korea, regarded by the US as 'rogue states'). 
7. The political climate for Western investments in Russia and 
for Russian business activities in the West has improved. 
8. The new conservative security mindset, characterizing the 
Bush Administration after 9/11, is consonant with the political 
orientations of Russian leaders and the traditions of the Russian 
state. 
9. Rearmament of Russia, viewed as essential and urgent by all 
Russian elites, can now be legitimized in the eyes of the US and 
other leading powers much more effectively than before. 
10. Improvement of Russia's relations with the US is supported 
by most Russian elites and a majority of the population, which is 
an important political asset for Putin and his coalition. 
Indeed, by joining 'the anti-terror coalition', Russia has been 
able to make gains across a wide and diverse spectrum of issues. But 
these gains have entailed some costs. Russia's main costs have involved 
acquiescence with what looked unacceptable before 9/11: NATO's 
massive expansion eastwards, America's pullout from arms control, 
direct US security involvement across the belt of post-Soviet states from 
the Baltic to Pamir, and Russia's decision to withdraw from key Cold 
War military bases in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. In case of US 
military occupation of Iraq, Russia will be pressured to acquiesce with 
even more: establishment of direct US control over the Persian Gulf and 
its energy resources. 
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The questions Putin's critics (and allies, too) have raised with 
regard to this new situation, focus on the price Russia has paid and the 
value it has bought. Has the post-9/11 deal been fair for Russia? Has 
Russia lost more than it gained by this acquiescence? Are the gains 
largely symbolic and/or transitory, while the losses are tangible and 
lasting? These questions are potentially dangerous for Putin in the 
Russian political context. 
From the perspective of Russia's traditionalists, conservatives, 
and so-called 'Eurasianists' (it is misleading to tag all of them as 
unreconstructed communists because their defining characteristic is not 
communism but Russian nationalism), Russia has come out, at least so 
far, as a clear loser from its new strategic partnership with the US. From 
this perspective, what is happening is nothing less than Russia's retreat in 
the face of a vigorous American offensive. 
The notion of a .retreat is steeped in geopolitical thinking, which 
in the days of the Clinton Administration was sneered at as 'old think' . 
But today, it is remarkable that most of the discourse on the question of 
Russia's gains and losses since 9111 has taken place in a geopolitical 
frame of reference (which is just one of many signs that at the dawn of 
the 21 st century, geopolitics is back with a vengeance, even if in 
modernized forms). 
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Indeed, when Russia is praised in the West, and criticized in 
China and in Russian conservative circles, for not objecting to American 
deployments in the post-Soviet South, the inevitable major inference is 
that the Russian acquiescence is, indeed, of major political importance. If 
we grant that Russia's own weight in international politics has grown 
largely due to the increased salience and significance of geopolitics, then 
we have to grant that Russia's acquiescence was a very high price to pay. 
Few would argue that a retreat has not taken place, and that this is 
Russia's price for its closer integration with the West. The debates, both 
within Russia and internationally, are about what this retreat means. 
The best-case interpretation comes from Russia's Westernizers, 
who argue that Russia has gained massively because it is now much 
more closely identified and tied with the West than at any time since the 
fall of the Romanovs. But even the Westernizers feel compelled to 
address the geopolitical aspects of the process, and they offer the 
following points: 
1. The new American presence in Central Eurasia represents 
Russia's gain, not a loss, inasmuch as it strengthens Russia's 
security in areas of Russia's vulnerability: in the face of the 
current threat from radical Islamism and of the future potential 
threat of Chinese expansionism. 
2. To try to resist the American thrust is imprudently risky for 
Russia, given the huge usable-power disparity between the two 
sides. 
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3. The Americans are unlikely to stay in the post-Soviet South 
for long. Their presence will inevitably generate discontent and 
opposition which will ultimately result in their pullout, and 
Russia will have a chance to return to fill the void. In order to 
make it happen, Russia must be careful not to alienate the 
Americans, while at the same time maintaining its own distinct 
role. 
4. In the new common cause between Russia and the West, 
NATO's expansion is not a cause for alarm; indeed, it is possible 
to view it as a process leading up to Russia's future membership 
in the Western alliance. 
5. To the Americans, the Westemizers present a bill for Russia's 
huge geopolitical concessions. Their complaint that the payment 
has been meager is only partly a bargaining ploy: underlying the 
complaint is the fear that the deal may really not have been very 
good for Russia. 
According to the worst-case VIew, propagated vigorously by 
Russia's conservative nationalists, the power predominance of the United 
States is so huge that Russia is highly unlikely to reap any benefits from 
its new partnership. 
1. Russia cannot possibly compete with the US on market terms. 
In any kind of an open market relationship between the two 
sides, America's global economic hegemony will guarantee that 
the US will always be the dominant partner, dictating the terms 
and reaping most benefits, while Russia will have to accept a 
subordinate, dependent, almost colonial status. 
2. Russia should use its geopolitical assets, but not by selling 
them. 
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3. Russia should vigorously pursue integration with its post-
Soviet neighbours and rebuff Western attempts to establish 
permanent positions in post-Soviet territories. 
4. America respects only strength. Russia will be able to make 
serious, durable gains in international politics only if it works to 
restore, in one way or another, to one extent or another, ·a 
balance of power vis-a-vis the United States. 
5. To turn Russia into the West's ally against China and the 
Islamic world (distinction between Islam and Islamism is usually 
blurred in this argument) would expose Russia's security to great 
dangers. Russia should align with China and Islamic states in 
order to resist American hegemony. 
What underlies the arguments of the Westernizers is the notion 
of Russian-Western ('Euro-Atlantic') solidarity based on both market 
and geopolitical considerations. What underlies the Eurasianists' 
arguments is the unreconstructed "realist" view of world politics, where 
Russia is paying dearly for its lingering liberal-internationalist illusions 
which have already led her to a historic geopolitical defeat. 
It is hard for the W esternizers to win the debate, if only because 
they agree with the Eurasianists on some of the most important points in 
the latter's position. Not only they have to argue within a geopolitical 
frame of reference, which the Eurasianists insist upon - but also, when 
they argue within a market frame of reference, they have to recognize the 
weakness of Russia's market assets in a highly competitive global 
economy. Westernizers' case for a market-geopolitical synthesis is easy 
to present as unrealistic, based on wishful thinking. The Eurasianist case 
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for the unquestioned dominan~e of the geopolitical imperative which 
should determine Russia's economic strategies often seems more fitting 
for a world which has left the decade of liberal hopes and entered the 
period of a new war. 
Is An Effective Synthesis Possible? 
Putin desperately seeks to integrate elements of Westemizer and 
Eurasianist approaches in a pragmatic foreign policy course. He tries to 
make the most of Russia's unique geography. He impresses the 
Europeans from Blair to Berlusconi with his apparently genuine 
commitment to making Russia an integral part of Europe. To the 
Chinese, the Indians, the Koreans and other Asians, he presents Russia as 
a major Asian power which can be of great use to Asia in a lot of ways. 
To the Americans, he presents Russia as the other end of an important 
world power axis, except this time Russia offers itself not as the sworn 
global enemy, as in the Cold War, but as a key partner in 'the 
Euroatlantic Comminity', stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
Just wait till he goes on an African tour. 
In his programmatic statements on Russian foreign policy, Putin 
reiterates that the global economy is a highly competitive place where 
Russia cannot expect any favours and must fight hard for a decent 'place 
under economic sun'. Russia's integration is portrayed as a hard-nosed, 
pragmatic choice: unless Russia is a full-fledged participant among those 
who make rules for the global economy, those rules will be more 
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detrimental to Russia's interests. Russia must join in order to be able to 
compete with everybody else more successfully. If Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin borrowed money from the West, Putin is repaying the debts 
ahead of schedule. This type of foreign policy has overwhelming support 
in Russia. 
In a sense, Putin's foreign policy course treats Russia's 
geopolitical assets primarily as commodities to be used to gain Russia 
maximum access to world markets. But, since Russia needs these assets 
for its security, as well, the real issue in the post-9/11 bargaining between 
Bush and Putin is whether Russia is selling - or merely leasing. As only 
time will tell, of course. 
The key issue, then, is how successful Russia will be in 
marketing its geopolitics. If it is successful, then Russia will continue on 
its Westernizing course. If not, it may be forced to revert to some variety 
of protectionist Eurasianism, putting geopolitical priorities ahead of its 
quest of a decent "place under the economic sun". 
Russia emerged from that fight as a key player in international 
efforts to contain American unilateralism. Coordinating its diplomacy 
with two other UNSC Permanent Members, France and China, Russia 
opposed a specific US policy option, pushed by a specific group within 
the US Government, thus enhancing the position of another group. In a 
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real sense, Russia's diplomacy became a factor influencing US policy-
making to help bring about a US policy Russia could support. 
In the world after September 11, Russia's potential as a 
relatively independent actor in world politics is higher than is assumed 
by those who cite its power gap and its institutional deficit. Still, the gap 
and the deficit are glaring realities. What has given Russia a heightened 
international role is the new war - 'war on terror'. But a new war is the 
last thing Russia needs if it wants to build a viable, competitive market 
economy and an efficient democratic state. In case this war escalates, 
Russia may be forced by the logic of events to revert to its habitual mode 
of existence: an armed camp controlling the heart of Eurasia - hardly a 
prospect anyone would welcome.1 
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Eurasianism in Russian Foreign Policy 
Eugene Kvache, Undergraduate Student, York University 
"By its very nature Eurasia is historically 
destined to comprise a single state entity ". 
N. Trubetskoi1 
Russia' s national identity has long been a subject of numerous 
scholarly discussions in both Russian and foreign academic circles. 
Primarily, Russia's uniqueness stems from the geographical factors, as it 
is the largest country in the world stretching across Europe and Asia. 
Reflections on the fate of Russia have been especially intense during 
transition periods in her tumultious history. In the contemporary period, 
characterized by the disappearence of the Soviet Union and the 
whithering away of the official communist ideology, a vacuum has 
emerged, which calls for new ideas to help Russia overcome the massive 
challenges of the post-communist transition and to regain the position 
that it once enjoyed on the world stage. 
One of the ideas which have gained prominence is the concept of 
Eurasianism. Its history dates back to the stormy debates between 
'Westernizers' and 'Slavophiles' which raged in Russia in mid-
nineteenth century. While the Westemizers insisted that the only way to 
successfully modernize Russia was the European model, the Slavophiles 
viewed Russia as the 'Third Rome', distinct from Europe and destined to 
create and lead a new, more spiritual Slavic civilization. 
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Eurasianism is also closely connected with geopolitical thought, 
popularized at the beginning of the twentieth century by British 
geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, Admiral T. Mahan of the US Navy, 
and others. According to Mackinder and his followers, a kind of natural 
global cleavage exists in world politics between land powers and sea 
powers. In this model, the natural repository for global land power is the 
Eurasian Heartland, the bulk of which was occupied for several centuries 
by the Russian empire. Whoever controls the heartland, wrote 
Mackinder, will forever seek to dominate the Eurasian landmass and 
ultimately the world? 
In its benign form, Eurasianism simply restates Russia's 
uniqueness and argues that Russia can take up a position of world rank 
and prestige without copying the Western model. Eurasianists of more 
extreme persuasions view the Eurasian Heartland through a 'Clash of 
Civilizations ' prism, as the base of a global anti-Western crusade whose 
goal is the ultimate expulsion of 'Atlantic' (read: 'American') influence 
from the continent. 
The goal of this paper is to outline the development of 
Eurasianist thought from its origins to the present day and to evaluate its 
impact on the contemporary Russian foreign policy discourse. 
The Slavophile-Westernizer Debate in the Middle of the 191h Century 
The Slavophile-Westernizer debate is rooted in the history of 
Russia since 1700s. Peter the Great's reforms brought Russia out of the 
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cultural isolation and stimulated the growth of the educated elite 
consisting of nobility and the petty service class. The Napoleonic wars of 
the early nineteenth century brought this educated elite into contact with 
the ideas of the French revolution, informing some of these young 
officers to call for reform and liberalization and eventually stage the 
Decembrist uprising of 1825. The reactionary policies adopted by Tsar 
Nicholas I in response to the revolt generated profound frustration and 
dissatisfaction among the educated elite. In that atmosphere, an intense 
intellectual debate erupted, concerning the very fundamentals of Russian 
history, Russia's place in Europe, and the paths of future development of 
the country. 
A catalyst for the debate was a book by Pyotr Chaadaev, titled 
Philosophical Letters and published in 1836. Chaadaev wrote about 
Russia's cultural isolation and backwardness, arguing that Russia had no 
past, present or future and had contributed nothing to world culture. 
According to Chaadaev, Russia had been shut out of the mainstream of 
history by Russian Orthodox religion, which encouraged a retreat from 
the world. Western culture, meanwhile, had benefited from the spirit 
underlying Western churches, which encouraged involvement in ethical 
and social issues of the time. Chaadaev was critical of Peter the Great's 
efforts to Westernize Russia, arguing that he had failed to civilize, 
providing instead only a superficial veneer of Westernization through 
imitation and importation. Chaadaev saw the value of Russian historical 
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experience exclusively in demonstrating to the rest of the world the 
frightening lesson of complete exclusion from the global spiritual unity.3 
Chaadaev's writings stimulated the growth of Westemizer 
thought. Key members were philosopher Herzen and historian Timofei 
Granovskiy, who was teaching at the Department of General History at 
the Moscow University. The West was the source of their inspiration, not 
so much because there they saw complete perfection in the Western 
model, but because they considered it as a more 'cultured', more 
progressive way of life. It was in the West that the beneficial fruits of 
Enlightenment were enjoyed at their fullest by the society. 
However, the Westemizers did not advocate slavish copying of 
all things W estem. This was evidenced in the writings of another leading 
Westenizer, Belinskiy: "It is time for us to cease admiring everything 
European simply because it is not Asiatic and to admire, respect, and 
seek it simply because it is 'human', rejecting on those grounds 
everything European that is not human as vigorously as we would reject 
everything Asiatic that is not human".4 
Above all, the Westemizers upheld the ideals ofpersonalliberty 
and social freedom as essential conditions for the development of Russia. 
However, while some found that woes of Russia were due to 
'insufficient' westernization, others saw them as a result of the 
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'excessive ' westernization. This pattern of thought was termed 
'Siavophile' and was touted as the alternative to the Westemizers. 
The Slavophiles, led by Alexei Khomiakov and lvan Kireevsky, 
felt that Russia should follow its own path, one based on the superior 
values and principles embodied in Russian Orthodoxy and expressed in 
institutions such as the family and the peasant commune. According to 
the Slavophiles, the Orthodox Church consisted of a congregation of 
individuals who, renouncing personal egoism and individuality, 
voluntarily entered into an organic union based on love, common faith, 
customs and values. Individuals became part of a greater whole and 
shared in a wisdom and spiritual truth that could be found only in the 
Church. 
Such ideal social bonds contrasted with those present in the 
West, according to the Slavophiles. The West embodied individualism 
and rationalism, where individuals were bound together not by a 
community of moral values but by contracts, interests and laws that 
demanded obedience. The Slavophiles argued that the problems of the 
West such as social conflict and isolation of the individual from the 
society were rooted in the Western Church, where external authority 
replaced a free and organic union. The Slavophiles believed that during 
Peter the Great's reign such an organic relationship had been destroyed, 
as the government had invaded the people's domain.5 
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At the heart of the Westernizer-Slavophile debate was the 
fundamental issue: What is Russia's role in history? While the 
Westernizers answered that Russia could play an important historical 
role only if it followed the path that Peter the Great had prescribed, 
Slavophiles answered that Russia could aspire to a great role in the future 
only if it stayed true to its unique traditions and avoided excessive 
westernization. This debate flared up in new forms and with new 
intensity in the 201h century. 
Eurasianism After the Russian Revolution 
The internal contradictions of the Russian Empire were resolved, 
for better or worse, in the revolutions of 1917 that brought an end to the 
tsarist regime. A large number of Russian intellectuals chose to flee 
Russia in the face of the Bolshevik victory. Eurasianism emerged as an 
ideological trend in the 1920s among Russian emigrates abroad. Their 
isolation from the homeland along with an acute sense of catastrophic 
character of the changes generated by the First World War and the 
revolution in Russia, served as a strong stimulus for the attempts of the 
exiles to understand their lot. The futility of overcoming Bolshevism by 
means of weapons being obvious in the 1920s, it led to setting the goal of 
overcoming it spiritually. Previous ideological approaches seemed 
inadequate under those conditions and required total innovation. It was 
the. Eurasianist who made an attempt at such innovation. 
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Eurasianism was heavily influenced by geopolitical theoreticians 
like Danilevsky and Mackinder. Mackinder held that the "Eurasian 
Heartland", spanning across Europe and Asia, had natural and climatic 
features which had shaped the common characteristics of economic, 
cultural and political development of the peoples living there. Its 
geographic integrity with the steppe as a common factor determined the 
unity of their historical development and ethno-psychological features, 
religious beliefs and languages which were formed under the influence of 
the environment. 
According to Nikolai Trubetzkoy, one of the founders of 
Eurasianism, the origins of the Eurasian identity dated back not to 
Kievan Rus, but rather to the Empire of Genghis Khan, which played an 
important role in the state formation of Muscovite Russia and preserved 
the Russian Orthodox Church under the conditions of religious and 
military threat from the 'Latin West'. The Moscow State became the 
direct successor of the Empire. Thus, the Eurasians considered the 
nomadic peoples to be an active subject of the Russian historical process 
and evaluated the impact of the 'Tartar yoke ' as positive at least to some 
extent.6 
In the view of the Eurasianists, the westernization of Russia, 
started by Peter the Great and continued by his successors, resulted in 
distorting Russia' s Eurasian originality and contaminating the national 
self-consciousness of the intelligentsia who uncritically adopted Western 
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pattems.7 This led to a cultural split between the lower and upper classes 
and eventually resulted in the 1917 revolution. But the raging 
revolutionary storm contributed to freeing Russia's Eurasian essence 
from the superficial European touch. According to the Eurasianist 
historians, the future was to reveal Russia-Eurasia global mission: to 
become the center of attraction for non-European peoples in the struggle 
between the West and the East. 
The Eurasianists, sharing a "catastrophic perception" of the 
ongoing global changes, strove for a new understanding of the cultural-
historical ideal that was to become a foundation for the spiritual 
overcoming of Bolshevism. It was supposed to be based on the notions 
of Russia as a great-power, nationalist Orthodox state.8 
The concept of 'Moscow as the Third Rome', and thus the 
guardian of Christian Orthodoxy, fitted perfectly in this perspective. 
Having borrowed this idea from the Slavophiles, the Eurasianists adapted 
it to modem conditions. Messianism was another characteristic feature of 
Eurasianist thinking. According to them, a special mission had been 
predetermined by Providence and by historical fate for the Russian 
people. The mission was to show the world the way out of the global 
crisis unleashed by the world war.9 Eurasianist ideas were destined to 
remain without practical applications to reality until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
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Eurasianism in Post-Communist Russia 
With the fall of Communism, geopolitics came to be regarded as 
an important frame of reference for foreign policy makers. Andrei 
Kozyrev, Russia' s foreign minister in the early 1990's, stated barely a 
month after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, "We rapidly come to 
understand that geopolitics ... is replacing [the communist] ideology". 10 
After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, 
Russia found itself in a new international situation. It was reduced in 
geographic size. While a number of important seaports and military 
bases were lost, there appeared an enclave of the Kaliningrad Region, 
isolated from Russia by Belarus and Lithuania. Further, Russia was 
deprived of her Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern and Central Europe, while 
obtaining along its new 'transparent' boundaries a number of states with 
unfriendly governments (especially in the Baltic States). 
Faced with these challenges in the early 1990s, Russian foreign 
policy makers conceptually divided Russia's international environment 
into two zones. Former republics of the Soviet Union were termed to be 
the 'near abroad', while the rest of the world was the 'far abroad'. In the 
euphoria of the early post-Soviet years, many Russian diplomats 
wishfully thought that the former Soviet republics, grateful to Moscow 
for their freedom and sharing the same past, would opt for the retention 
of 'fraternal bonds' with the Russian metropole.11 Also, there were the 
hopes that with end of the 'Cold War' the West would become for new 
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Russia a reliable political ally, a generous donor, and an ideal model for 
imitation in matters of social and economic development. Needless to 
say, none of these hopes have materialized in its entirety. 
In the aftermath of the loss of prestige on the world stage, 
Eurasianist thinking provided an attractive alternative model for Russia. 
Eurasianism was capturing the imagination of members of the Russian 
political elite, and today counts many adherents at the top levels of 
Russian policy-makers. They range from such figures as the leader of the 
Communist Party, which is by far the largest political organization in 
Russia today. Gennadi Zyuganov, its chairman, has published a 
geopolitical manifesto, The Geography of Victory, in which he 
abandoned anything resembling traditional communist doctrine. "We live 
in an era where geopolitics is literally knocking at the door, and ignoring 
it would be not just a mistake, but a crime", stated Zyuganov in the 
introduction to his manifesto. 12 Some commentators found Eurasianist 
sympathies in the policies of Russia's Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov. 
His policies fitted the Eurasianist doctrine so neatly that it was hard not 
to view Primakov as one of the movement's backers, although he has 
never publicly stated his position on the theory. 13 
One of the primary proponents of Eurasianism in modem Russia 
is an increasingly influenti~l former historian Aleksandr Dugin. He has 
updated Eurasianism by dropping its initial postulate about the eternal 
hostility of Russia and the West as a whole. Instead, he speaks about the 
Eurasianism in Russian Foreign Policy 225 
concentration of what he calls 'the world evil' in the major naval powers 
of the West- Great Britain and the United States. He argues that Russia 
should form an alliance with continental Europe against those Atlantic 
powers, an alliance which would seek both ideological and geoeconomic 
dominance in world affairs. According to Dugin, the economic strength 
of the naval powers is based on their control of the oceans. In response, 
Russia should lead Eurasia in creating east-west and north-south land 
transport networks.14 
Finally, there was a widespread feeling that the pro-Western 
approach to foreign policy had overestimated the 'commonality of 
interests' between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. The fact that 
no significant external economic assistance (on the scale of a Marshall 
Plan) had been provided to help Moscow's post-communist transition 
was seen as a concrete example of the distance still existing between 
Russia and the West. 15 
Therefore, since mid-1992, an increasing number of influential 
foreign policy thinkers and members of the political elite began to call 
for a new foreign policy, capable of reasserting Russia's role as an 
'independent' (from the West) and distinct great power. Eurasianist 
thought could be seen as gaining positions in the hearts and minds of the 
foreign policy elite. 
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The growing influence of the Eurasianists brought about the 
formation of a new national consensus on foreign policy based on three 
fundamental principles. First, owing to the uniqueness of its geopolitical 
position and cultural heritage, Russia's foreign policy cannot be oriented 
exclusively toward the West. Instead, Russia has to behave as a 
'Eurasian ' great power. Second, the two overriding priorities of Russia's 
foreign policy are the preservation of the country's territorial integrity 
and the maintenance of Russian influence in the 'near abroad' (former 
Soviet Union). Third, while cooperation with the West is necessary, it 
should be ' conditional' and based on the principles of 'equality' and 
recognition of mutual interests. 
Principal attention was given to relations with the ' near abroad'. 
New attempts were made to reconstruct an economiC and political space 
under Russia' s hegemony. The territories of the former Soviet Union 
were officially proclaimed an area of exclusive Russian influence, which 
paved the way for active Russian military involvement in settling violent 
. conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan. The policy of great power 
in the ' near abroad' was accompanied by a stronger reliance on the 
military and by a consolidation of the anti-Western constituencies at 
home after the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections. Moscow's policy 
of assertiveness culminated in 1994 in the military intervention in 
Chechnya. 
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To sum up, contemporary Eurasianism stresses Russia's 
geopolitical and cultural 'distinctiveness' in contrast with the 
Westemizers' insistence on Russia's basic affinity with the West. 
Eurasianism implies that Russia's main priority is control over the 
former Soviet space, rather than integration with Europe. In the 
Eurasianist vision of the world, Russia is an independent pole in a global 
multipolar system, with the right to decide matters of international 
importance on an equal basis with the other great powers (poles), 
including Europe, China and Japan. 
The tide of Russian foreign policy debates since 1991 has been 
characterized by the . clash between the two different conceptions of 
Russia's place in the world: one which acknowledges that Russia can be 
a 'normal' great power by becoming closely integrated to Europe and the 
West; the other which emphasizes that Russia has a unique identity 
distinct from the West and can be a great power only by preserving its 
uniqueness, rather than by following the Western and European path. 
The present Russian political leadership seeks to combine both of these 
perspectives in their foreign policies which are marked, above all, by 
pragmatism 
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